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TINDEMANS CRITICIZES LACK OF JOINT POSITION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 28-29 Sep 80 p 1

[Commentary by Leo Tindemans: "Europe and Its Security"]

[Text] Strangely enough, it is in the foreign policy sector--matters not governed by a treaty--that we have recently arrived at a common European position. It is with regret that I must express a great disappointment, namely the recent meeting of the United Nations devoted to the north-south dialog.

The European Community reacted as one to the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. However, the differences in views continue to be important when it comes to evaluating the present international situation. No common position was adopted with regard to the Soviet Union, nor have we managed to clearly define our relations with the United States.

Of greater concern is the evolution of the defense of Europe question concerning which we are no longer able to find a common position. The production and installation of midrange missiles in this respect is a current very well known example. There is no longer even a common strategic plan for Europe. Closer collaboration in the military sector would permit us to give our defense greater credibility and to economize which, in these times of budgetary difficulties, is not to be disregarded.

Today if I had to write a new report on the European Union, I would certainly give even greater attention to the problem of Europe's security.

Since the Cuban crisis, about 20 years ago, the international situation has never been as instable as it is today.

The troubles in the Middle East, the occupation of Afghanistan, the failed putsch in Saudi Arabia, the death of Marshal Tito, the economic problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where foreign policy serves as a distraction, the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the uncertainties of U.S. foreign policy and the possible proliferation of atomic weapons are so many factors which make our age a dangerous age.

Europe will be unable to react in a satisfactory manner unless it shows itself to be more unified in all sectors.

However, a European foreign policy continues to be necessary, even if we set aside these tensions and events. There are many persons throughout the world who are turning their eyes toward Europe and consider it a possible alternative. The Lome Convention can be cited as an example in this regard.

Europe could play a much more active role in Africa. There is no need to recall here that Central America and South America feel themselves culturally closer to Europe than to North America.

I would be remiss were I to fail to emphasize that a European security policy is not incompatible with the maintenance of solidarity with the United States. On the contrary. In my report on the European Union, I had suggested that Europe as early as possible should select four sectors in which it would speak with one voice. Two of these four sectors were relations with the United States and relations with the Middle East. If these suggestions had been duly followed we would not have to improvise so much today. More than ever, the Western democracies should help one another and be mutually supportive.

A neutralist current is developing in Europe. Others are now discovering Europe and its possible autonomy, a discovery which is accompanied by an aggressive attitude toward the United States.

For some, it seems that Europe should serve as an alibi to weaken or torpedo the Atlantic Alliance. In this event, a policy of peace can only give birth to a defeatist current. History has moreover told us what price we must at times pay when vigilance goes to sleep and the will gives in.

Leo Tindemans
President CVB

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CSO: 3100

NEOFASCIST PARTIES, CONTACTS IN WEST EUROPE SURVEYED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Oct 80 pp 46-53

[Article on the international of extreme rightists and neo-Nazis in European countries: "'Long Live Fascism'"]

[Text] Eyes front, the soldiers are marching in cadence through the countryside. All are in combat dress, most are carrying submachineguns. Upon command, they drop to the ground, crawl through the mud and jump up again. There follows target practice with the "MP 40" and later individual close-combat training.

The recruits, 75 neo-Nazis from West Germany, France and Belgium, in the summer of last year engaged in exercises for underground warfare in the woods of the Ardennes on the German-Belgian border.

The training was under the direction of the extreme rightist Vlaamse Militantenorde (VMO), a paramilitarily drilled Flemish troop of ruffians concentrated in Antwerp.

The self-appointed leader of the about 300 men strong force is Bert Erickson, 49, owner of the Antwerp cafe Odal--the name of the German rune which is the VMO emblem. Meanwhile the organization has become an important fulcrum of Europe's growing force of neo-Nazis.

"I am also a member of the Hoffmann military sports group," VMO member Michel Graisse admitted a couple of days after the bloodbath at the Munich Oktober-Wies'n on Belgian television when the contacts between the assassin and the Hoffmann group had become apparent.

Graisse, responsible for VMO international liaison, left unanswered the question as to whether the addition to the German Viking Youth young fighters of the Hoffmann group or perhaps also the Munich assassin Gundolf Koehler had gone in for military sports with VMO.

It is clear, however, that the various neo-Nazi groups are in contact with one another, that some of their actions and attacks are planned and executed on an international scale--a completely new phenomenon for the pursuers concentrating on border-transgressing terrorism of extreme leftists.

After the massacre at the Bologna railroad station on 2 August, at which 84 persons died, the main suspect was traced to Nice. He was in contact with French Police Inspector Paul-Louis Durand, 25, a leading member of the French neo-Nazi group Federation d'action nationale europeenne (FANE).

At the same time French neo-Nazis in Paris committed arson on behalf of Italian rightist terrorist Mario Tuti, and extreme rightists blew up a printing works in Marseilles.

In Italy and France alone, according to police estimates, 20 to 30 extreme rightist groups each are operating, with their actions becoming bolder almost every time. They appear to have a well-constructed international information system enabling them time and again to undermine the investigative work of the police.

The German neo-Nazi Ekkehard Weil, who had gone underground last year during prison leave, was arrested in Belgium in January. Manfred Roeder, the founder of several ultraright groups, in 1978 first left for Switzerland and then for Denmark to join persons of like mind.

Arms aid is also being offered by various Spanish, Italian and French organizations, such as Occident in Paris. The roughly 200 neo-Nazis imprisoned in West Germany are also being cared for from abroad, with donations coming from organizations in the United States or Belgium or from a foundation administered by the former South Tirolean layer of bombs Norbert Burger.

In other words, the scene is chequered, with the spectrum comprising the racist National Front in Britain on the fringe of Europe as well as the Grey Wolves of the Turkish fascist Turkish. But there is a lack of reliable data on the scope and degree of organization of this bizarre neo-Nazi international. For until the massacres of Bologna and Munich the protectors of state and constitution as well as politicians and the public did not really take the neo-Nazis seriously; they were often considered crackpots, and, to be sure, their only nostalgically blown up ideology has far less substance than the anticapitalism of the extreme leftists, and their intellectual and organizational assets are smaller.

As recently as 3 weeks after the contact with French policeman Durand had been uncovered, French Minister of the Interior Christian Bonnet expressed the opinion that the extreme rightists were no "real danger" since most groups were operating as movements "within the legal framework of the republic." Their significance was played down similarly by the ministries in Italy and Spain when neofascist activities were discussed.

The 170-page 1979 annual report of the Bonn Office for the Protection of the Constitution covers the international cross-connections of West German neo-Nazis on three typewritten pages--a document of federal bureaucratic ignorance.

For example, it claims that the Swiss Nazi sympathizer Gaston-Armand Amaudruz, 59, resident in Lausanne, whom the Berlin Police Department classifies as "definitely harmless," is an important liaison man of the ultra-rightists.

And the Belgian VMO, important for the new Nazi international, is erroneously confused with the annual fairly harmless Flemish People's Militia gathering at Diksmuiden. About the paramilitary Ardennes training near La-Roche, the people from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution did not know anything.

The ignorance prevalent among West European government organs about rightist terrorism is the inevitable result of the misjudgment of the extreme right movement in Europe during the past 20 years, when it was generally classified as veterans cliques of incorrigible old fascists.

Now police and security forces realize that the official parties of the extreme right operating on the fringe of legality have been important way stations for terrorism.

Whereas in West Germany militant neo-Nazis left the continually unsuccessful NPD only in the past few years and went underground, in Italy, France and Greece the borderlines between legal party activity and the underground have not been clear all along.

Despite the fact that the Italian constitution prohibits "reestablishment of the dissolved Fascist Party in any form," the veteran Fascist Giorgio Almirante managed to build up his neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) as the biggest extreme rightist party in Common Market Europe. With not quite 2 million votes it became and remained Italy's fourth strongest party.

Almirante's strategy adheres to the principles of Mussolini in his early days: in times of crisis, acts of violence are to increase the unrest among the population and create a climate of polarization.

In the early 1970's the bomb terrorism between the underground forces of the extreme right and the Red Brigades of the extreme left escalated to almost civil war. Neo-Fascists murdered innocent civilians in the street, and the extreme leftists countered with arson.

All attempts to ban the MSI have foundered to this day, though a judicial investigation reached the conclusion that the party "glorifies the aims of Fascism" and uses "violence as a political means."

The most important liaison man of the MSI with the legal organizations abroad was Pino Rauti, today an MSI deputy in the parliament in Rome. He began his career as a contact man with the Germans during the time of the Nazis. Already at that time he had distinguished himself with several books as an admirer of Hitler. His books--for example, the "Elements of the Fascist Racial Theory"--were also translated into German.

As early as 1956, Rauti founded a Nazi fighting force oriented toward German drill and blind obedience--the Ordine Nuovo--a precursor and prototype of fraternal organizations elsewhere in Europe. Rauti's men wore swastikas and read Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

When the Ordine Nuovo was banned in 1973, Rauti became a member of Almirante's MSI, but most of his comrades preferred to fight on underground--in illegal terrorist groups such as the Ordine Nero commando or the Nuclei armati rivoluzionari (NAR), now probably the best organized internationally active fighting group of the extreme right in Italy. It is also being blamed for the bomb attack in Bologna.

In Italy too, the prosecutors proceeded much more cautiously against the extreme rightists than against the extreme leftists. Of an average 150 indictments of neo-Fascists in Milan per year, 148 did not lead to any sentencing.

And when there was a threat of a sentence on occasion, the defendant vanished to a foreign country, with neofascists in Greece and Spain offering a little vacation spot.

Until the fall of the regime of the Athens colonels in July 1974, according to the expert on Italy Petra Rosenbaum, "Athens was the capital of the black international, a Mecca for Italian Fascists in search of money and arms."

After the end of the military dictatorship, Italian emigres helped their Greek friends build up new organizations.

The chief organizer was the deputy chairman of Ordine Nuovo, Elio Massagrande, who gave the Greek groups the same name of "new order"--Nea Taxis. Headquarters was the bar Verona in the old town of Athens, where Massagrande served fascist propaganda material as well as spaghetti al sugo.

Later the Karamanlis government expelled the active Italian. His aide Aristoteles Kalentzis was arrested and sentenced after a series of bomb attacks. Today he occupies a cell adjoining those of former dictators Papadopoulos and Pattakos in the Korydallos Prison in Piraeus.

At the initiative of the leader of the Spanish fascist party Fuerza Nueva, Blas Pinar, neofascist and extreme rightist parties in Latin Europe have combined in an umbrella organization called Eurodestra with headquarters in Madrid.

Comparable to Almirante's MSI, Blas Pinar's party too (with 2 percent of the vote) has an illegal wing cooperating closely with rightist military people, intelligence and security police. "Before our secret dossiers land on the desks of the minister of defense or prime minister," says a democratically minded member of the General Staff in Madrid, "a copy is already on the table of Blas Pinar."

In the past 4 years Franco fascists have built up about 20 parliamentary organizations, notably their youth group Fuerza Joven. With about 3,000 members, it is a force, with a strict hierarchy, of staunch youths, mostly sons of high-level military people and policemen.

Despite the fact that the wearing of uniforms by civilians was banned in Spain, the youths assemble every year at Madrid military headquarters on Hitler's birthday, wearing SS-like uniforms with swastika armbands. After all, a young orator professed, Hitler "fell defending Europe."

In April of last year a member of the Fuerza Joven stabbed a young worker to death with an SS dagger in the center of Madrid. "I killed him because he looked at me deprecatingly," the murderer said later explaining his motive.

Meanwhile the senator of the Region of Navarra has inquired of the government in Madrid what it intends to do when fascist youth gangs "armed with sticks of iron, chains, knives and handguns" attack the towns, "threatening and beating inhabitants, slashing tires and smashing store windows."

Like the young neo-Nazis in Belgium, the Spanish young fascists train in camps under the direction of old Franco fighters. Germans are in charge of the youth camp of "Holy Mary of Fresh Air" in the Escorial, 35 kilometers from Madrid. There are strict "Commander Walter," a former SS officer who speaks Spanish well, trains the young fascists to fight decadence and communism.

"On Sundays we go by bus to the mountains of Madrid," says a young fascist, "and for a start practice with baseball bats on dummies. After lunch, there is theoretical instruction, and then close combat, with the leader choosing the most courageous among us for a later commando."

After what they go through in the training camp, the indoctrinated youth are so whipped up that they often hit at random. Thus 13 Fuerza Joven members in the City Park of Madrid attacked a pair of lovers, bashing in the skull of the man with a baseball bat whose handle was inscribed with the words "Long Live Fascism." Later the culprits stated that they had wanted to purge the park of "undesirable elements."

This year 21 people have been tortured and killed by neofascists in Spain. The culprits also included foreigners seeking to liaison with the "Black International," the illegal sister organization of the Eurodestra.

An important turntable of the militant Eurofascists is "Cedade," the "Spanish circle of Friends of Europe," founded in Barcelona in 1960 with the approval of the Franco regime.

The association reportedly already had 2,500 members and supporters 5 years ago, predominantly anti-Semitic old and new Nazis devoted to National Socialist ideas. The association also maintains an "SD" subdivision in which about 200 lifeguards are trained and learn military skills for action some place in West Europe. "From Rome to Paris, from Madrid to Lisbon, the bloodthirsty fascist and Nazi-type killers are connected as if through an invisible spider's web," wrote the Italian magazine PANORAMA when first traces of the Bologna assassins led to Nice on the Cote d'Azur, to the secret headquarters of French extreme rightists going back to the time of the OAS. In France, Police Inspector Durand had already been active for several years as a leading member of FANE. Shortly before the attack he had been in Bologna, and he was acquainted with the main suspect, Marco Affatigato, apprehended in Nice.

Until it was banned 4 weeks ago, FANE had been considered the probably most brutal of all extreme rightist groups in France. Its leader was Michel Leloup, who wore a gray suit with white shirt and tie and who had earthily northernized his name to "Marc Fredriksen."

While Fredriksen-Leloup's organization did not manage to come up with more than about 260 members, wearing black shirts, riding breeches and boots, their ideology, typical of French neo-Nazis, is uncommonly aggressive and above all anti-Semitic.

Over Fredriksen's apartment in the 10th arrondissement in Paris one can see the slogans "One race, one battle--"Israel must be destroyed." Festive occasions take place in the name of "our Fuehrer and Adolf Eichmann."

Boldly FANE claimed credit for having committed several attacks of arson in Paris. In the past few months 67 Jewish personages at the Cote d'Azur received letters threatening their lives bearing the FANE emblem--arrows and faces in a circle, topped by an eagle.

The last sentence in each instance read: "We have only one god--Adolf Hitler."

After evidence pointed to connections between FANE and the Italian terrorists, Minister of the Interior Bonnet decided to have the group banned.

German pursuers regard the ban as an "important blow against the international Nazi movement" because there existed "very close entanglements with German groups."

FANE even had considered itself "in charge of the project of creating an umbrella organization," the FRG Prosecutor General's office suspects, with divisions and departments of its own designed to "comprise, if possible, all groupings of the neo-Nazi type in the West European sphere."

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FORMER FANE, NEO-NAZI TERRORIST HAS TIES WITH GERMAN GROUPS

Paris 1. 'HUMANITE' in French 7 Oct 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Pierre Durand: "A Nazi at Large"]

[Text] FANE leader Michel Caignet has as much freedom of movement in Giscardian France as he has in Social-Democratic Germany.

The end of the election campaign in West Germany permitted us to take a closer look at the activities of the neo-Nazi whose publications are circulating in broad daylight in the FRG but some of whose activities, under the pressure of public opinion, have at times been the subject of criminal prosecution. Thus the trial of five neo-Nazis opened on 30 September 1980 in the High Court of Celle, near Hanover. They are charged with having committed two bombings, one on 2 September 1977 in Flensburg (Schleswig-Holstein), the other in Hanover (Lower Saxony) on 21 October 1977. There seems to be no doubt about their guilt, and it is rather the slowness of the hearing which could be a cause for astonishment.

What interests us about this case is that investigation permitted establishment of the fact that this neo-Nazi group, whose leader is Paul Otto, was in touch with other Hitlerian organizations (they are particularly active in the northern part of the FRG) which themselves are in constant contact with French fascists, particularly those of the FANE (Federation for Nationalist European Action), which was recently dissolved but which does not seem to have come out of it any the worse for wear.

One of the neo-Nazi groups is headed by Gunnar Pahl (Wiking Turn 10/2-2380 Schleswig) who describes himself as a "national-socialist and an enemy of the system." All of his correspondence is written on paper bearing a skull and crossbones. The Mayence court was to have heard his case last August; however, here too, things are being dragged out.

This man Gunnar Pahl received letters from one of his French counterparts, Michel Caignet. Caignet (who writes German very well and Germanizes his first name to Michael) is none other than the former leader of the FANE of which he seems to be one of the most active members, with responsibility in particular for liaison with West German terrorists. Arrested with several associates following the recent antisemitic attacks in Paris, he was soon released.

Profiting from our presence in the FGR, it seemed to us worthwhile to investigate his case, insofar as this was possible. You will see what a journalist can accomplish--the police could have done this much more easily--and you will note in these days of "antiterrorist Europolice" that there are targets which are paid little attention, both in Paris and Bonn.

An Investigation by Military Security

In 1977, in the Hamburg region, there lived a journalist specialized in agricultural matters, the owner of a publishing house and a confirmed Nazi, the author, in particular, of a book, "Conscience de Race" [Race Consciousness]. His name is Thies Christopherson; and, at that time, Caignet was working for him. French military security should take note of the following circumstances.

Artilleryman Michel Caignet performed his military service in the 16th Artillery Regiment, based in Zweibrücken (Deux-Ponts) in the FGR. Since he spoke and wrote German well, he even became the secretary of his chiefs. But Caignet was not only a passable Germanist (he was planning to pursue his higher studies of German in Kiel); he was also as much of a Nazi as anyone could be.

The investigation by military security also established the fact that since his youth he had been attracted by Hitlerian racist theories and that he had made many trips to Germany (principally to Ulm, Lindau, Würzburg, etc.) during the preceding years. In Germany, he kept close company with one Yvo Baudler, who seems to have introduced him into West German fascist circles.

If Caignet got into trouble with military security it was because he had been stupid enough to "decorate" his room with crossbones and Hitlerian slogans. There was an investigation; the guilty party was easily exposed; and Michael Caignet was quietly transferred to the 22d RIMA [Marine Corps Regiment] (1st Company, 1st Section) in Albi. When someone would have us believe that in France the police are not up on the curriculum vitae of the neo-Nazis, forgive us if we do not believe it.

A Too Talkative Nazi?

But there is more. While Caignet was performing his military service in the FRG, he was in contact by letter with a man named Alex Kuhl, a Nazi

fanatic, who talked of nothing but exterminating the "reds" as soon as possible. This Kuhl had been arrested (he exaggerated, even in the eyes of the Bonn authorities); and he spent some time in the Neumünster prison.

It seems that he was rather talkative and that the police services noted that he maintained close correspondence with Caignet and two other French fascists, Robert Yver and Bruno Renault. He is also said to have revealed that Caignet was one of the most active members of "Peiper combat groups" about which we know that they engaged in many assassination attacks in France.

Axel Kuhl, long since released from prison, is traveling a great deal between the FRG and France; and it is possible that he had a residence in Paris.

Missed Meeting in Frankfurt

On 27 September 1980, Michel Caignet was invited to a neo-Nazi meeting in Frankfurt am Main. His announced presence--he participates in many meetings of this kind in the FRG and is in touch with Belgian, American (including those of the Ku Klux Klan) Nazis and others, if we are to believe those in Frankfurt who are closely interested in Hitlerian quarters--has not been confirmed. It is true that at the same time the fascist assassination attacks in Paris took place and that Michel Caignet was vaguely heard about by the police...

In any case, Caignet does indeed seem to be one of the key figures of fascist terrorism. The FANE bulletin, NOTRE EUROPE [Our Europe], director, Marc Frederiksen; editor in chief, Michel Leloup (one and the same man), reports his presence on 21 June 1980 at a "summer solstice party" in the Lyons region where, at the same time, attacks were made against monuments of the Resistance. A West German delegation from the Nazi organization, "Jung Front," took part in these attacks. Caignet gave a speech there: "After an appeal to the martyrs who fell for National-Socialist Europe, the audience broke out in song. ('J'Avais Un Camarade' [I Had A Comrade], an old German military song) The ceremony ended with song of loyalty and the FANE anthem, followed, for our German friends, by the 'Horst Wessel Lied' (Nazi Party anthem.)"

Any exaltation of national-socialism and racism is forbidden by law in France. Judging by what we see, we would not say so. Even if in this country it is only "propaganda"... even if the small groups in question, which consist of only a few dozen adventurers in search of excitement [en mal d'aventures], does not amount to much. The police and the courts would have little difficulty rendering them harmless, if a responsible government really wanted this.



The cake with a skull and crossbones of a small Nazi group in the West German "sanctuary", that of the Hoffmann organization. Michel Caignet cultivates contacts with personalities of this kind. But who, in fact, is leading West Germany? It is Social-Democrat Schmidt, is it not?

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CSO: 3100

LEFTIST LEADER EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH PALESTINIANS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Sep 80 p 4

/Article: "Lyssaridis in a Talk with AL-SAFIR: We Aspire to the Day When We will Celebrate a Liberated Palestine--and a United Cyprus"/

/Text/ The chairman of the Cypriot Socialist Party, Dr Vassos Lyssaridis, declared that Israel is trying to establish an entity like itself in Lebanon in the name of the Christians and that Sa'd Haddad is trying to do in Lebanon what Denktash did in Cyprus, with the cooperation of Turkey and American imperialism.

Lyssaridis, who was the private physician of the late president Archbishop Makarios, criticized "those who believe that negotiations with and concessions to imperialism can create a national presence," stressing that struggle alone will create a national presence and enable peoples to dominate their territory and their country.

He said that he aspires to the day when the Arab and Cypriot fighting people will celebrate a liberated Palestine and a united Cyprus.

This took place in a conversation AL-SAFIR held with Dr Lyssaridis before he went to Beirut, as follows:

/Question/ Has it been discovered who attacked your home last 24 August in the village of Brodros?

/Answer/ So far, no, but it is clear that the forces behind this episode are those which tried to impose solutions upon Cyprus to turn it into a springboard for a military policy against the progressive forces in the region. As for who is pulling the trigger, that is not important--what is important is who was standing behind the attempt, which was an imperialist operation.

/Question/ What are your conceptions of the future as regards the situation in Cyprus?

/Answer/ They will try to impose a fait accompli on the island through phoney negotiations to give American president Jimmy Carter an excuse to increase military and political aid to Turkey, so they can prevent the problem from being debated in the United Nations, because they are trying gradually to sanctify the occupation and turn it into a fait accompli.

He said, "The Arab nation especially understands that hostile forces are trying to prepare the way to establish the principle that aggression and occupation can create rights, as they did in the case of Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem. However, these forces must understand that efforts aimed at establishing this principle will meet with responses from the popular forces, which are not prepared to agree to the continued perverse conditions."

He added, "It is well known that there are two contradictory lines in Cyprus today. First is the line of those who think, consciously or unconsciously, that offering concessions to imperialism will lead to a solution allowing us a national presence, and the second is the line of those who believe that eliminating imperialism and its ramifications will provide us with the circumstances necessary for an independent national presence."

He continued, "Imperialism is trying to stifle the voice of the people holding to this line, but we say that death will not stay the struggle. Rather, it will increase its force, and for this reason the negotiations underway will fail. It is naive to believe that imperialism, or Turkey, which is its surrogate, will abandon its designs through good will. Rather, the abandonment will occur when imperialism realizes that attaining its desires is not possible, and that will be when the progressive forces defeat the imperialist designs and create social and economic circumstances which will enable the island to remain and prevent the occurrence of a collapse which the forces of neoimperialism expect, enabling them to buy Cyprus with annual aid."

/Question/ Do you expect a new Turkish aggression?

/Answer/ Not in the near future, because the political climate now does not permit that, and the circumstances of the Turkish Cypriots in the free zone do not permit them to do so. Nonetheless, Turkey may try to create pretexts. The Arabs remember how many times Israel declared that it had no designs on Arab territories, but always made repeated aggressions and new acts of expansion.

/Question/ How do you view the domestic situation in Cyprus?

/Answer/ I do not expect a military confrontation or acts of violence of any kind to occur, but political contradictions exist and severe political struggles will occur.

/Question/ What are your expectations about the future of Lebanon and the Palestinian cause?

/Answer/ Anyone who has good will or illusions about Israel's intentions must review them now that Israel has ventured to incorporate Jerusalem. I do not believe that Israel will change its face. al-Sadat's treason has become plainer and there is an axis comprised of the United States, Israel, Turkey and Somalia. The imperialists are trying to explode the stability in the region by exploiting different aspects of factionalism and nationalism in every country and using right-wing groups factionalist or racist in origin.

He said, "Sa'd Haddad is trying to do in Lebanon what Denktash is trying to do in Cyprus, and both will fail, although they are able to stir up trouble. Israel's attempt to implant a body similar to it in Lebanon in the name of Christianity will never deceive anyone."

/Question/ Is there a message you would like to direct to the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples?

/Answer/ I do not consider the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples to be a separate entity. We are united with them in our struggle against imperialism and Zionism and in the struggle to regain our usurped land and turn it into nations where the people control their resources. My message is optimism, although we must sacrifice with more blood because we have no choice but to continue the struggle for dignity.

Dr Lyssaridis concluded his statement by saying "I aspire to a day when we will celebrate a free Palestine and a free united Cyprus. The progressive Arab forces can rely on us in the common struggle, and solidarity is a true word for expressing our feelings."

11887
CSO: 4902

INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS RESUME IN NICOSIA

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 10 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Nicosia--Intercommunal talks for a peaceful solution to the question of Cyprus began yesterday at 1000 in Nicosia. The Turkish negotiator Umit Onan and the Greek Cypriot negotiator Yorgo Yuannidis met at 1000 at the Ledra Palace Hotel which is under the control of the United Nations.

In a statement just before entering the talks, Turkish negotiator Umit Onan stated that the issues of bi-zonality and security which had been the major sources of disagreement during the talks had now been resolved. Onan called this a very positive development. Saying that a solution based on bi-zonality and federalism would be discussed during the talks, Onan announced that he was hopeful for a lasting solution to the lengthy Cyprus problem at the end of serious consultations.

Also in a statement just before the talks, Greek negotiator Yorgo Yuannidis stated that he was hopeful that this time a peaceful solution would be found to the Cyprus problem. Saying that the Greek side was entering the talks with good intentions and that it was prepared to discuss all aspects of the question, Yuannidis stated that he believed that the Turkish side would behave in a similar manner.

Hugo Gobby who is special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations said before the meeting that a positive atmosphere had been brought about through the understanding demonstrated by the two parties. He added that it was important for this atmosphere to continue into the period in which specific discussions would be held. Stating that this could be achieved if the parties conducted themselves in a manner that would inspire confidence and abstained from acts that could arouse suspicions, Hugo Gobby added that great responsibilities had to be shouldered by the organs of the press and the media in bringing this about. Hugo Gobby also said that he and the secretary general of the United Nations would do all in their power to find a solution to the question of Cyprus.

The talks began following these remarks. Yesterday's brief discussions were opened by Hugo Gobby who read an opening statement by Kurt Waldheim,

the secretary general of the United Nations. Following the reading the discussions were adjourned until the resumption of specific discussions on Tuesday, 16 September.

The intercommunal talks began last year on 16 June. They were interrupted on 22 June following disagreements between the parties over the issues of bi-zonality and the security of the Turkish Community.

Gobby's opening statement is binding upon the Turkish as well as the Greek Cypriot side. Both parties have the right to register their reservations to what was said in the statement. The statement begins with a mention of United Nations efforts to bring about peace and continues as follows:

"The secretary general understands that the following common ground has been established between the two parties as the result of intense negotiations and that this common ground makes possible the start of the current discussions.

- a) Both parties have ratified once again the validity of the summit agreements of 12 February, 1977 and 19 May, 1979.
- b) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution to the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution to the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.
- c) Both parties have declared that the question of security will be raised and discussed during the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this topic will be discussed from an angle that takes into consideration certain practical difficulties that may confront the Turkish Community of Cyprus as well as the security of Cyprus as a whole. Both parties have asked the secretary general for a resumption of the intercommunal talks.

The implementation in practice of concepts delineated in paragraphs b and c will be determined in the course of wide ranging discussions focusing on the constitutional and territorial issues. This determination will be made following an examination of the positions and proposals that appear on each side's agenda in relation to those issues.

The secretary general of the United Nations understands that according to the summit agreement of 19 May, 1979, the following will appear among the topics to be discussed:

- a) The reopening to settlement of the Maras region under the supervision of the United Nations and in conformity with Article 5 of the summit agreement of 19 May, 1979.
- b) The initiation of confidence building and security enhancing measures by both sides for the purpose of a return to normality in conformity with Article 6 which states that special emphasis is to be placed on such measures,
- c) Constitutional issues,
- d) The territorial issue.

It is understood that all four issues will be considered simultaneously in successive meetings. Committees and working groups are to be formed by the participants at an appropriate and early stage in the discussions.

MILITARY SERVICE REDUCED BY TWO MONTHS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 9 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Nicosia--Military service in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has been shortened by another 2 months. Accordingly, effective 18 August 1980, military service for enlisted men will be 24 months while noncommissioned officers will serve 22 months. This decision was taken at a special meeting of the TFSC Council of Ministers which convened yesterday at 1200. The decision to shorten the duration of military service was taken in conformity with proposals and recommendations by the TFSC Security Forces Command. In accordance with the Law for Military Service published in Resmi Gazet on 13 May 1980, and in effect since that date, the duration of military service for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers is determined by the Council of Ministers within a framework of proposals and recommendations originating from the TFSC Security Forces Command.

Following the meeting that shortened military service for enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, Kenan Atakol who is minister of foreign affairs, defense and tourism stated that work had begun for the quick implementation of the decision. Kenan Atakol said that he hoped that the decision would be a fortunate one for the people and stated the following:

"In every case our government strives for the welfare of our people and in this case we wish to see an early participation by our youngsters in the economic life of the community. Working towards this goal and after having taken into consideration the recommendations of the Security Forces Command, a decision has been reached to reduce military service to 24 months for enlisted men and 22 months for noncommissioned officers. The decision goes into effect as of 18 August 1980. It is obvious that this decision will introduce new strength into our process of economic development at an earlier date without causing our state any difficulties in meeting its defense requirements."

Following the announcement by the Council of Ministers of reductions in military service, an overall happiness could be detected among the population. This was particularly true among those with children currently in

the armed forces and the parents of children who are of military age. Many individuals requested detailed information from newspaper offices and news centers either on the telephone or in person. The sensitivity of our people towards the duration of military service is well known. Following the adoption last May of the Law for Military Service, public opinion had been awaiting a decision that would determine this duration.

9491

CSO: 4907

DPP CHARGES BULLDOZERS GIVEN TO NUP MILITANTS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 2 Sep 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Nicosia--A press statement by the General Secretariat of the Democratic People's Party [DPP] announced the discovery of a 13 million lira impropriety following an investigation at the Office for Agricultural Equipment. The statement claims that the Ministry of Agriculture is particularly lax in providing an obstacle against administrative practices which provide special treatment to some individuals for political reasons. The statement claims that two bulldozers worth 13 million liras--one equipped with rubber tires and the other with tracks--are being turned over to NUP militants by the Office for Agricultural Equipment. The statement reads as follows:

"The results of an investigation by our party indicate that a bulldozer worth 3 million Turkish liras is being leased for a period of 3 years to Hursit Enver from Yesilkoy. The bulldozer is equipped with rubber tires and its license number is TDK 192. In taking delivery of the bulldozer, Hursit paid only 160,000 liras of the 400,000 lira cost of the lease. The other bulldozer which was worth 10 million liras and equipped with tracks was sold to Hasan Ozal of the NUP for next to nothing through a similar long-term installment sale. The decision to dispose of two vehicles that could otherwise have served the needs of the state or of farmers or that could have brought services to villages, is one that was taken without recourse to competitive bidding, behind closed doors, solely for the enrichment of certain individuals and in spite of the state. Should the DPP deem it necessary, a parliamentary investigation concerning relations between the Office for Agricultural Equipment and the Ministry of Agriculture as well as any possible improprieties that may be involved, will be requested."

For its part, the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy has announced in a brief statement to the press that it intends to reply today to the claims and the accusations made in the DPP press statement.

RADICAL LIBERAL DEFENSE EXPERT: USE MILITARY AS PEACE UNIT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 11 Sep 80 p 7

[Article by Flemming Ytzen: "A 'No-Growth' Solution to the Problem of Defense Will Constitute the Beginning of Genuine Disarmament"]

[Text] Before the negotiations concerning the future defense plan, the ruling Social Democratic Party talked a great deal about the need to give consideration to altering the nature and structure of the defense program. At the party congress which has just been concluded, the prime minister stuck to the basis for negotiation which the government has adhered to up to the present: the "no-growth" defense program which is made subject to the price index's fluctuations and which, indeed, entails an increase in defense expenditures of 800 million kroner, but which, according to the Defense Command's statements, will result in a considerable reduction of the existing strength and a decrease in the amount of materiel and the number of troops.

This paradoxical basis for the coming defense plan--increased expenditures but less strength--has caused the Radicals to issue the following statement in anticipation of the coming negotiations: the party desires a thoroughgoing structural change in the composition of the defense program.

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, who is the spokesman for the Radicals' defense policy, fastens upon the defense minister's statement: "We cannot do it all." Bilgrav commented on what the minister said in the following terms in the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"The defense minister and the government have now realized that means and goals should be brought into harmony with each other. In other words, we do not want to go on palming off a defense plan which only exists on paper on our NATO partners. It would be advantageous for the Liberal party and the Conservative People's Party if they would display the same honesty. In fact, the truth is that it also will be necessary to cut down the defense program even if the expenditures proposed by the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party are increased by from 3 to 5 percent per

year. On page 16 of Booklet No 1, which is concerned with long-term defense planning, it is stated that conforming with the defense law currently in force would call for an increase of 70 percent in expenditures for defense. In other words, anyone who asserts that current strength must be maintained must also proclaim his willingness to increase expenditures for defense by 70 percent. Otherwise, we cannot be considered trustworthy."

Protection of Sovereignty

The Radicals' call for a change in the structure of the defense program states that that program should consist of the amounts of material and the numbers of men which are necessary to maintain Danish sovereignty in a pre-war situation. In a situation where an international crisis existed, Denmark should be able to give preliminary warning of possible violations of her sovereignty in the hope that the conflict could be solved by diplomatic means. According to Bilgrav-Nielsen, a defense program should not have the capability of waging conventional war on Danish territory.

"The expression 'protection of sovereignty' has been the name given to the type of defense we want. It is not my own expression, but it certainly states our position quite well. Such protection of sovereignty could be used as an instrument for exercising control during a crisis in the period before war breaks out," says Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen.

"Are we not deceiving ourselves if we talk about maintaining sovereignty without being able to make use of conventional military forces?" he was asked.

"I agree that there should be a military capability which could be used in response to possible violations of our sovereignty, but we are not in a position to wage a real war. It will only be possible to use our military forces in a prewar situation for the purpose of emphasizing our desire for Danish independence and sovereignty. In case a critical situation escalates, we would be able to give warning for the purpose of invoking international public opinion, thereby bringing about initiatives which could reverse that escalation."

Threats of War

"Will our NATO allies then be able to claim that a Danish defense program of that kind would call for expansion of existing agreements regarding reinforcements, so that American Leathernecks would come to our relief even in a prewar situation?" Bilgrav-Nielsen was asked.

"I think that is a rather distorted way of describing the situation. I do not think that it will be possible to keep a war on Danish soil going by having a few depots in Jutland. If an enemy wants to occupy Denmark, it will happen so quickly and be accomplished with such effective means that

depots would be useless in any case. We would be doing ourselves a disservice if we would accede to a demand by our NATO allies that an altered defense structure could only be put into effect in Denmark on the condition that the possibility of reinforcement from outside be increased. That is a crazy piece of logic," he replied.

"It seems, in other words, that the protection of sovereignty you are talking about can only be used to guard our Great and Lesser Belts and our air space. Will its mission have been completed as soon as there are regular troops on Danish soil?" he was asked.

"If the enemy in question wishes to establish himself firmly on Danish soil, there is nothing we can do about it anyway. Our territorial area is too small for us to be able to keep a war going successfully on Danish soil," he replied.

"Isn't it a necessary condition of protection of sovereignty that we could unconditionally count on support from our NATO allies at the moment when a threat of invasion first hung over us?" he was asked.

"That depends upon whether or not one believes that it is military forces and an apparatus for making war which compels an adversary's respect," Bilgrav-Nielsen responded. "I do not think it is. The way things are, at present, it is not a threat of war which prevents adversaries from entering into armed conflicts."

"What is it, then?"

"It is the problems which result from occupying a foreign country in the first place. I am convinced that if the Soviet leaders could have foreseen what repercussions they would incur as a result of invading Afghanistan, I do not believe they would have done it. The Soviets' reactions in regard to Poland indicate that they were cautious. They had already gotten a Vietnam in Afghanistan, and they would hardly be able to stand having another one in eastern Europe," he said.

Disarmament

"It is a hackneyed expression to say that there is so much military technology now that we are able to exterminate the population of the entire globe several times over. The real threat of war lies more in the presence of these large quantities of weapons than it does in the existing international conflicts. For example, let us take the 572 NATO missiles which were the subject of such violent discussion this past winter. In my opinion, the danger with respect to those missiles lies not so much in their supposed explosive force as in the fact that they cannot be tracked, for that means that, at the very moment when we were supposed to be disarming, we have cut ourselves off from the possibility--that is, from the possibility of

being able to exercise joint control over the disarmament process. The possibility of exercising joint control which the respective parties should have in a situation where disarmament is being carried out is in the process of being lost. That shows again that it is the presence of these sophisticated weapons which, in itself, escalates the danger of war and prevents any chance of a real relaxation of tension. I am also sure that there is a real desire for a relaxation of tension among large sectors of the population.

"We are not afraid to let Denmark lead the way in taking the initiative in regard to disarmament. That will be accomplished by amplifying the whole debate regarding defense and security right from the start so that the question of defensive strength is made to depend upon what we want to bring about through a humanistic security policy. For example, we will link security policy to our assistance to developing countries, as has already happened."

Structural Reform

"How do you picture the process of getting a structural alteration of the defense program started?" Mr. Bilgrav-Nielsen was asked.

"If we know that a no-growth solution will entail an actual reduction of the defense program by one third where personnel, materiel and administration are concerned--anyhow, we have the defense ministry's own statement that that is the case--it is rather obvious that the thing to do is to look for ways in which we can build up some other type of defense program which, for about the same amount of money, will do a better job of taking care of Danish defense needs. I feel that it is necessary for the defense ministry's own people to cooperate and contribute to this discussion," he replied.

"Can you participate in that structural reorientation as a party?" he was asked.

"We can indicate the need for it," said Mr. Bilgrav-Nielsen. "Certainly, we cannot actually provide carefully-analyzed alternative models, but the defense ministry itself ought to be able to contribute to that process. The trouble with the defense programs up to now, in fact, has been that a budget has been agreed to and that filling it out, as far as the individual items are concerned, has been left, in general, to the defense ministry's own experts, and thus it was done in accordance with NATO models. Now we are turning the problem around and saying, 'Here are the premises for the type of defense we think suits Denmark, so the defense ministry must come up with an alternative model which fits these defense and security requirements.'"

"Won't such requirements inevitably have consequences with respect to our membership in NATO?" he was asked.

"Well, that is really exciting," he replied. "Some people say that we should simply resign from NATO, but I do not think we can consider doing that. NATO is an amalgamation of democratic nations in which each nation has a free right of self-determination, so we also should be able to say, 'We ourselves will decide how we think we can best contribute to Western cooperation with regard to defense,' and that we think it will promote our security and the relaxation of tension to make our contribution in another way than we have done up to the present. By doing this we would also be playing the ball over into the court of some of the eastern European countries which also do not feel safe with the existing military apparatuses-- I am thinking here, first and foremost, of Rumania and Poland--and I believe that we can do that while simultaneously holding firmly to the basic principle that we want to remain in NATO. I am so optimistic that I believe that, in the long run, NATO will accept such a basic principle as that."

The "No-Growth" Solution

"Will the radicals help put the 'no-growth solution' through and work for structural reforms in other ways if NATO's price for acceptance is agreement to the placing of an additional 50,000 Leathernecks on Danish soil in a critical situation?" Mr Bilgrav-Nielsen was asked.

"I do not think that is a condition that NATO will make," he replied. "That is not NATO's demand, but one can imagine, on the other hand, that the Social Democratic Party might wish that we would have an escalation of policy regarding bases and reinforcements in the future defense program. We would have to say no to that. We do not want to be involved in a future defense program if they want to escalate the stationing of heavy material here and if they want to begin making changes in the Danish position to the effect that we will not accept foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime. If they want to begin changing that wording, we will not go along with them."

"Then how do you evaluate the Social Democrats' wish to put through a 'no-growth solution' and their desire to work for the creation of a new military structure?" he was asked.

"I think they were very honest in the statement they made when they said, 'We cannot do it all, and if more money cannot be allocated we will have to reduce the defense program by one third.' That is honest talk, and I could wish that others would be as honest as they are," Mr Bilgrav-Nielsen replied.

"I also think," he said, "that the Social Democrats are ready to agree to serious consideration of the nature and structure of the defense program. Naturally, the question is whether they can find political backing. One should realize that at present there are many members of the Folketing who say no to increased military expenditures and there are members who say

yes. Therefore there is an obligation here--on the Socialist People's Party, for example, whose votes can decide whether or not the 'no-growth solution' goes through. I wonder whether the Socialist People's Party will go to such an extreme as to actually vote with the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party against a 'no-growth solution', although for very different reasons. A 'no-growth solution' can be put through with the participation of the Radicals, the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party and the Justice Party, which have 85 votes altogether. In other words, the Socialist People's Party can get the whole load to topple over. Thus, the Socialist People's Party can force the Social Democrats to enter into a compromise with the Liberal Party and the Conservative People's Party which will mean greatly increased expenditures for defense."

Peace Efforts

"Do you ascribe real significance to the large amount of talk by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries about peace and disarmament?" he was asked.

"I think that most of the smaller eastern European countries are sincere in their wishes for peace and a relaxation of tension," he said. "But I have my doubts about the Soviet Union. Its system is unfathomable. One cannot see how decisions are made, and one does not know what decisions are being considered.

"Let us take a practical attitude," he went on to say. "We should by no means get ourselves involved in the internal situation in the eastern European countries. They are not doing that in our country. The situation is somewhat more difficult with respect to the Soviet Union. The question is: what can we do in support of what we have seen can be set in motion in an eastern European country? A certain amount of disengagement. And what can we do to support the movement without meddling? I think there is only one answer to that question, and that is that we should act in as relaxed a manner as possible, de-escalate our military activities and persistently continue our efforts to achieve a relaxation of tension, so that a certain great power cannot get a pretext for forcing the Poles and other people seeking freedom back into the ranks, while complaining over the behavior of aggressive forces in the west. As far as disarmament is concerned, I think the Poles think as we do--they find the armaments race absurd.

"Discussion of the relaxation of tension provides the western European countries with their only chance to obtain a political foothold among the peace-seeking countries of eastern Europe. I am convinced that Helmut Schmidt was thinking in that way when he was so hesitant in backing the U.S.A.'s Mr Carter."

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen in the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"It is time to recognize the fact that we have come to a crossroads where defense policy is concerned. Our highly-technical defensive apparatus,

built up on models from the big countries, is such a burden now because the materiel becomes obsolete at such a rapid rate, among other things, that we must either accept a doubling of our expenditures for defense or accept a considerable reduction of our defense program, and consequently an altering of our objectives." From the Statement at the 1980 Congress of the Social Democratic Party:

"Where defense policy is concerned, there is no alternative to NATO, which also must be used as a means for obtaining increased relaxation of tension.

"A credible Danish defense program must continue to be maintained. That can take place within an unaltered economic framework. During the coming negotiations having to do with a defense program, the Social Democratic Party will attach a great amount of importance to the nature and structure of the defense program."

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen in the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE:

"As the public knows, a defense program with an unaltered budget framework will require a very significant alternation of our objectives. Consequently, the minister of defense has proposed a defense program which is reduced by one third, and at the same time he outlined an altered assignment of priorities to the individual defensive functions, so that a more prominent position is given to early-warning missions and the maintaining of sovereignty and a more inconspicuous position is given to the actual combat functions."

9266

CSO: 3106

NEO-NAZI, RIGHTIST 'FANE' FOLLOWERS CONTINUE TERRORISM

Attacks in Paris Area

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Sep 80 p 16

[Excerpts] From Saturday night to Sunday, 27 to 28 September, the fifth antisemitic attack was made on the Synagogue on 14 Chasseloup-Laubat Street, in Paris (15th ward). Four shots were fired against the Synagogue's facade, very probably by those who had perpetrated the four attacks from Thursday to Friday night.

The rabbi of the Synagogue saw a red Peugeot-104 suddenly dash away. It was undoubtedly the same "little red car" which witnesses of the other attacks had already mentioned. Moreover, the same weapon, a 30-caliber American-made gun, fired the shots. Just 2 days before, in a message to the AFP, an anonymous correspondent claimed this attack in the name of the European Nationalist Falangists.

The police criminal squad, however, seem to doubt the authenticity of this claim.

In the investigators' opinion, this series of attacks would more likely be the work of an isolated group of neo-Nazi militants who could either be acting in connection with the "European Nationalist Falangists," which replaced the FANE [European Federation of National Action]. Since this organization's dissolution on 3 September, or is acting on behalf of some small rival group of people. This not the first time, say the police, that some organizations competing with FANE are guilty of such attacks as these while signing them with the name of the Mr Marc Fredriksen group.

Since Saturday, the criminal squad investigators are also interested in the activities of Mr Jean Malliarakis's small extreme rightist group, "the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement," and the 50 odd militants--generally believed to belong to it--who have broken away from one or other of these organizations. In an unsigned letter sent to our editorial staff between Sunday night and Monday, an anonymous correspondent claims to have committed the attacks and releases the "European Nationalist Falangists [FNE] from any responsibility for them.

Throughout Saturday, further thorough searches have been made at former FANE militants' homes but without contributing any more to the investigation than did the previous ones.

Mr Marc Fredriksen, secretary general of the defunct FANE and five members of his group, who were arrested 26 September, were set free at the end of 48-hours close custody. Following his release, Mr Fredriksen denied that his group had any part whatsoever in the attacks. He pointed out that at the time of the fifth attack he was "under arrest." "It was by provocation," he said, "that these activities" have been attributed to the FNE.

Interview With Simone Weil

Paris LE MATIN in French 12 Sep 80 p 14

[Interview with Simone Weil by Maurice Szairan]

[Excerpts] [Question] Recently, Jacob Kaplan, the Chief Rabbi in France, sounded a forceful warning. "Never since the last World War have the tenets of hate, be they those of Nazism, racism, antisemitism, or anti-Zionism, acted with greater malevolence and audaciousness than in our day." Is this, Madam, also your opinion?

[Answer] I am not too sure of this. Remember, for example, all that has been said, written or imagined concerning Leon Blum. In 1915, I happened to hear someone, on noticing that I returned from deportation, express regretful surprise "that they had not killed them all."

Were we to go back over the events of the past 30 years, we would notice that the periods strongly marked by racist or antisemitic incidents have been numerous, and that once the tension relaxed, they were invariably attributed to epiphenomena stirred up by some small group of people. Besides, see how any "political movement" became a factor in the subject: at the time of the Algerian war, the intensity of racism with respect to the Maghrebi was much greater than that regarding the Jews. The latter were hidden behind the former. Between two evils, the racists pretended to choose the lesser.

[Question] All the same, the government was finally obliged to dissolve FANE, a neo-Nazi organization, wasn't it?

[Answer] FANE fell foul of the law, however restrictive it may be in terms of dissolving associations and leagues. It is, moreover, natural that these dissolutions be out of the ordinary. For the spirit of the 1901 law is to affirm the principle of freedom to establish associations. Freedom is to be enjoyed in common by all.

But let us discuss this peacefully, let us try to study these events rationally while endeavoring to decide what they mean. What is FANE's representativeness in a country of 53 million inhabitants? Undoubtedly,

something insignificant. There will always be those who have a hankering for Nazism. They are no doubt more numerous than the few militants claimed by this small group of people. On the other hand, were we to find that FANE and other groups were capable of taking advantage of popular support, even tacit, or of a significant intellectual support, then indeed we must become deeply concerned.

A possible event such as this would surpass by far the antisemitic tragedy. Our freedoms and our societies would be in danger, and we must indeed bear in mind that, even over and above the very horror of it, the Bologna attack is upsetting because it clearly proves that the extreme right is once again active in Italy.

[Question] However, a gap is looming up between the Jews in France and the powers that be. Does Giscardism understand this community?

[Answer] It is very difficult for non-Jews, no matter who they are, to understand the traumatism resulting from the tragedy through which we have lived. We are emotionally deeply scarred because, in the midst of French Judaism, there is not a family which has not lost a parent, if not several or more relatives. The French Jews have lost the illusion they had that, because they were French, nothing could happen to them. Unconsciously, no doubt, we were annoyed with "others" for not understanding us. We are still living through this terrible ordeal of which they haven't the slightest notion. It is true our sensitivity is always just skin deep. No doubt, this "fact of being Jewish" is somewhat psychologically incommunicable. But don't the Protestants have more or less conscious memories of religious wars, particularly in certain areas, although they go back several centuries?

[Question] But it is a well known fact that this traumatism does not preclude the Jewish youth's self-assurance in France. Never has the latter expressed itself so often and so brilliantly as in the areas of creative life: Why is this in your opinion?

[Answer] Before the war, our one desire, our instinct was to declare ourselves exclusively as Frenchmen. And then, two phenomena came into being. On the one hand, after the holocaust, the new Jewish generation, even if it were ever so little less sensitive--and it was sensitive to some extent--it could not just turn over the page and melt in as if nothing had happened. On the other hand, this explosion of French Jewish youth fits into the present-day movement for manifesting memberships and special characteristics. And this desire for affirmation, for differences displayed in the national community is conducive to a creative spirit. I personally know what it feels like to be myself expressed and affirmed as a woman and as a Jewess. It is merely the assertion of one's identity and dignity.

[Question] These are remarks which will be badly received in an ever also somewhat Jacobin France. What is to be done to permit this freedom of difference?

[Answer] Today many people claim this freedom of difference. To introduce it into our customs, we must, first of all, make a daily personal effort. Every one of us has the fearful tendency not to accept differences, the "not like us" syndrome. Cost what it may, we must explain to our children why each one is born into a family, cultural and historical setting. And each one must insist on being oneself, accepted as such, without adopting a specific pattern, on these grounds, antisemitism need not be separated from other forms of racism, all of which should be denounced. This is an objective for which all of us should strive.

You wanted to know if in my opinion the circulation of the serial story gave rise to a "holocaust response." I am not quite sure. The public looked upon it as a tragic story which acquainted them now and then with facts which they knew nothing or very little about. But it was something similar to reading newspaper reports on Cambodia or Uganda. For a moment we are truly deeply shocked and then, unfortunately, there is hardly any afterthought. We return to the world of our material cares and we forget. We put the whole affair out of our minds.

Interview With Raymond Aron

Paris LE MATIN in French 12 Sep 80 p 15

[Interview with Raymond Aron by Jean Botherel]

[Excerpts] [Question] How do you feel today about the antisemitism phenomenon?

[Answer] Personally, for as long as 35 years now I have not felt threatened by anti-Jewish hostility. During the first 25 years which followed the war, Nazi atrocities made any antisemitic demonstration practically impossible. For the past 15 years, that is, since the 6-day war and General de Gaulle's well-known press conference during which he portrayed the Jews as a "chosen people, self-assured and effectual," it again became possible and permissible to discuss the Jewish question. It is far more gratifying than to dismiss this problem. Today, we can discuss the unique situation of the Jews in France and throughout the world.

[Question] Some fanatical movements nevertheless are resorting to physical threats in this discussion...

[Answer] Extremist organizations, like their slogans, their attacks, seem to me to be rather more characteristic of all small groups of people who are inclined to resort to violence, regardless of their ideology; I do not see in this any proof of a spreading antisemitism. Of course, my memories of the 1930 years when we experienced a militant antisemitism may have distorted my opinion. As a matter of fact, a man of my age and my social status cannot fail to sense the existence of antisemitism at a time when centers of the Jewish community in France are suffering from it.

[Question] As a matter of fact, on the subject of France's foreign policy, do you think that our diplomacy in the Near East has developed since the beginning of the Fifth Republic?

[Answer] not at all. Valery Giscard d'Estaing is carrying out the same policy which General de Gaulle introduced and which Georges Pompidou had followed. Regarding Israel, they have the same analysis: that the State of Israel has the right to exist within safe and recognized borders, which strictly speaking, means absolutely nothing at all. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, however, did make a decision which does not come within the general's and Pompidou's logical choices: it is France's almost hostile neutrality toward the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel. It was possible, it was only proper that the French either declare its neutrality or else endeavor to further the possibility of success for the policy initiated by the United States.

As early as 1961, in an article in FIGARO LITTERAIRE with which I had been closely associated, I pointed out that the alliance between Israel and France was fortuitous and dubious, that it was based solely on a transient hostility with respect to the Arabs and that once the Algerian war wound up, there would hardly be any further reason for a privileged alliance between France and Israel, except for religious purposes. Now, as far as diplomacy is concerned, I believe that the religious purpose of the alliance will be short lived.

[Question] Isn't this the kind of analysis that a number of French Jews are now making? This would explain their assembling for action against the head of state's diplomacy as we saw at noon for Israel, an assembly which created friction within the very community.

[Answer] An indeterminable fraction of the Jewish community in France received Valery Giscard d'Estaing's diplomacy with a mixture of sadness and indignation. This fraction does not include the religious, the Sephardim, the Jews from Northern Africa. To me it seems important. I think, however, that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is doing his best to make a radical separation between the French Jew question and the Israel question. That said, I am not, of course, judging France's present policy. That is an entirely different matter. It so happens that a number of Jews interpret as an act of aggression every stand the president of the republic takes in the Near East.

As to problems related to institutions representatives of the Jewish community, they are aware of the clash and conflict existing between traditional organizations and those more recent ones, which are actuated and managed by another generation. At the consistory as at the Unified Jewish Social Fund, those who serve as directors are basically well-to-do men--a custom linked to a historical tradition which is well known: the "Court Jews" were the traditional defendants of the community which was largely made up of

the humble folk. Today, an organization such as the Jewish Renewal is recruiting the younger members who are becoming annoyed with their elders' cautiousness. Before the war, and even now in some environments, Jews tend to say: "We must not do this or that because it will stir up anti-semitism." Now, this kind of argument irritates the younger generation, and I shall gladly say, the best of this generation. The latter, based on what they have experienced in the past, believe that the demeanor worthy of the Jew is to conduct himself in the manner he deems proper, to affirm his bond to Israel. And they justify their behavior with this line of reasoning: "It is not the Jews who create antisemitism; no matter what we do, antisemitism will or will not always exist."

[Question] In order to make clear their disagreement with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's policies, some have gone so far as to press claims for a Jewish pressure group.

[Answer] The overwhelming majority of the community has rebuffed the idea of a "Jewish lobby," for reasons not emanating from a certain fear but rather from a sound analysis of the situation. In the first place, lobbies recognized in the United States do not have official existence among us. On the other hand, when a constituency is made up of a large Jewish population, the candidates take this into consideration and it is useless to organize a lobby. In short, at the state supreme authority level, the lobby would hardly make any sense: there is nothing to lead anyone to believe that any president of the republic would act in any way toward Israel other than did Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The lobby, therefore, would have all the drawbacks, all the ineffectiveness of ostentation. As much as I have always considered it essential, since 1933, to make it clear that I was a Jew, I see no reason whatsoever, to make common cause with the community on all occasions and in all matters. This is something I do not do.

Kilos of Dynamite Seized

Paris LE FIGARO in French 25 Sep 80 pp 1, 13

[Article by Jean-Charles Reix]

[Text] The seizure of 1,250 kilos of gum dynamite, 8 guns and rifles and ammunition supplies at Rochebesse, on the former farm of the Ardeche murderer, Pierre Conty, shed new light on the French terrorists and reveals their ties with their European counterparts. The operation launched immediately after the crime squad investigations inquiring into the recent Direct Action attacks, conducted in the Rochebesse farming community, has already made it possible to prove that the explosives seized were of the same nature as those used during this revolutionary group's attacks and that they were also used in the activities of both the Italian extreme left subversive organization "Prima Linea" and in those of the Basque Independent Party. This arsenal, which Conty himself very probably set up--the explosives had been stolen in August 1975 from a supply depot in Isere, his native district--was, as a matter of fact, since that time, used by members of "Direct Action," a small extreme left group.

When the opportunity arose, the "Direct Action" members even had their "Prima Linea" friends and those from the Basque independent branch called Military ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty group] make use of them. These disclosures are contained in the records which the inspectors from the crime squad's antiterrorist section are getting ready to send to the government Security Court.

After the Tuesday haul in Ardeche (Marie Therese Merlhiot, 33 years old, Conty's wife, and two other suspects, Bruno Darribere and Jean-Pierre Bolognini, 26 years old, were questioned there), there was no longer any doubt but that an organized terrorism has existed in France for several years now. For at least 6 or 7 years. It also came to light that it was a powerful, organized, well-armed movement which had ties with the main European subversive organizations.

To understand more fully the vicissitudes of the investigation which the Parisian police have just conducted in Ardeche and in La Mancha--another terrorist was arrested Monday in Hauteville--we would have to go back over the events of the past 15 days.

On Saturday, 19 September, Jean-Marc Rouillan, for some years suspected of being "Direct Action's" "founding brain," as the result of a tip, was caught on Pergolese Street in Paris. Surrounded in the hallway of a house where he had an appointment, he gave himself up. His companion, Nathalie Menigon, who was waiting for him in a car, was captured after some heavy shooting.

Removed to the Quai D'Orsay, Rouillan remained silent. The police had better luck with Nathalie Menigon. Deprived of drugs, this young 23-year old addict could not tolerate the 6-day privation imposed on her by her keeper. She ended by cracking up and talking.

In this way, the crime squad learned of the existence of another terrorist couple, Laurent Louessard, 26-year old, and Maria Arago-Eltur, a 20-year old Spaniard. A political economy student, Louessard is also housemaster at the Carnot Lyceum in Paris. It was here, in front of this establishment, that the police arrested him last Thursday. Since Monday, the "Direct Action" survivors have been fighting back by peppering the military school with machinegun fire.

Louessard's arrest is "a tremendous catch," perhaps even more significant than that of Rouillan. He is a scholar, the brain behind "Direct Action." He and his companions, according to the police, are in fact the international contacts with the revolutionary movements "Prima Linea" in Italy and the ETA in Spain.

Maria Arago-Eltur is known as a kind of special Spanish-terrorist representative. Louessard admits having supplied 800 kilos of dynamite to Olga Giroto, one of the "Prima Linea" Egerias [women advisors] arrested in Paris last 27 March in the company of five or six other young women, three of whom were to admit their membership in "Direct Action."

Where do these explosives which the French so obligingly gave the Italians come from? From Ardeche, more correctly, from the Rochebasse farming community, of which Conty was the leader before he became the most wanted murderer in France. A young man, Philippe Franc, 21-years old, had been assigned to deliver the dangerous cargo in Ardeche in the beginning of March, on board a locomotive, and had deposited it in Olga Girotto's cabin. It is this amateur driver who was questioned Monday, at Hauteville in La Mancha.

Executed by the Secret Service?

The last chapter in the Pierre Conty saga was written Tuesday morning when gendarmes and police, for the umpteenth time, courageously lay siege to his hiding place. They used four helicopters to reach La Rochebasse, this deserted, rugged mountainside from which departed forever on 24 August 1977, he who was to be known as the "Ardeche murderer."

Accompanied by two members of his farming community, Jean-Philippe Mouillot and Stephane Viaux-Pecatte, Conty committed his first holdup at Villefort, in Lozère. Throughout the three criminals crime-ridden game hunt, deaths piled up. They cold bloodedly shot down a soldier belonging to the French disciplinary battalion (Ardeche); then it was two farmers' turn, father and son Malosse, whose car the fugitives coveted.

Since that day, Conty's former neighbors, on several occasions, had caught a glimpse of Conty. But when the police arrived, they found no one in La Rochebasse.

It is generally believed that Conty and Viaux-Pecatte (a former foot-boxing trainer) made use of the European terrorists' escape routes to reach the Lowlands. Viaux-Pecatte, however, was to be picked up at Gronigen, in Holland, during an anti-terrorist raid there. Last 21 May, the Ardeche Assize Court sentenced him to 18 years hard labor, while Conty received the death sentence in absentia.

What became of the mad killer? During a press club interview, Christian Bonnet, the minister of the interior, implied that he was dead. Without any further details. Some police suggest that he may have been the victim of a settlement of differences among terrorists; other experts believe that the Secret Service may have put him to death for his revolutionary activities. In any case, from now on it can be positively asserted that from the time of his bloody holdup and no doubt well before it, Conty was in connection with that May 1968 survivor fringe and the anti-Francoists who formed the international Independent Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) and later "Direct Action." Laurent Louessard, 26-years old, headmaster of a day school in Paris and an economic science student, together with his friend, Maria Arago-Altur, 20-years old, codifier in Paris, have been charged with criminal attacks with explosives, first-degree murder and conspiracy.

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CSO: 3100

'ACTION DIRECTE' TERRORIST NETWORK'S TIES NOTED

Paris LE POINT in French 29 Sep 80 pp 73-74

[Article by Jean-Marie Pontaut and Jean-Loup Reverier]

[Text] Have the police dealt a fatal blow to one of the main French-style terrorist networks? The crime squad, at any rate, is shouting victory. The first attempt to organize in France a hardline organization modeled on the Baader Gang and the Red Brigades has apparently just failed: the "Action Directe" group has been broken up. The arrest on 18 September of 26-year-old Laurent Louessard, the man who was organizing Action Directe's "international relations," and Tuesday's discovery of the group's secret arsenal in Ardeche have dashed the hopes of our little Baaders. An exemplary investigation.

Everything began--or rather, began again--on Saturday 13 September. On that day the brains of Action Directe, 28-year-old Jean-Marc Rouillan, and his female companion, Nathalie Menigon, 23--the group's Egeria--fell into a trap set on Pergolese Street by police officers from the Central Directorate for General Intelligence. Having come there in the hope of making contact with an Arab diplomat, they were not completely "clean," as the underworld expression puts it. There was a gun in his belt and in her handbag, as well as four bulletproof vests and an 11.43 hidden under the seat of a stolen Peugeot 604. Rouillan did not have time to use his pistol, but Nathalie emptied two magazines at the officers. No one was hurt.

At Police Headquarters in Paris, Rouillan confessed to most of the assaults committed by his movement, while Nathalie Menigon tried to convert the officers to the revolution. That big catch very quickly opened up a new lead in the person of one of the couple's "contacts," whom the investigators located. The machinery of the crime squad, headed by Inspector Marcel Leclerc, went into operation. Laurent Louessard, an economics student and housemaster at the Carnot Lycee, was picked up a week ago Thursday. His Spanish female companion, Maria Pilar Arago-Altur, 20, was arrested the same day.

The young woman, very upset, confessed immediately. And what confessions! She told how the terrorist group was established. She explained that it

had happened in her presence early in 1979, in the 11th Arrondissement of Paris, at the Tison Street residence of two comrades, Carlos Jauregui-Azpilaga, 26--linked to ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group)--and Mireille Munoz, 22. It was there that the name "Action Directe" was chosen and that the strategy of French-style terrorism was decided on. Rouillan, the group's thinker, said it would be impossible to achieve their objectives except through action by degrees. Public opinion--and the police--would react too sharply otherwise. So it was necessary gradually to create a climate of violence and instability in the Italian style. It was a deadly sequence which was to lead, through explosions and machinegunnings, to the kidnapping and murder of those holding the levers of power in France. And a communique was to set the tone: "To wreck society through direct action by destroying its institutions and the men who serve it and by relying on the people's forces."

The theory was symbolically put into practice as early as 1 May that same year: Action Directe struck capitalism "on the head" by machinegunning the front of the building on Pierre-I-de-Serbie Avenue that houses the CNPF (National Council of French Employers). The attacks multiplied very rapidly: there were bomb attacks on SONACOTRA (expansion unknown) and the Labor Inspectorate, followed by the machinegunning of public buildings (the Ministry of Cooperation and the Ministry of Labor).

But the group also needed money, with the result that it alternated between political assaults for which it openly took credit and holdups for the shameful purpose of getting some cash. Its take ranged from the modest sum of 50,000 francs stolen on Villiers Avenue in August 1979 to the 180,000 francs taken on Bosquet Avenue last 28 August, a caper that ended in a hail of submachinegun fire at an emergency police vehicle. The money was used in particular to pay monthly "salaries" to some of the leaders: Rouillan was receiving 15,000 francs a month.

But money is not always enough. Papers were also needed, as witness the attack last 5 August on the city hall annex in the 14th Arrondissement, where several thousand official documents and unused identification cards were stolen. All very useful to Action Directe and its foreign "correspondents."

Maria Pilar Arago-Altur disclosed something in that connection: it was Louessard who had established the contacts with members of the ETA military branch and the Italians in "Prima Linea." He reportedly invited some of them to Paris to perfect systems of mutual assistance.

At that point everything fell into place in the minds of the investigators. They finally had the pieces to the puzzle that had been missing since the first Action Directe members were hauled in in March 1980. At that time--6 months ago--the group had struck a big blow by submachinegunning the front of the Ministry of Cooperation and barely missed Robert Galley, who had just left his office. The stolen Mercedes used in that attack was recognized by Inspector Broussard, making it possible to follow the trail.

On 28 March the police dropped in on two of the gang's hideouts: the back-room of a shop at 12 Juliette-Dodu Street and an apartment being rented by Pascal Trillat, 22, a law student, at 39 Grange-aux-Belles Street. He was already suspected of belonging to another terrorist group known as NAPAP (Armed Nuclei for People's Autonomy). There they questioned a beautiful Italian woman terrorist belonging to the "Prima Linea" ring. She was Olga Giroto, 23, and is suspected of having killed a doctor in Turin.

Among the seized documents, police made a disturbing discovery: a thick file containing the names, addresses, and photographs of several politicians. It seems to have been put together with a view to possible kidnappings. In it, for example, they found a photograph of the country home of one of President Giscard d'Estaing's daughters. With it was a photograph of the highway sign showing the name of the village. The activists later admitted that they had started shadowing several ministers and had established a "hit parade" of the best protected. For example, Minister of Justice Alain Peyrefitte would be more difficult to kidnap than Minister of Interior Christian Bonnet.

The police had made another discovery on 27 March: a stockpile of 600 kilograms of explosives. Maurice Bouvier, central director of the PJ (Criminal Investigation Police), told LE POINT at the time: "It was a great operation, but those 600 kilograms are not the only ones in circulation." In these past few months, getting their hands on the rest of it has been a priority objective for the police, who were afraid that Action Directe might strike big.

It was the young Spanish woman arrested on 18 September who helped police find the remaining stockpile. Pressured with questions, she candidly admitted, "Of course, I know where it is; I went there to get a 7.65." And she said more specifically, "It is in Rochebesse, in Ardeche."

The investigators started at the name Rochebesse. That is where the famous Pierre Conty used to live. Following a holdup in August 1977, that former-leftist-turned-goat breeder had killed a gendarme and two farmers who were hindering his escape. Those murders earned him a death sentence in absentia. Since then Conty has never been found.

Inspector Leclerc organized a surprise operation. Isolated on a rocky peak, the Rochebesse farm could not be quickly taken except by air. At 0800 hours last Tuesday, the gendarmes leaped from a helicopter. Conty's former mistress, Maite Merlihot, 33, was arrested along with two of her friends. One of them was 26-year-old Bruno Daribere, who led police to the hiding place: a converted cave whose entrance was a trapdoor. There they discovered 1,250 kilograms of explosives, eight military weapons, and about 1,000 rounds of ammunition. The gendarmes even felt that Conty may have been hiding there recently. Like the 600 kilograms discovered in Paris, those 1,250 kilograms had come from a store of 2 tons of explosives stolen in Saint-Quentin, Isere in 1975. And the investigators feel that the missing 150 kilograms may have been delivered to ETA or the Red Brigades.

Is the adventure of the Action Directe fringe element completely over? To all intents and purposes, yes, say the police, who nevertheless do not rule out the possibility of some final death throes like the gunfire at the Military School following Noullan's arrest. But the police have proven that by legal means alone it is possible to neutralize a terrorist ring.

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CBO: 3100

FLNC LEADER GETS 15-YEAR SENTENCE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Sep 80 p 14

[Article by Philippe du Tanney]

[Text] Yesterday, Yves Stella, the 37-year-old Bastian commercial agent, thought to be one of the leaders of the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front], was condemned by the government security court to 15 years' hard labor. The condemned man was not in the box to hear the sentence passed because as early as last Thursday, he had announced that he would no longer attend the continuation of his trial, instructing his lawyers not to plead his case.

He was on trial for "participation in an association of criminals whose aim is to make an attempt against the integrity of the national territory," concealing explosives, and participation in the attempt perpetrated against the television relay station in Serra di Pigno on 13 August 1977 (24 million francs damage).

At the time of his arrest on 1 June 1978, in front of the villa of an accomplice, where submachine guns and tracts were to be discovered, Yves Stella was getting ready to load 15 kilos of explosives and detonating devices into his automobile. Throughout his trial, which began 2 weeks ago, Yves Stella had tried to minimize his role.

However, he admitted that he might have been a "political commissar," but without authority over his comrades. He could only have had "some influence" over his militant friends.

To the public prosecutor, M. Olivier, who yesterday morning had requested a sentence of "20 years, or in any case, not less than 15 years," Stella was, indeed, a leader of the FLNC. "The proof? This warped intellectual continued to organize the crime from the Fleury-Merogis prison." The prosecutor was referring to the discovery in November 1978 at Biguglia (Upper Corsica) of FLNC records in which statements taped by Stella on the machine in his cell included directives on the reorganization policy to be conducted after the disbanding of most of the network, and especially on the choice of new action objectives.

These documents weighed heavily at the trial of Yves Stella.

PCF'S MARCHAIS LAUNCHES NEW BOOK, DEFINES POLICIES, GOALS

Politburo Communique

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 4 Sep 80 p 3

[Text of 3 Sep PCF Politburo Communique summarizing Georges Marchais' book "L'Espoir au present"]

[Text] A book to fight, to convince, and to carry communist ideas forward.

The PCF (French Communist Party) Political Bureau yesterday published the following announcement:

The publication of the new book by Georges Marchais entitled "L'Espoir au present," is a major event. Its content places this exceptional book at the very heart of current political affairs, as at the moment of everyone's return from vacations and during the months to come.

The abrupt aggravation in the antipopular policy of the Giscardian administration, the multiplication and breadth of demand struggles, the developments of the international situation, the evolution in the socialist world, and the approach of the presidential elections today quite legitimately raised numerous questions among the workers. In "L'Espoir au present" the party's secretary-general tries to respond--on the basis of ideas of the 22nd and 23rd congresses, in a personal and direct manner, in the light of his experience--to those essential questions. In the face of all those who preach a wait-and-see attitude, resignation, and "the fatal inevitability of misfortune," he evidences the immense reasons for confidence for today and for tomorrow which go along with the struggles of our people.

As Georges Marchais emphasizes, "this book of hope is a fighting book."

"L'Espoir au present" is an appeal to fight for progress. Against those who accuse France of trying to save capitalism, Georges Marchais proves--

in frankly taking up numerous issues, such as petroleum and nuclear power--that scientific and technological progress, social and human progress are inseparable. Starting with specific examples, he underlines the real causes of the crisis in French society; he shows how the fight for human liberation is identified with the fight against capitalism; he advances a series of social, economic, and democratic proposals which constitute as many guidelines of struggle applicable as of this moment.

"L'Espoir au present" is an appeal to fight "for a new world," for peace and disarmament. Against those who paint the world in the colors of the apocalypse, Georges Marchais, on the basis of irrefutable arguments and discoveries he made during his journeys, illustrates the realities of a world which moves in the right direction. "Without makeup and without mutilations," he underscores the contribution made by socialism to the peoples who built it and to all humanity, the broad range of the "new national liberation wave," the importance of changes which have taken place in the capitalist countries, particularly in France since May-June 1968. On the basis of this evolution, whose complexity and difficulties he does not hide, Georges Marchais advances new ideas on vital problems, such as peace, detente, and disarmament, the establishment of a new world order, Euro-communism, and the promotion of "a new internationalism with the dimension of everything that advances in the world."

"L'Espoir au present" is an appeal to fight for France. Against those who want to deprive it of its independence and lead it into decline, Georges Marchais with precision recalls the grand characters of the French nation and its regions. With supporting facts, he underscores the value of slogans "Produce French" and he specifically sketches the broad outlines of the new economic policy capable of extricating France from the crisis and "building for it a future worthy of its past."

"L'Espoir au present" is an appeal to fight without waiting for change. Against those who are satisfied with describing the political situation as "deadlocked" or "without prospects" Georges Marchais shows how each advantage gained, each new right, each "possible progress, little or big, toward more justice and liberty" achieved through struggle constitutes as many points of support for more decisive progress, as many axes for union and change. A change which the communists want to push to the very limit, all the way to democratic socialism with self-management, which they want to see triumph as quickly as possible, and under whose sign they will make their fight during the future presidential election.

"L'Espoir au present" finally is an appeal to fight in order to give the government and the French Communist Party their proper place in the country's life. Against those who stubbornly insist on cartooning the reality of the PCF [French Communist Party], Georges Marchais--talking about permanent members, cells, democratic centralism, and communist intellectuals--describes the PCF such as it is: the party of the working class,

a democratic, revolutionary party whose contribution to France is highly important and which constitutes "the political key to the future of the workers and of France," the key to change.

"L'Espoir au present" is written in a simple, lively, easily understood style. It is addressed to all communists, all workers, all young people, all those who suffer from the inhuman policy of the bosses and of Giscard d'Estaing and who keep asking questions, who fight, and who keep hoping. Tackling the burning problems of the moment, the worries and the big questions, the book is of concern to all those who are interested in political life, in the movement of ideas, in debates. A book to convince and to fight, it is a decisive instrument in carrying the ideas of the communists forward.

The Political Bureau has decided immediately to launch a drive to disseminate the book by Georges Marchais nationwide. The L'HUMANITE Festival will be the first phase in the massive sales drive. It urges every communist, every party organization without delay, in each enterprise and each town, to make the proper decisions so as to permit the dissemination of "L'Espoir au present" to meet with a tremendous success, in keeping with the high level of the current political stakes.

The Political Bureau hopes that the broad dissemination of this book by Georges Marchais in drugstores and the commentaries and discussions that will be devoted to it will enable all those who are interested to become familiar with it and to read it. [5058]

Review, Excerpts

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Sep 80 p 10

[Introduction by Patrick Jarreau]

[Excerpts] Georges Marchais is making his return in the news this week. The PCF [French Communist Party] secretary, who had already given his opinion on the events in Poland after his return from vacation spent in Bulgaria, is presenting his book to the press, Tuesday 9 September. The book, published by Editions Sociales, is his third one, following "Le Defi Democratique" (Democratic Challenge) published by Grasset in 1973, and "Parlons Franchement" (Let's Speak Frankly) published by Grasset in 1977. In "L'Espoir au present" (Hope in the Present Tense) Marchais expresses positions taken by the PCF for the last 3 years.

Marchais' book is the basis for the campaign of the presumed presidential candidate, who will have to give

a speech on 14 September during the "Fete de l'Humanite." The official designation of the candidate will be at a national conference, scheduled to meet on 11 and 12 October. The conference will decide on proposals from the Central Committee. Marchais, who will be the second communist leader participating in a presidential race (this without any doubt) has decided to give a personal tone to his campaign.

"L'Espoir au present" offers formulae often associated with the PCF's experience and reflective of Marchais involvements. Some members of the Central Committee wonder if it would not be better to choose a candidate who fits more closely the traditional image of the PCF and its representatives. Someone less in view but more unexpected. Marchais is sometimes reproached for having adapted the PCF's policies for his own ends, because he attempts to incarnate those policies. His comments during the Olympic Games ("The French Bourgeoisie likes raw youth") are an example of his extravagances, which insure him a place in the news but do not please all communists. It is difficult to evaluate to what degree Marchais' personal qualities and faults will make a difference in the minds of voters.

Marchais explains in his book that the PCF proposes socialism. There is no more talk of a transition toward a socialist society, "an advanced democracy." The new theme is the continuous creation of new economic and political relations rising from current social struggles. These new relations will be the basis for French democratic, self-managed socialism. The thinking is very classical. Developments in science and technology would permit fulfillment of everybody's needs if resources were not divided among only a few by a capitalistic system. This eulogy of progress leads Marchais to criticize some ecologists' themes, especially their criticism of nuclear energy. However, Marchais intends to take into consideration the "ecologists' aspirations for a world in better harmony with nature."

Marchais is in favor of "telling the truth concerning the Socialist balance sheet, which demonstrates the superiority of the system. Even if the Polish crisis showed that steps are not always taken under the best

conditions." Marchais thinks that Socialist countries have "altered relations among world powers and let us see an original path for French Socialism." He also believes that the question of a switch to socialism has been opened since the "May-June 1968 movement presented a new phase which is still ongoing. The socialist leaders' attitude in 1977-78 brought about a lost battle but not a lost war."

Marchais attacks Mitterrand, but no other socialist leaders. He emphasizes that "revolution" in France means a consensus which calls for agreements among parties "heading for a change." However, to achieve this working class struggle, the communist party must be reinforced. Marchais insists on today's diversity in the communist international movement and the possibility for each party to lead its own way toward socialism. He justifies the PCF's internal management and praises its contributions to France. However, he acknowledges mistakes, such as the PCF's condemnation of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party [LCY] in 1948.

According to Marchais the PCF seems to be leading a single-handed battle, for which it wants to be recognized as the only true alternative to the existing power.

After noting that "capitalism is moving into a deeper crisis, while socialism is progressing," Marchais wrote:

"The direction society will take and its progression calls for more and more significant participation by the people in choices and decisions. It requires elaboration and implementation of systems permitting us to deal openly with problems and to solve them for the benefit of socialism, giving a free hand to the internal dynamism of this new system.

"Here we are dealing with a fundamental question of progressive democratization of all structures in the society and of all social relations. It is an objective and at the same time a necessity for socialism, a general requirement for such an advanced kind of social organization. This is what the French Communist Party calls the universal democratic component of socialism.

"As you know, we disagree with our Soviet comrades on this point. We have a different vision of the ways and means by which to develop socialism."

Marchais talks also of "revolution" or "change in society," for which the PCF is fighting.

"I spoke on socialist countries. I spoke also on gains by the French workers' movement. Socialism is the answer to problems in French society. This is the only answer suited to workers' and the nation's interests. For this reason, socialism will have French components. It will be a French style of socialism.

A French style, democratic, self-managed socialism."

Marchais presents the conditions required to develop "democracy to the limit. The entire banking system must be nationalized as well as all large enterprises. In socialist France there will also be other forms of social proprietorships (e.g., cooperatives) and an economic sector based on private, craft-oriented, commercial and industrial property. This is a sensible requirement if needs are to be satisfied as well as possible. France must also have a modern and powerful agricultural system. And this is possible only if decent, guaranteed revenues are provided to farmers. Instead of collectivization, socialism will modernize familial farms."

Marchais gives details on his conception of the way to power. "French people have acquired universal suffrage, a gathering of democratic rights, the Bourgeoisie is trying to diminish and falsify. But what French people have acquired is for the most part irreversible. It's from here that we start. Revolutionary changes must come from choices made by a majority through universal suffrage. But let's be aware of illusions! To transform society the majority must come from a popular movement. This movement can happen only by and through struggles."

Marchais adds:

"To create a majority movement of transformation, it is necessary that workers, employees, technicians, farmers and intellectuals have common objectives. Objectives corresponding to each others interests. This implies choices. There are some contradictory interests among the various social classes in our country. Choices will have to give priority to the interests of the neediest, the most exploited. These are choices of social justice and liberty, of which I spoke earlier. They will not cheat any worker.

France is a country where people long ago create organizations to defend them, to express their desires and interests. They also created political parties. Thus, no majority gathering can be conceived without agreements among parties, which will lead the new society.

This is why we communists are so in favor of a union. We want it today and tomorrow. We want a union of leftwing parties, which will be clear, strong and durable around transforming objectives responding to needs of the working class and the people, a union based on loyalty and equality.

We tried an experiment on this subject. We initiated a common government policy program with the socialist party. Despite our efforts, this experiment did not fulfill the hopes of workers. At the last minute the socialist party rejected the program, ended the union and brought about defeat. Today, when one sees Mitterrand becoming pro-Atlantic and anti-Soviet, and Fabre accepting job offers from Giscard, we see how right the PCF was to oppose the rightist tendencies of its partners, as early as 1977. We have thought much about this experiment and the reasons for its failure. The lesson to be learned from this is: what is and will always be crucial to move society is a popular movement; action and union of workers, fighting together for objectives which they define, support and control.

There is no 'supernational' way to socialism for French communists. All French people identify realization of their wishes, well-being and security with their country's prosperity and security."

Marchais, then speaks about Eurocommunism.

"Today, journalists announce the 'death' of Eurocommunism. They are wrong! The rush of these gravediggers is not without purposes. They would like to drag down communist parties within the 'Euroleft.' But we strongly reject these attempts. This so-called 'Euroleft' would engulf communist parties in a social democrat West European bloc, collaborating with imperialism submitted to the United States and opposed to world revolutionary forces.

This concept is so unacceptable that it is doomed.

Other journalists base their comments on the fact that differences of opinion exist--for example, between French and Italian communists. Or they refer to the fact that some parties refused to attend the European communist parties' meeting for peace held last April in Paris.

This comes from a restrictive and outmoded view of problems, needs and possibilities of the revolutionary movement.

Differences of opinion? What discovery! For instance, differences of opinion have always existed between French and Italian communists concerning European integration and expansion of the Common Market. We have always said that they should not be ignored but that they should not be an obstacle to a common action on the points that are mutually agreeable.

Relations between communist parties evolve, in the sense that they admit their differences.

I could choose many examples but I will limit myself to the meeting between the French and Soviet communist parties held earlier this year, since it was extremely publicized. Our opponents have attempted to hide its unprecedented aspect. The Soviet Communist Party [CPSU] acknowledged frankly and openly differences of opinion, for the first time. They did this to promote common action on all other mutually agreeable objectives, in the spirit of equality and mutual respect.

There is an increasing diversity, which I underlined earlier. It bears on the actions of communist parties. For instance, must we disengage ourselves from experiments such as that by the Portuguese communist parties and the Portuguese people, who fought for and have been able to maintain important democratic concessions? Or the Greek Communist Party? Or the South American or the Near East? Let's be more humble!

But beyond communist parties, don't we find revolutionary experiments that we should take into consideration? For instance, the Algerian people led by its government and the National Liberation Front? Or experiments from Africans, Asians and Latin Americans?

This is why Eurocommunism is not dead, but is instead stuffed into an ill-fitting suit which needs to be retailored. A new internationalism must be promoted to meet world changes."

Then, Marchais talks about the role of intellectuals in the party.

"When one wants to bring about a socialist revolution, it is necessary to know the true revolutionary theory of transition from capitalistic society to socialist society, which Marx and Engels initiated--what we call 'scientific socialism.'

"At the beginning of the workers' movement, intellectuals brought knowledge to workers. It could not have been otherwise. Lenin himself was an intellectual. But today it is the entire party, with its objectives which has acquired knowledge and must bear fruit by thought and action. The party is called a 'collective intellectual.'"

Marchais talks about the internal apparatus of the party.

"It always makes me smile when I hear about protesters within the party. We are all protesters! It is a part of being a communist to protest against the established power and to want to see changes. And everybody does it according to his or her own feelings. This means that discussions are often animated and sometimes heated. We even let protests be public during our congress. Of course, we cannot allow a permanent and aimless rediscussion of the party's policies and decisions. This would ruin the party's efficiency and would give our opponents means of applying pressure on our decisions. This would turn the party into a mundane salon, not a fighting political organization.

Everyone knows I do not fear debates--on the contrary. However, once the discussion is over and a democratic decision has been reached, it must apply to all communists. And I mean all communists! It is with all of them that we want to implement our policies and progress. This does not obligate any communist to agree if he does not want to, or renounce his views because they do not meet with everybody else's. However, if one does not agree on anything and wishes to criticize everything, even in public, it is better to be honest with oneself and leave.

It is possible to do so quietly. The door is open both ways. But the main point is not here. The main point concerns rules which guarantee democratic elaboration, cohesion, efficiency and respect for positions taken: this is the famous democratic centralization." [8924]

Reactions, Impressions

Paris LE MATIN in French 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Commentary by Jean Elleinstein--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Georges Marchais' book, "L'Espoir au present," describes the evolution of the French Communist Party (PCF) since the 23d Congress, and confirms the fears held by thousands of communists and hundreds of thousands of voters.

The book appears in sum as the platform of the communist candidate for the presidential election, without there even having been any real discussion within the communist party. An article by Lucien Seve in L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE of 7 September shows that we are back to the personalization of power, to the cult of leadership, to the time of Maurice Thorez and of "Son of the People."

As to the substance, I raise three main points about this superficial book written before the events in Poland.

--First, the description of contemporary French society remains one-sided and by consequence both true and false. It is true because the crisis is hitting the French hard, and [is hitting] in the first instance the workers and laborers (employees, for example). The tribune's function, which the PCF has performed, is expressed forcefully throughout Georges Marchais' book. At the same time, this description is false because it does not take into account the real improvement in standard of living, not only in the middle classes, but also among skilled workers, due in large part to the struggle waged by workers themselves for decades. The tourists Georges Marchais encountered on the airplane that brought him back from the Isle of Reunion, /"wearing bizarre sombreros,"/--this is the beginning of the book--were probably not of

the privileged class, but rather middle class people who scrimp all year to pay for a trip overseas. A number of shop committees in the Paris region organize such trips and even cruises. The deterioration of living conditions due to the crisis does not keep the standard of living of French workers from being incomparably superior to that of Soviet workers, despite unemployment and inequality.

--Secondly, the defense of the generally positive record of the socialist countries is awkward, full of contradictions, and totally unacceptable, as the Polish summer shows. Georges Marchais refuses today to see what he saw at the 22d Congress of the PCF in 1976. He no longer speaks of democracy as a means and an end of socialism. He is silent about the absence of civil liberties in the USSR and in all the countries of "real socialism." He defends the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Soviet foreign policy in its entirety. He forgets unhappy Czechoslovakia. Socialism with a French complexion has also been consigned to the oblivion of history.

--Finally, he does not lay out any real prospects for change, in that he rejects union with the Socialist Party, contenting himself with describing its swerve to the right, and ranking it with the forces of the past!

How then can French society be transformed? The statement that "we would enter a union with the Socialist Party tomorrow" becomes purely a figure of speech. In place of the historic alliance between the PS and the PCF which alone could democratically transform the structures of the economy and society, really improve the living conditions of the workers, and effectively cope with the crisis, Georges Marchais substitutes party solidarity, and consigns union into one of his deskdrawers, in Colonel Fabien's place....

This regression of the PCF towards a pro-Soviet policy, anti-unionist, this loneliness of the long-distance runner runs through Georges Marchais' book from one end to the other and contradicts the very title of the book. There is no more hope but in the past, in the pious memory of the Common Program, about which one wonders, reading Georges Marchais, whether it even existed. There is only hope for the future if the PCF modifies its directions and its international functioning. For the moment, the opposite is more what seems to be happening... It is for the communists to judge, to try to change the course of things; and for the voters to make their feelings known.

(Editor's Note: Elleinstein is a communist historian.) [9516]

Chevenement: Opportunist Tract

Paris LE MATIN in French 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Commentary by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, national secretary of the Socialist Party, promoter of CERES, the Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education]

[Text] This book by Georges Marchais confirms that the language he speaks is fundamentally opportunistic. It simultaneously maintains two contradictory positions: on the one hand, it recognizes the necessity of agreements between parties in order to assemble a majority for change. But on the other hand he hides behind the argument that popular movement alone is decisive, to refuse to engage in any discussion or common action with the Socialist Party.

No dialectic spirit: Georges Marchais pretends not to see that in the absence of one clear political perspective, only specific accords can enable popular movement to take off. The result: by blocking the road to union, by closing out the future, the communist party bears today the responsibility for the despair.

He is playing the game of all those who dragged their feet for 10 years before being convinced to rejoin the union of the left. There is an objective interdependence between the sectarian choice of the PCF and the reemerging temptation of a new "third force."

Is this not the goal sought by the leadership of the communist party? A simpleton's dream: get back to the comfortable solitude of "the Italian model," of the only party defending the working class? At that moment, once again, the royal road of a union with no prospects or future will be opened up....

For this, Georges Marchais already has his hands free: for union, or against it, the communist party, on the basis of the line laid down by Georges Marchais, can turn about 180 degrees from one day to the next.

One can understand why, between the daily struggles and the distant prospect of socialism, G. Marchais offers no plan: one doesn't need a plan, for doing nothing. [9516]

Lalonde: Science, Technology

Paris LE MATIN in French 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Commentary by Brice Lalonde, the ecologist candidate in the presidential election]

[Text] What a pity! Here is a chap full of energy, an organized party, perfectly willing militants. They are fighting rightly for those they

deem oppressed by industrial society. And what do they propose? More of the same, getting in even deeper into it. Georges Marchais wants to out-Herod the capitalists: more factories, more heavy technology, more states....

I found it most noteworthy that Georges Marchais' book opens with a hymn to high technology and productivity. In reality, the entire first chapter is a violent anti-ecological diatribe. This served to confirm what I already knew: a current violently critical of industrial societies is emerging in the working class and even among those of its members who are loyal to the PCF. To dam it up, Georges Marchais does not deal with specifics: he resorts to the most demagogic obscurantism, holding up for veneration a concept of science that has been obsolete for half a century. Pleased with it, he repeats with EDF [French Electric Company] that the danger of radioactivity is an invention of reactionary cowards!

In a general way, the lack of political imagination is disconcerting. The PCF always wants what is bigger, fatter, more numerous. It is always a question of repeating the past but at a quicker pace. The entrepreneurs of great spectacles for simpletons, of which the industrial world is in great need in these times of crisis, have thus found their best ally; Georges Marchais well deserves the title of principal co-director of today's industrial society. For my part, I salute the millions of individuals exploited, wronged, assassinated by the industrial mode of production and who will never find in this book the least call to revolt. For them, "L'Espoir au present" is slavery to production and the "carrot" of consumption in the senseless world that Georges Marchais finds, all in all, positive. [9516]

Charpy: Time of Contempt

Paris LE MATIN in French 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Commentary by Pierre Charpy, member of the Central Committee of the RPR, the Rally for the Republic, and director of LETTRE DE LA NATION-- passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] Georges Marchais actually surprised me by copying the title of Chapter 7 of his book from an RPR poster: "I believe in France." But I do not demand author's royalties from him for having appropriated for his own use a slogan with which we have plastered our walls.

This is but a minor detail of the liberties he takes with history. But this is no surprise: we have become used to it. Nevertheless, a bit of modesty would have counseled omission of the clandestine life of the communist party in the war. No, not him, all the same!

A bit of prudence would have caused him to slide over the meeting between French and Soviet communists last January. The story is too fresh, and everyone still remembers the final communique. Instead of a /"frank and open recognition of differences,"/ (Marchais version), it affirmed the /"solidarity"/ of the PCF with the invaders of Afghanistan. But, from the moment when he justifies the coup of Kabul by /"respect for the right of peoples to settle things for themselves,"/ lie and truth become words which for him no longer have any meaning. Otherwise Marchais would not dare to launch into the proof of the /"overall positive record of achievement of the socialist countries"/ with his crowning argument the price of a subway ticket in Moscow. Even Stalinism, which he denounces as has been the practice since the Khrushchev report, was a period of /"great social transformations for the benefit of the peoples concerned."/ In short the communist countries are so many paradises, where happiness is only disturbed by the tools of the capitalist countries. And if the peoples there are condemned to silence, it is because they are too busy to see the angels passing by.

The PCF naturally has a place of honor in this idyllic description. How beautiful is this French version of /"democratic centralism"/ as traced by the pen of Georges Marchais! Discussion therein is so free that one wonders how there could have been, this year in Paris, a "Fitzbin affair," and where ex-communist Pierre Daix could have even found the material for his new book, "The Heretics of the PCF." Problems with intellectuals? Go on now! Lenin was an intellectual, right? Besides, the whole party has become intellectual. The proof? It is said that the party is an /"intellectual collective."/ I do not know who says it: it is Marchais who writes it. One must need bow down to it, as to the party.

It is also so intelligent, the PCF, that it can be permitted to have a /"different vision"/ from that of its Soviet comrades on /"ways and means by which socialism could and should be developed,"/ which all the same does not mean that there are any differences on the final objective, or that /"French socialism"/ is different in nature from Russian socialism.

But what is French socialism? It is /"the present hope"/ ["l'Espoir au present"], a society where one tears down freely, not tomorrow but today.

The other society, the nonsocialist, is nothing but a den of thieves where the workers are bled by profiteers.

The first campaign salvo by Marchais, his book had to be /"political"/, as he said. In fact, it is only Manichean: everything is good on the one hand for the workers, and everything is bad on the other. One sentence is enough to summarize the whole: /"The more the employer makes, the more the worker loses. And vice-versa!"/

Marchais goes so far that even the workers whom he is addressing will not recognize themselves in this black tableau of their condition. They will be startled to read that /"certain austerity measures are even designed to hasten the age of death"/ so that /"he who dies younger will not get the annuities he has paid into for his retirement. Capitalism steals his life and then his money to boot."/

Everything is in this vein. The Marchais technique could be recognized: /"The worse things are, the better they are."/ But like all techniques, it has its limits. These limits are transgressed when Marchais takes all Frenchmen for imbeciles. This is what he does in this book which rather deserves to be titled "A Time of Contempt" than "L'Espoir au present." [9516]

CSO: 3100

PCF MAKES OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON 1981 BUDGET

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 24 Sep 80 p 3

[Excerpts] Andre Lajoinie made the following statement during a press conference.

[Text] "During their days of study, the communist deputies and senators reviewed the social and economic situation and the preparation of their activity for the next parliamentary session.

While the French are experiencing increasingly difficult living and working conditions, the Giscard-Barre government and its majority is knowingly lying to the public. Formulation of the Eighth Plan revealed the government's desire to conceal the serious worsening of foreseeable unemployment over the next few years. Presentation of the economic theories on which the budget is based, tends to make austerity accepted as the only possible policy.

This seventh appropriation bill emphasizes the overwhelming assessment of Giscard d'Estaing's 7-year term. Since 1974, prices have doubled, the number of unemployed has more than tripled and workers', civil servants' and farmers' income has dropped while company profits have doubled. It is the logical consequence of a carefully formulated policy whose first priority centers on satisfying monopolistic demands. The authoritarianism of the Giscardian power undermines democracy and freedom. It places national independence up for grab by aligning France's policy on the disastrous--for our people--demands of European integration.

It abandons an independent national defense for an integrated defense of our forces within the Atlantic bloc. It participates in the arms race by wanting to equip the French nuclear forces with the neutron bomb, a true offensive weapon, not a defensive one.

Far from being an "electoral" budget as asserted by the socialist parliamentary group, the 1981 budget is really an unemployment, inflation and austerity budget. It releases substantial credits and fiscal advantages to speed up the redevelopment of large companies. It creates very few jobs and

sacrifices people's basic needs in education, health, culture, sports and housing. It thus clashes head on with the interests and aspirations of youth.

It increases austerity through a very heavy tax pressure on both income and direct taxes burdening the workers, low-income families and senior citizens whose buying power was reduced by numerous price increases over the last few months. It increases the difficulties of local communities and public enterprises.

The budget policy supports an economic policy which sacrifices industrial equipment in sectors vital to our national independence, notably in the steel industry, energy, coal, chemistry, machinery, textile, etc.

Leading technological sectors like aeronautics are not getting the funds essential to their development.

The trade balance deficit and the heavier public debt are due to the weakening of our industry and to company shut-downs. The Giscardian power intends to give a handful of multinational companies the means to hold a few profit-making sectors and to increase their installation in foreign countries while restructuring their French base for this purpose. This leads to the destruction of important production facilities.

Adoption of the 1981 budget would result in increased austerity and a worsening of the French's difficulties with no contribution toward getting our country out of the crisis.

However, this policy is meeting with growing resistance from the workers. Many varied battles have forced the authorities to retreat, as witnessed by the taxation of oil companies. They can force them to amend the budget with the workers' interest in mind, whether it concerns income tax relief for the under privileged or the increase of funds of a social nature.

During the session, the communist parliamentarians will be the spokesman of these men and women who, all through France, and despite diversive and dividing tactics, refuse the inevitability of the crisis and, by fighting for the preservation of job security, are the responsible defenders of the national interest.

In addition to the budget discussion, the government intends to bring up for debate several draft bills of a dangerous nature like the Eighth Plan and the Peyrefitte bill which seriously challenge the workers' use of basic freedoms and rights in defense of their demands.

The government refuses the guidance debate approved by a vote demanded by the elect communist officials. This refusal to debate democratically illustrates its will to reduce the role of national representation.

Communist deputies and senators condemn the government's authoritarian attitude. Parliament must fulfill its role of elaboration, guidance and control of national policy. Consequently, they once again demand the rapid scheduling of a debate, followed by a vote, on the overall economic and social policy of the government.

Answers to Journalists

The communist deputies then answered the journalists' questions. Anicet Le Pors thus explained that there were three stages to the proposed bill aimed at democratizing the budget discussion to be submitted as early as the beginning of the next session. It would involve, first, a debate on the merits of the budget trends. Coming at the end of the spring session, it would provide the opportunity to limit the government on the eve of the summer session when, in the absence of any parliamentary control, it takes nefarious decisions for the workers. Then would come a debate on revenues as a whole. It would provide the opportunity to advance tax proposals on income, fortunes, companies, capital and the VAT [value added tax]. Finally, each of the ministerial budgets would be reviewed, thus resulting in the control of expenses. It would provide the opportunity to review Article 40 of the Constitution.

Communist parliamentarians aware of France's interests and of the necessity to safeguard peace will act for a truly independent national defense policy and to promote a policy aimed at reducing armaments.

The communist parliamentary group will submit, in the near future, a draft bill aimed at democratizing the budget debate and increasing the powers of Parliament in the control of the implementation of the appropriation bill.

6857

CSO: 3100

ITEMS EXEMPT FROM PRICE CONTROL LISTED

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 21 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] Radios, tape recorders, stereophonic sets, musical records, magnetic tapes, cameras, electric irons, deodorants, motorcycles, certain foodstuffs, ice-cream products, photocopying work, printing and developing of photographs, vulcanizers, and funeral parlors are some items and services, among many others, whose prices are being decontrolled. This pertains to the second list which the Ministry of Commerce has announced. The items and services which are included in this list are being exempted from the market control, and they will be watched only to make sure there is no price-gouging.

The first steps on the decontrol of certain prices were made 2 months ago. Now this is being extended also to the above items, in implementation of the new policy of the government, which aims at the liberalization of the market. And it is expected that this will be supplemented by decontrols on other items as well. Ultimately, only basic food commodities and fruits and vegetables will be left under market control.

The market control over the items and services which the second list contains will cease with the signing of the relevant decision by the minister of commerce in the next few days.

With the announcement of the list, Mr Dimas said that the freeing of the economy from monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions and its release from excessive governmental interventions and policing constitute the best way to fight against inflation.

"The implementation of this policy," said the minister, "resulted in a decline in the consumer price index of 1.7 percent in the 2-month period of July-August 1980, compared to an increase of 0.4 percent during the corresponding 2 months of 1979. The continuation of this policy is vindicated as a practical measure by the fact that the prices of those items which were decontrolled in July have decreased, remained stable, or increased less than their corresponding change in 1979.

"From the continuing study of the operating conditions of the market, it has been found that for a number of other products as well the competitive operating conditions of the market are sufficient, and consequently their prices can be decontrolled in the certainty that this event will not affect the consumer price index unfavorably.

"Also, the activation of the Competition Protection Service and the issuing of a significant number of decisions concerning imposing penalties on businesses which by their conduct have been restricting or altering competition are leading inevitably to a strengthening of competition--a fact which permits the further decontrol of the prices of other goods as well and a reduction of the market controls on prices. The Ministry of Commerce is resolved to use to the fullest the severity of the law on the "protection of competition," as well as to strengthen the market control on those items of popular consumption which directly affect the income of the consumers.

"Finally," Mr Dimas stressed, "the freeing of the market from monopolistic and governmental interventions boosts small manufacturing and industrial production, the result being an increase in the supply of these products, the strengthening of employment, and the reduction of inflation."

The table of items which are being decontrolled include the following items or categories of articles and services:

Calculators. Surveying instruments. Testing apparatus. Electric irons. Electric razors and hair-clippers. Sockets, plugs, jacks, and other similar items. Musical instruments and replacement parts for them. Radios. Tape recorders, stereophonic sets, and replacement parts for them. Cameras. Movie cameras and projectors. Musical records and magnetic tapes. Fans and ventilators. Appliances for artificially conditioning air (air conditioners). Electric toasters, toaster ovens, coffee-makers, and electric knives. Food grinders, presses, and electric mixers. Electric dry cells. Bookbinding and printing machinery. Deodorants generally. Polishes and varnishes for surfaces and footwear. Liquid-gas appliances except for ranges, space-heaters, and lamps in excess of 1,000 candle-power. Industrial gases in liquid form. Lead and products made from lead. Outdoors and camping articles. Motorcycles. Asbestos-cement items, except for corrugated and flat sheets and pipes with a diameter up to 4 inches. Scissors and shears generally. Needles for sewing, knitting, for sewing-machines, and so forth, pins. Glycerin and glycerin-containing solutions. Paraffin and products made from it. Vaseline and products made from it. Gypsum. Manufactured ice. Asphalt. Carob flour. Jams and fruit preserves in accordance with Articles 132 and 133 of the code. Foodstuffs and beverages. Vegetable juice. Catsup. Walnut fragments. Ice creams. Shelled sesame seeds. Fruit pulp. Tea. Sauces. Nougat. Chewing gum. Ground sesame. Honey. Grape or currant honey (syrup from must) and carob honey. Biscuits packaged in metal and paper boxes. Preserved fish eggs. Fruit preserved by drying. Fish oil. Malt. Hardtack (biscuits). Toasts and crackers prepared by bakeries. Graphic arts

materials. Rendering of services for the making or production of products on behalf of third parties (jobbing). Services rendered by the central vegetable-market organizations. Rental of baby scales. Denturists' fees. Tire and inner-tube repairs. Rendering of services by car washes. Photocopying work. Services rendered by funeral parlors. Services of printing and developing photographs. Services of making and installing awnings. Admission prices set by municipal parks. Cork and products from it. Electric hair driers.

12114

CSO: 4908

PSI CRAXI'S 15-POINT POLICY PLATFORM FOR THE EIGHTIES

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 28 Sep 80 pp 6-11

[Article by Bettino Craxi: "If That's a Brother Party..."]

[Text] "I can assure all who have been so kind as to worry about it that the state of my nerves is excellent. As a rule, the tougher things get the cooler I get. I would point out, though, that this habit of judging people who disagree with you not by what they argue, but by the state of their nerves, is a bad habit. We are a step away from the psychiatrico-political school which in other countries and in particular hospitals has known moments of true grandeur." That was Bettino Craxi, secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, talking. His is a party which, as Francesco De Vito and Guido Quaranta tell it on earlier pages of this issue, is now the center of some heated polemics, particularly on the part of the PCI. And this is happening just as it is getting ready for its own party congress in December, perhaps one of the most momentous in its history, since the intention is to assign the PSI a "fundamental" role among the left-wing parties and in the nation. On what theoretical and policy platform? As of now, it may be said that nobody knows the details yet, although the general outlines of this intention, announced after the 8 June elections have already been dubbed by those who helped draft them with a new name: neolabourism. To get some idea of this platform we asked Bettino Craxi for some of his views on the PCI, on the government, on the nation's economic situation, on our foreign policy, and on his idea of labourism. He responded with a 15-point essay summing up his plan for the eighties. Here it is.

1. The PCI can have a position of greater influence in the political conduct of the nation if it really wants one. It can also create a different situation among the left, if it is really interested in doing so. Instead of this, however, it is pursuing a line of alienation which can only lead to further breaks.

This is all very well for a group of Catho-communists who are committed to schematic plans: it cannot be good for a great party that has always been distinguished for its tactical flexibility and its ability to move.

2. The flaw that underlies such behavior is not just a matter of attitudes, as some believe. It lies in an underestimation -- if not worse -- of the whole fact of the left wing that is not communist, not hegemonized or hegemonizable by the communist party. But at this rate, when they are through they will find they have precious few people to talk to aside from a handful of Christian Democrats, most of them unsure whether or not they want anything to do with them.

3. It is from this same more or less Catho-communist mulchpile that spring all the pessimistic and catastrophic visions that impel some politicians to call for a higher order and a higher discipline. Insofar as we are concerned, we incline more toward confidence and optimism. We have confidence in the people, in the labor movement. We are optimistic about the nation's ability to get over its crisis, and in the contribution to that end that can come from the workers' movement and from its active readiness for renewal.

4. Vittorio Strada wrote recently that "the central issue about which an infinity of other problems turn is that of the significances attached to that epoch-making event we call the 'Leninist revolution.' That is a cluster of questions and issues which Eurocommunist historians and theoreticians -- including the Italians -- have committed the sin of looking at it head-on." I agree with him. But when I raised this issue 2 years ago, saying nothing new for that matter, I came under attack from all sides. I could not manage to engage in a serious discussion with the main communist spokesman. I did, however, gather a choice collection of quips and jokes and barbed pleasantries. I am now working on a new approach to the same problem, which boils down to the problem of the bottom line in the history and future of the left in Italy. The answers are disparate: some are encouraging, some are chilling and talk of "strange models."

5. It is a venerable tradition on the European left to take one's text from "models." It stems from those schools of thought which, in the past, used to illustrate specific logical systems as brands of utopia. Insofar as we are concerned today, we are not interested in setting up an Anglo-Saxon "Labourite" model, nor yet in employing a term which is, after all, alien to our tradition. The idea is rather to single out a few common postulates to reopen a dialogue, a prospect, an innovative plan of action to which all the forces of the left (the left being understood as the movement of all who work for a living, and not merely of workers as a "hegemonic class"). The goal is a con-

vergence, a coming together of minds among all those who "live by their own work." It is a coexistence of progressive traditions and of ideological schools in a critical climate of review, of open dialectics, of theoretical flexibility; it is precisely because of its theoretical flexibility that the Labour Party in the postwar period achieved its great growth into the most disparate social classes. It is by virtue of complete predisposition to accept what Webb used to call "the inevitability of gradualism" -- but which still looks like a great sacrifice to a particular kind of whimsical and inconclusive revolutionarism going around among the Italian left -- that it achieved a major share of its success. A different view of the party, of political groups and social groups that can come together in an open movement but cannot tolerate the "primacy" of the party and the leadership of the working class which is in turn led by the party. There is a heritage of experience in European socialism from which we can still draw a great deal, though of course we must be careful to draw the best, not the worst, and not forgetting, of course, that there is a whole new world to explore. Basically, there is no one model, no perfect theory of socialism: what we have rather is trials of socialism. There are mighty and very ancient human and civil ideals of freedom and equality that have moved forward through practical experience and are measured against the touchstone of history. The quarrels we are still getting tangled up in today are mainly the stuff of yesterday. No doubt about it: if in the eighties we go back to the language and the patterns of old-style communism we shall be trapped in a horribly difficult problem! I do not quail in the face of difficulty, though, and a lot of comrades in the Socialist Party and elsewhere on the left agree with me.

6. What about the DC? I am hard put to it to keep up with the shifting and overlapping movements inside the DC. It is a long standing rule of mine never to measure its progress by that of factional developments within its ranks, but I have always hewn to the general and strategic line that party took as a whole. This may explain my apparent indifference to some of their criticism. We have made a great effort to reestablish significant conditions for collaboration. From the outset we have made it clear that we were not talking about a general alliance, one beginning at the center and branching out from there everywhere. Within its limits, however, this new experiment was something we went into with conviction. Any political maneuver directed openly or obliquely at us would precipitate the severing of an axis for collaboration. When a thing is broken, it is broken; and the judge in this case is still the nation.

7. Asking the socialists who have returned to a government coalition after 7 years' absence to declare bankruptcy seems to me completely irrational. Nobody should cry scandal if socialists give as good as they get in such exchanges. We do not identify with the Cossiga government, as the usual manichaeans write. But

we are, for all that, an integral part of it and we support it with loyalty, with realism, and without any trace of triumphalism. Certainly the time will come for change: but it will come when we see some clearer ideas and the conditions that justify it. The "troubled autumn" does not seem to me the proper season for crises, traumatic changes of course, or risking paralysis. Having said that, we do not claim to have solved the problem of governability. We are making our contribution to its solution, and that is no simple matter. We know that without reform in our organizational and institutional stance and without support from other centers of civil and social representation governability will remain an aspiration. We are trying, however, to achieve at least the minimum level of it, but that minimum level is a far cry from sufficient for any government action of broad political scope.

8. We socialists have set the good example. Merely by making young and energetic talent, not jaded with long-past and over-chewed experience, available to our institutions is a great service Italian socialism renders to our democracy. There is a lot of snide insinuation about the PSI's vigor and its ambitions, which some would like to exorcise. Methinks I can spy, behind these insinuations and incantations, the workings of a party of immobilists which has its members just about anywhere you look, a party that uses the very same arguments, albeit obliquely or upside-down, in its dealings with us. The truth is that it is not the PSI they fear: they are afraid of the contagion of the policy of renewal and reform of which the PSI is the source and the example.

9. The government is holding its ground. It is flagging at the parliamentary level but it is facing up to difficulties with the best of wills. It was not formed to last the life of a legislature, but neither was it formed to languish a few short weeks. It has said from the outset that it intended to do an emergency job, to fill a void, to look to the legislature's future. Nobody, though, seems to be committed to a long-term operation. We hear calls for the unopposed resignation of the government but nobody says what different sort of government could replace it. The desire for something "better" is certainly laudable. All of us want something "better," and of course it is always possible to do better. Provided, of course, that you set about it with consistency.

10. On the other hand, it is wise to navigate carefully amid extremes and extremists. Look at a brand new case -- make that two cases -- having to do with Afghanistan and the USSR. On the one hand we have Berlinguer who, struck by sudden amnesia in the course of his speech in Bologna, went through a long list of nations that were victims or principals in tragic events,

citing Namibia, South Africa, South Korea, Zimbabwe, Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua -- but forgot to mention Afghanistan. On the other hand we have the foreign office people over in the Farnesina who take exception to a cabinet minister's visit to Moscow as part of normal relations between nations, so as not to displease our most powerful ally. Nobody has ever said a word about this particular line of conduct. That would be a kind of "Kabulism" turned upside-down. Channels to the USSR must be kept open and economic cooperation must go on as before. We have already made the mistake of going along with pointless sanctions against Iran. We must be on our guard against all sorts of extremism and against inferiority complexes. It is no simple matter to put together a foreign policy worthy of the name. Any effort in that direction will therefore get our support and backing. Getting the recipe just right is always a very complex undertaking: you must stick to principles, keep faith with your allies, broaden your relationships, and never forget your manners. If a cabinet minister cannot go to Moscow, we shall simply have lost the chance to get a hearing for an opinion or to spot a field where we might take a hand.

11. The agreement with Malta was a far-sighted piece of policy and a triumph for Italian diplomacy. It involved a lot of foot-dragging resistance and a lot of opinions more or less unvoiced. And yet the issue was clear. Malta's neutrality coincides with the interests of a small people who want to turn over a new leaf and shed the role thrust upon them -- that of being essentially a military springboard; and it coincides with Italy's interests and those of the Mediterranean region in general, a region in which we are, so to speak, up to our necks. A guarantee of Malta's neutrality should be underwritten by Libya, Algeria, and France, as was originally planned. We finally reached the point of signing the agreement, after years of waiting and pleading, at perhaps the worst possible moment. The issue was heated up and the agreement was tinged with anti-Libyan feeling which is not there and was never intended to be there. Historically, our party is a friend to Libya. Our fathers defended the independence of the Libyan people against the colonialism of their own country. We looked with a sympathetic eye and warm hearts at the young officers' revolution. Now we feel very deep concern at something we do not understand in Tripoli's policy and in the role Tripoli wants to play in the Mediterranean and in Africa. It goes without saying that there is great mutual interest in developing good relations. But such relations must be cultivated on a level of parity, of mutual respect, of non-interference, of good manners and of respect for international rules. What we find, instead, are dark spots and disturbing questions. The Mediterranean has become a powderkeg, and any venturesome militaristic move could touch off explosions. Clarification is absolutely indispensable. I hear rumors that Qadhafi would like

to pay a visit to Italy. Let him come, by all means. His visit would provide a fine chance to start the clarification process and do some frank talking. There is an economic chapter. There is also a political one and another that has to do with terrorism. There is one that has to do with Italian citizens in Libya, those who are working there and those whose business there nobody seems to know. Disturbing reports have been flooding into Rome from reliable sources, and those reports need to be checked out. What is going on in the 20 or so ideological and military training camps for foreigners, where the language of the land where the orange-blossoms bloom has been heard. Are there Italians in Ain el Beida and at Nir al Ghanem, or at Ras Hilal, at Bu Hadi, near Tripoli, at Derna, at Tobruk? Between neighbors who work together and want good relations, things ought to be out in the open. And we, I repeat, must stick to the path of good relations.

12. There is a new instalment in the chapter on right-wing terrorism. The first sign of it emerges from the circumstances preceding the death of Judge Amato: very grave matters upon which we must demand the full light of publicity. Amato's public criticisms before he was murdered, his concerns, and the troubles he was experiencing are frightening, and I hope that whatever comes out of it all will not simply be dropped.

13. The "devaluation party" had formed and twice mounted the attack. Now it has pulled back to lick its wounds. Even so, it put up a tough fight. First in June, with a massive effort, and then again in August, not quite so effectively, it was necessary to stand up to a well-planned attack. The governor of the Bank of Italy behaved with the utmost propriety, and even the government did not waver. There were rumors of maneuvering inside the sanctuaries of power. I heard them, but did not follow up on them. I am as curious as the next man, but I am neither a policeman nor a financier. If anybody wants more specific information he can ask the ministers concerned.

14. A national policy becomes even more difficult to put together when it is constrained, as it is, on one side by growing isolationist feeling and on the other by the pressure of multinational strategies. Carniti recently reminded the government of the fundamental role of organized labor with respect to the government and to the decision-making process. He told it like it was. From that plain talk, however, stem several consequences to the broader responsibilities with which the labor movement has been vested. There is a corporative invasion afoot, and it must be dealt with on pain of losing all semblance of the logic of collective solidarity and of worsening the crisis of the principal collective bodies.

15. There is a remarkable way of oversimplifying things in this country, and it consists in blaming everything that goes wrong on the politicians as a class. Nobody remembers that we also have a "non political" ruling class, and that it needs faster replacement. The industrial ruling class, private and public, is one example. There have been some staggering errors committed in industrial policy -- both in the private and in the public sector -- which nobody is aware of. And now should the people who have been laid off, and the public coffers, should pay for those mistakes? This is not right or just. We must learn to distinguish between the difficulties inherent in the domestic and international market and blunders in planning forecasts. Not to mention the rest.

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MINISTER DE KONING INTERVIEWED ON DEVELOPMENT AID POLICIES

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[Report on interview with Minister of Development Cooperation Jan de Koning, by Wim Brummelman: "Aid Assistance, That We Do Ourselves; but a Financial Monetary Policy, That We Cannot Achieve Ourselves"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] During the UN conference on development cooperation in New York, which ended last week and was largely a failure, it was apparent once again that the EC, as a united political bloc, does not exist. Even on such a relatively simple subject as the level of development aid to be provided, there were hopeless differences. "It is a scandal that they did not get any further than a very vague indication," said Minister Jan de Koning of Development Cooperation.

ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD spoke with the government official about cooperation within the EC context, about the IMF, about the OPEC countries and also about the Dutch position during the UN conference. De Koning: "Undoubtedly, the Dutch statement compared favorably with that of any other Western country, from the point of view of the developing countries, but also from the point of view of a good development of the whole world economy."

Minister De Koning's preference to subordinate the Dutch input in international conferences on development cooperation to the position chosen by the European Community as a whole, is widely known. This preference is not inspired so much by ideological considerations as by the sober realization that the Netherlands alone, without the EC, does not represent anything at the international political level.

This does not mean, however, that Minister De Koning is willing to walk in step with Europe under all circumstances. "There are parts which are of such great value to us that, when the EC takes an insufficiently positive position in this respect, we will ultimately decide to operate on a smaller, but better basis, rather than take advantage of the political heavyweight -- which the EC is, after all -- to push important matters through," said the minister in an interview with INTERMEDIAR, which was published on the eve of the UN conference in New York.

At the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations in New York, the size of the development aid to be given in the coming years proved to be such a subject about which, in De Koning's opinion, the EC took an "insufficiently positive" position.

The Netherlands, and also Denmark, backed the demand of the developing countries that the rich countries transfer at least 0.7 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to the poor countries, in the form of official development aid. This aim should be attained no later than 1984. But the other EC countries would not hear of it. This was a reason for the Netherlands to choose its own position.

De Koning: "The points of view were miles apart. The Federal Republic of Germany and England, for example, did not want to accept any time limit. The Netherlands then expressly reserved the right to differ from the EC position, if such a position were to be developed."

[Question] Our EC partners not only took an extremely reserved position on the issue of official development aid. They were very unsympathetic on all fronts. Did the Netherlands step out of the EC club in other areas as well in New York?

[De Koning] No, not really. You might say that during the conference, the Netherlands continuously exerted its influence to achieve a wording, as progressive as possible, within the EC context. To come as close as possible in the neighborhood of the Group of 77. But it is clear that, for example, in the area of trade policy, an EC position is the only one to hold water. It so happens that the trade policy of the member states has been delegated to the EC. It is also clear in the area of financial monetary policy, that isolated action by the Netherlands would not make any sense at all. Aid assistance, that we do by ourselves. But a financial monetary policy, that we cannot carry out by ourselves. And the same applies for energy matters.

Dogmatic

[Question] It is not easy to cooperate with the EC partners. Have you become more pessimistic?

[De Koning] During the 3 years that I have been here, it has been my experience, first of all, that the developing countries attach great value to an EC position. Secondly, that to influence positively an EC position is extremely difficult because there are countries which, for economic reasons -- England -- or for dogmatic political reasons -- Federal Republic of Germany -- are not willing to take a position which would come a little closer to the developing countries. Thirdly, I have noticed that the authority of the various ministers of development cooperation within the Community is so dissimilar that real decisions can hardly be made. Most of my colleagues only have authority in the area of aid assistance, or even only for part of that.

[Question] If development cooperation were to be considered important, they would certainly send representatives who really have something to say.

[De Koning] Yes. This point may not be the most important, but it does considerably hamper the work of the EC development council (which includes all the ministers of development cooperation of the member states), because it has to concern itself with too narrow an area. But the most important matter is indeed the political position of the countries.

[Question] So it is proven at every turn that the Netherlands takes a different position from that of the other EC countries. The question remains: isn't there

a point where it would make more sense for our country, in a political sense, to step outside the EC club and to choose its own position, together with, for example, Denmark and other like-minded countries?

[De Koning] We were willing to do this in terms of aid policy. The developing countries took note of this with sympathy, but have not made any further use of it. Understandably, because they get nothing out of it.

[Question] In other words: it is nice, but...

[De Koning] At this point, it is not even valued by the developing countries. This was made very clear this time. We said that we were willing to support the demand of the developing countries, 0.7 percent for 1984. But the developing countries themselves came up with a much more vague formula, because they could only find four Western supporters -- the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden -- for this hard formula. In the end, the much more vague formula gave them all the votes, except for the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

Look, for me and my colleagues from the Scandinavian countries, the acceptance of that 0.7 percent in 1984 was a sign of good will. A sign of dependability, to show that we really want to do something about economic relationships in the world. This is why we attach so much importance to a reaching of that goal by the Western countries. Because if that cannot even be achieved, then it will not be possible to take any action at all with regard to much more difficult matters, such as the restructuring of one's own industry, to name but the most difficult one. Well, if it appears during the negotiations that they are not even willing to give that signal, then we will say: then we will have to be willing to act independently in this regard. But then it is, after all, understandable that the developing countries, who have a great deal of sensitivity for the political and economic relationships in the world, say: that is nice of you, but we prefer not to take you up on it.

If I were a developing country, I would not be interested in support from the Netherlands, plus three even smaller countries, either. Then I would also be interested in getting the support of as many Western countries as possible.

Unreal

[Question] And yet, the Netherlands is criticized for its attitude in international negotiation. It is said that the Netherlands is no longer a front runner. Yugoslav Minister of Development Cooperation Cabric has said that the influence of the Netherlands in the Third World is waning.

[De Koning] I believe that what Cabric said is wrong. I also feel that it is unreal. The opinion of Yugoslavia also differs from that of the hardliners in the Group of 77. Yet, Yugoslavia did not leave that group. And rightly so, because Yugoslavia can only exert an influence within that Group of 77. But then, it is a little unfair to reproach us for never leaving the Western group. The same applies to us: we can only exert an influence within the Western group.

In my speech at the meeting of the Brandt Commission in the Hague last spring, I expressed this as follows: "The Netherlands must maintain relations within the EC, within the Western group of countries, within the group of like-minded countries

and with the Group of 77. Each relationship has its own value. If one of these relationships is broken, then we suffer a political defeat. Politically speaking, it is naive to pay attention only to relations with the Group of 77. This does that Group no good, one does not buy anything with that."

Fund

Energy and international financial and monetary relationships, these are the two subjects which lately have become central to negotiations between rich and poor. With regard to the second point, the financial-monetary matters, the issue to be discussed is the role of the IMF, the International Monetary Fund. The question is whether the IMF does enough justice to the independent position of the developing countries.

During the meeting of the Brandt Commission in the Hague, Minister De Koning also had something to say about this. He noted that private banks, which, in the past, to a substantial degree took care of the recycling of oil dollars, are no longer willing or able to carry that responsibility. To prevent the flow of capital to developing countries from drying up, there is an urgent need for new initiatives, said De Koning. And at that he pointed in the direction of the IMF.

[De Koning] With regard to those remarks, I got unusually quick results. IMF Director Larosiere has announced that, at the end of this month, he will present the management of the IMF with a proposal to make available \$25 billion, for a period of more than 10 years and with concessionary conditions, for assistance to developing countries. This is precisely the kind of financial operation I asked for in May of this year.

It is not only the fact that the IMF gives (balance of payments) assistance to developing countries in need, which is important, but particularly also the conditions under which this is done. De Koning at the meeting of the Brandt Commission: "Up to now, the conditions of the Fund have been primarily directed toward a restoration of equilibrium in the balance of payments, and the Fund has generally requested drastic measures from the countries to which it gives loans. Measures of this kind, such as a reduction of consumption demand, are acceptable for highly developed countries. For developing countries, where the subsistence level of the people is borderline, such conditions are no longer suitable. One cannot ask someone who is practically starving to death, to tighten the belt on account of the equilibrium of the balance of payments."

Van der Stee

That was in May. In June, Minister of Finance Van der Stee issued the "Memorandum concerning management conditions related to credits from the IMF." It includes, among other things: unhappiness about the conditions is understandable, "especially in countries where many people live at the subsistence level," but: "This does not alter the fact that, even in those countries, an untenable balance of payments position makes adjustment unavoidable." And, according to Van der Stee, for the IMF to set criteria with regard to domestic distribution questions is contrary to the assumption that the fund does not interfere in the domestic affairs of a country. The conclusion reached by the minister of finance is: "With regard to the revised guidelines concerning conditionality, it is the general opinion and mine as well, that for the time being no new initiatives are considered necessary."

[Question] Isn't your story a little divergent in tone from that of Van der Stee on some issues?

[De Koning] Well, they are two sides of the same coin. We both agree that the IMF should provide opportunities to restore a country's balance of payments. The only question is: under what conditions? Do these conditions allow the developing countries in question, if they so desire, to pursue their economic growth and to maintain the purchasing power of their poorest groups? One of the most important conditions involves the duration of the loans. Up to now, except for a few exceptions, this duration could only be rather short because the IMF receives the majority of its monetary reserves from the rich countries. This must be withdrawable immediately, so to speak. What the IMF management has proposed is for the IMF to take out long term loans on the capital market and thus enable it to effect long term lending. Thus, the developing countries are given the opportunity to spread measures, which are absolutely necessary, -- I fully agree with Van der Stee on this point -- to restore their balance of payments to a healthy condition, over a longer period of time.

[Question] What do you mean then when you say that the conditions under which the IMF provides assistance, should also be directed toward development goals?

[De Koning] That the IMF make its funds available in such a way that it would be possible for a developing country to maintain its policy of subsidies -- because this is what it is really all about -- for certain groups. That a necessary depreciation of the currency, for example, be coupled with measures which act as a compensation for the weakest groups. Only the country itself can make a decision to this effect. But whether such measures will be taken, obviously depends to a large degree on the total financial framework one will have to deal with. That should give the developing countries sufficient room.

Interest Rate

[Question] And this condition would be met with long term credit?

[De Koning] Yes, this way you give the developing countries more opportunities... A second important point, of course, is the interest rate used by the IMF. The IMF management has not yet expressed its views on this subject.

[Question] The assumption that you and Minister Van der Stee are not fully aligned with regard to the IMF, is wrong then?

[De Koning] The memorandum on the IMF was discussed with me before it went to the House.

[Question] Why didn't you co-sign that memorandum then?

[De Koning] The IMF falls exclusively under the responsibility of the minister of finance. A double signature would give the impression that we are both responsible for the IMF policy. That is not the case. But there is, of course, an internal consistency in the government policy with regard to the IMF.

[Question] But that doesn't mean that there could not be any differences in emphasis between you and your colleague, does it?

[De Koning] But they cannot result in policy differences. Of course, there is a difference in the way we look at it. I tend to look at the IMF from the angle of the interest of developing countries, while the Ministry of Finance tends to look at the IMF from the point of view of the interest of a healthy financing of the whole world economy. These two things are not opposite. The developing countries benefit from a well functioning world economy and vice versa -- and that may not be sufficiently realized yet -- the interest of a healthy development of the world economy is served by an improvement in the position of the developing countries.

A Voice

[Question] Another aspect is the question of developing countries having a voice in the financial monetary area. The Brandt Commission said that the share of developing countries in the staffing, the management and the decision making of the IMF should be enlarged. You did not refer to it in your speech during the meeting of the Brandt Commission.

[De Koning] A voice within the IMF is tied to the financial contribution one has made to the total IMF capital. If that is going to be changed, it will be very difficult to find another satisfactory distribution key. I have the feeling that this cannot be discussed yet. I also believe that the developing countries are much more interested in being able to talk about international monetary policy, rather than that they already have a clear picture of how they might possibly want to change influence relationships.

It is also understandable that those who brought in the money, the rich countries, are rather reluctant to give a greater voice to third parties. Some of them -- as someone in New York put it -- because they are not at all in favor of debtors taking over the bank, and others because they say: it is of the utmost importance that the IMF keep the confidence of the financial backers. If the rich countries are no longer willing to make their monetary reserves available, then that would be the end of the game. Then the IMF would no longer function.

[Question] You say that the Group of 77 wants to talk about financial-monetary structures without immediately demanding a greater voice. And yet, the rich countries didn't want to talk about that in New York. Why not?

[De Koning] The Western countries took the position that financial monetary matters could be discussed within UN context, but that the decisions have to fall within the framework of the IMF. All the rich countries agree that the jurisdiction of the specialized bodies of the United Nations cannot be tampered with. The developing countries did not oppose this, but they did propose a form of discussions which gave the rich countries the impression -- rightly or wrongly -- that IMF decisions would be brought up again for discussion in a UN context anyhow. This is where the procedural negotiations concerning a new round of worldwide negotiations (a kind of new North-South dialogue which should start next year) broke down.

The Netherlands could agree with an intermediary proposal made by the president of the study group in question, the Yugoslav Cobryna. For us, it is important that it was said that in the new round of negotiations, decisions can only be made by

consensus. This gives us enough assurance that the jurisdiction of the IMF will not be affected. Nor that IMF decisions will be brought up again for discussion within the United Nations.

OPEC

[Question] But for the other Western countries, this guarantee was not sufficient. The debate broke off at that point. On the other hand, there is the energy problem. Now the OPEC countries could say: you don't want to talk about financial-monetary matters, we don't talk about energy.

[De Koning] That could be. The OPEC countries are going to discuss the energy problem in November. Then we will see in how far the OPEC countries are really willing to make concessions on the issue of energy to the Western countries and to the non-oil producing developing countries.

[Question] Following the failure of last year's UNCTAD conference, the announcement by the OPEC countries that they wanted to put the energy problem on the agenda of the development cooperation negotiations, was somewhat of a surprise. They had never been willing to do this previously. If this pledge is withdrawn, wouldn't the Western countries have brought this on themselves by their obstinacy at the New York conference?

[De Koning] I do not believe that that would be justified. I believe that the rich countries may indeed proceed on the assumption that OPEC is willing to discuss energy. And that the non-oil producing developing countries may also assume this. Last year, in Havana, it was decided to put the energy problem on the agenda. And that offer still holds! But the implementation of it is another matter; that can indeed be done in all kinds of ways.

[Question] For example, via a very vague wording.

[De Koning] Or with a very one-sided wording. That concessions are made with respect to certain countries and not with respect to other countries.

Shortsighted

[Question] This would be understandable as a means to vent feelings of dissatisfaction about the current state of affairs.

[De Koning] Not really. I would find it rather shortsighted. If the OPEC countries are genuinely concerned with improving the position of the poorest developing countries and with effecting real changes in the functioning of the world economy, then they are also bound to be willing to do something for this. In the form of concrete offers in the area of energy. The fact that a 2 week conference did not produce a satisfactory final result, should not be of decisive importance in this regard.

[Question] There is increasing speculation about the possibility that the OPEC countries might arrange matters themselves with the countries of the Third World. There has even been talk about an alternative IMF. Is there a chance that matters will develop in that direction?

[De Koning] That is, in any case, conceivable. The main danger of such a development would lie in the fact that partial solutions might be reached. These are by nature rather unfair. It could happen, for example, that the OPEC countries might say: we are going to expand our development aid and the financing of developing countries, but then only for Islamic countries.

[Question] A few Arab countries have already said that they also want to help non-Islamic developing countries.

[De Koning] But it remains partial. It depends totally on them. Then they can decide what has to be done and what does not.

Reduced Willingness

[Question] It does indeed remain a partial solution, but OPEC could proceed on the point of view that if the rich countries are totally opposed, then we will do something ourselves; that is the next best thing.

[De Koning] More partial solutions are conceivable. It is also conceivable that some rich countries may make a deal with some oil countries. Then everyone else would be further excluded. You could imagine a hypothetical situation where countries such as the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany would say: all right, we are covering our own energy needs. And this would greatly reduce their willingness to make concessions to the poorest countries on that basis.

[Question] Is that then the aim of those Western countries?

[De Koning] No, I do not believe that. But they might well be lured or forced in that direction. And this would mean that for a number of developed countries the world would become even more uncertain than it already is, and that for a number of developing countries the only thing left to solve their problems would be the charity of the rich countries.

[Question] Who would either lure or force the rich countries?

[De Koning] If there is no willingness on the part of the OPEC countries to achieve a global, worldwide arrangement with regard to the energy problem, then I believe that a number of developed countries and a number of oil producing countries would indeed say: then we will just have to do it on a bilateral basis.

[Question] And there are oil countries which would lend themselves to this?

[De Koning] It is difficult to look behind the screen of the OPEC countries. There is, of course, a solidarity among the OPEC countries, which is also worth something. The question is: how long will this solidarity hold?

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ALGERIA CANCELS NATURAL GAS CONTRACT, CONSEQUENCES ANALYZED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 20 Sep 80 pp 64-69

[Article by H. J. Loeman: "Surplus of Natural Gas, Still Shortage Threatens"]

[Text] Algeria has in fact torn up the contract with the Netherlands Gas Union for the yearly delivery of 5.6 billion cubic meters of LNG [Liquid Natural Gas]. It is a blow to employment and industrial development around Eemshaven, where the LNG would have been unloaded in the mid-eighties. It is not a blow to our own energy supply, which is not threatened by it. That does not alter the fact that for a number of Western European natural gas consumers a really precarious situation will arise after 1985.

A period of scarcity, which was predicted last year by some energy experts, is beginning to clearly develop, because of the uncooperative attitude which Algeria is assuming. In countries such as Belgium, France and especially the FRG, which also have concluded long term LNG contracts with the Algerian state enterprise SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons], one can be more concerned than we in the Netherlands, who still have a substantial natural gas reserve.

A bit of history will make a great deal clear. At the beginning of the sixties, natural gas contributed hardly 2 percent of the Western European primary energy supply. Likewise—and not last of all—this share has increased in almost 20 years to over 14 percent because of the discovery of Groningen gas, a percentage, which theoretically can be increased. For

the fact is that the world natural gas reserve is enormous: about 70,000 billion cubic meters, a figure which only makes an impression, if you think of the scope of "Slochteren" in its initial stage: over 2,000 billion cubic meters. Consequently the world still has 35 Slochterens available and that would be more than sufficient to remain on top of the energy situation, even if the oil supplies begin to dry up in 20 to 25 years. A pleasant prospect, which however, is no more than a poor consolation for our generation. With the exception of a few countries with their own supplies, Great Britain, Norway and the Netherlands, Western Europe's natural gas supply does not appear very bright in the short term. Insiders fear that a situation of acute shortages for most European countries will arise about 1985.

Reasons:

The complete disappearance of Iran as a supplier;

Algeria's changed attitude about LNG export;

The aggressive price policy of countries such as Algeria and Libya which has a very retarding effect.

The question of Western Europe, in a period when after Afghanistan a new cold war begins to take shape, the Soviet Russian offer to deliver Siberian natural gas, whether or not to accept; and

The certainty that natural gas supplies which could help Western Europe with the problem--the Norwegian section of the North Sea, Saudi Arabia, Canada, will become available, at the earliest, at the beginning of the nineties.

The Shah's Iran was not only the world's second oil exporter, it also had a substantial gas supply of 10,700 cubic billion meters, which amounts to 15.5 percent of the world reserve. Iran naturally still possesses this wealth, but the revolutionary Islamic government does not intend--read: is not able--to lift a finger about it. An agreement exists that Iran must deliver yearly to the Soviet Union 11.5 billion cubic meters of gas via the IGAT--2 pipeline. And amount intended for industry in southern Russia, which, however, would put the Soviet Union in a position to conclude new delivery contracts with countries such as Austria, Italy and Switzerland. However, angry words arose because of an extreme price increase dictated by Iran, with the result that the

IGAT-2 project was stopped in March 1980. It is not likely that this conflict will be settled soon. The chaos in Khomeyni's Iran is too great for that. In some energy scenarios (among others, Phillips Petroleum), the possibility that Iran will deliver natural gas to Western Europe in the eighties, is no longer considered.

This blow is now followed by the not very flexible attitude, which Algeria has assumed as OPEC's largest natural gas exporter. Boumedienne's Algeria concluded in an early stage a series of long term contracts with energy enterprises in the United States and France. In 1969 an agreement was made with El Paso Natural Gas Company in America for the yearly delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of LNG. Because of delays, caused to a great extent by the broad safety standards which the Americans set up for importing LNG, the deliveries only began in 1979. The price of gas then was already increasing considerably. The Algeria of Chadli Benjedid asserted that this El Paso transaction caused Algeria a loss of \$300 million.

Tedious price negotiations followed with El Paso and the other customer, the state enterprise, French Gas Company, which were spoiled in March 1980 by the complete stoppage of deliveries to El Paso. The French Gas Company, which is dependent on Sahara Gas for 12.5 percent of its requirements, was also supplied since January 1980 by fits and starts. However, at this time the transport of LNG has again reached its former level--11 LNG tankers per month--without an agreement on the price increase demanded by Algeria (twice the price). Consequently, as regards the French Gas Company, there is every appearance that the deliverer has reduced its demands.

As regards price, Algeria is "a hawk" among the oil countries, consequently it has a demanding attitude about the price of gas. It wants to couple this with the price of low sulphur crude oil, which has increased considerably. Moreover it demands an export price from its border. This is completely unacceptable for the French Gas Company as well as El Paso.

LNG transport is seven times as expensive as crude oil transport. If these high transport costs are calculated along with the considerably increased LNG price, this natural gas becomes unmarketable in the importing country. This is certainly true for Western Europe where the market value of natural gas is determined to a great extent by the replacement value of other fuels. Too expensive imports of natural gas lead, without any further ado, to higher oil and coal consumption.

Neither the French Gas Company or El Paso rejects a somewhat higher price. This would then have to be paid at the border of the importing country and be coupled with the price of household fuel oil/gas oil, whose market value is considerably lower than expensive crude oil.

This price crisis not only causes long delays in the international gas trade, it has, moreover, shocked all customers who have concluded long term gas contracts with Algeria. The demand for an extremely high price and resorting to pressure tactics such as completely stopping export, now arouses distrust.

The breaking of the agreement with the Netherlands Gas Union to deliver it yearly—for 20 years—5.6 billion cubic meters of LNG is not unexpected. Whoever read in the French press last month that the Algerian minister of energy, Belkacem Nabi, who at the same time is director of the state enterprise SONATRACH, "emphasized definitely ending the LNG experiment," knew enough.

Consequently we can wonder what will happen to the other LNG contracts which SONATRACH has concluded with other European energy enterprises. Besides the Gas Union, they are as follows.

Company	Quantity*	From
District Gas (Belgium)	5.2	1982
Ruhrigas (Germany)	5.2	1983
Thyssengas (Germany)	4.0	1984
Deutsche BP	4.6	1985
French Gas Company (France)	5.1	1985

*billion cubic meters

The Netherlands Gas Union makes an observation against its better judgment, emphasizing that the LNG contract with SONATRACH is still not officially cancelled. Moreover, one hopes for an interim solution. If the Arzew-3 liquification plant does not appear there, which now is almost certain, there is always still the possibility of delivering a certain amount of LNG through the two existing liquification plants on the Algerian coast. This is all the more probable because a big gap has appeared due to the complete stoppage of LNG deliveries to El Paso.

The Americans firmly refuse to agree to doubling prices, but meanwhile negotiations between the American Department of Energy and SONATRACH are again in progress. It appears there are good chances of resumption of deliveries. What interim solution the Gas Union has in mind is naturally questionable.

The only LNG transport project which is still pending--although the current contract is still not signed--is the transport of 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas yearly from Nigeria, beginning in 1984. This is such a modest amount that construction of a high priced gasification plant at Eemshaven would not be very remunerative. If it is still desired to realize this project then there remains as a last chance, making an effort to unload at Eemshaven the Nigerian LNG which is purchased by the FRG--3 billion cubic meters per year. However, some FRG ports, including Wilhelmshaven, will certainly oppose this.

Italy is the only EEC country which does not have to suffer from the Algerian aversion to LNG transport. It expects that it now will be able to cover almost a third of its natural gas requirement with Algerian gas.

Work is proceeding at full speed on the pipeline which will connect the enormous gas field at Hassi R'Mel in the Sahara with the Italian mainland. This gas pipeline, 1950 kilometers long, which is being financed partially by the EEC and the European Investment Bank, runs via Tunisia and Sicily to Italy. It is expected that this pipeline with a yearly capacity of 18 billion cubic meters will be ready in several years.

Plans are also ready for laying a second pipeline. Now that enthusiasm seems to be subsiding, people in Western Europe, as well as Greece and Yugoslavia are beginning to consider the realization of this second project credible. For that matter, it surely will have to come, if Algeria wants to increasingly supply its natural gas in nonliquified form.

It is clear that southern and central European countries will benefit mainly from this project. Transport of natural gas from the Sahara by pipelines to the Netherlands, Belgium, northern France and the FRG is an extremely expensive matter, which according to the Gas Union would cost the Netherlands alone, several hundred million guilders more than transport with LNG tankers.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, in spite of the loss of Iranian gas, has offered to increase exports to Western Europe substantially. That is to say by pipeline, through which gas can be transported from Western Siberia to Central Europe and from there to France, the FRG and eventually Belgium and the Netherlands. The Russians have no shortage of natural gas. According to the monthly (Sovetsky Soyun) production has quadrupled the last 15 years and the available reserves have risen to 24,000 billion cubic meters (consequently, that is approximately 14 Slochterens).

Russian gas is already being delivered: 10 billion cubic meters a year to the FRG, 3 billion cubic meters to France, 6 billion cubic meters to Italy and 2 billion cubic meters to Austria. They want to first double this amount, provided the purchasers pay the bill partially with materials and technical know-how. Negotiations have begun with the above mentioned customers and it is expected that the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark will soon be involved in these negotiations. The (Sovetsky Soyun) asserts that exports can be increased at the end of the eighties by or to 40 billion cubic meters a year. This is not quite clear. The periodical also mentions the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg as potential new buyers of Siberian gas.

In any case, Western Europe will not be able to cope with the period of greatest scarcity, which is expected around 1985, with Russian gas, if it ever is bought.

The same is true for the natural gas which Saudi Arabia has available. It is true, this richest of all oil countries has only three small gas fields, but during oil production--still about 9.5 million barrels per day--an enormous amount of so-called associated gas is released. At the moment 80 percent of this is flared off, consequently burned up uselessly. A waste which makes the hair of many in the West stand on end. When oil production in these countries began--in 1950 Aramco produced only 540,000 barrels a day--the gas released thereby was regarded as an undesirable and useless by-product. There was nothing else to do, but burn it up. It was decided to end this only in 1974. Great progress still cannot be reported. About 15 billion cubic meters can be made available yearly to one's own industry, 8 billion cubic meters is put back into the ground and over 50 billion cubic meters are still burned up. Saudi Arabia is now making large investments--they are working on a five-year plan--to use this associated gas commercially.

The question is whether Western Europe can also benefit from this. There are four transport routes, one of which--transport of LNG around the Cape of Good Hope--can be left out of consideration as much too expensive, the other three offer possibilities.

LNG transport via the Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Red Sea and the Suez Canal is a distance of 12,000 kilometers to Western Europe. If the Suez Canal is made passable for LNG tankers with a cargo capacity of more than 125,000 cubic meters, this route is conceivable.

Another prospect is gas transport via a pipeline 1,300 kilometers long across the Arabian peninsula to Jeddah on the Red Sea and from there as LNG via the Suez Canal to Europe. This would shorten the gas tanker route by 4,650 kilometers.

Another solution is gas transport via a pipeline to a harbor somewhere on the Mediterranean Sea and from there as LNG to Western Europe. One could possibly run the pipeline through Iraq and Turkey to Southeastern Europe. However, it is not a very attractive opportunity because of the many border crossings.

Energy experts think that Arabian gas--Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar also produce natural gas--will only be available after 1995, "if everything works out." They also think that Japan, which is now concluding contracts, will demand the lion's share of the Arabian gas for itself. It is not particular about a penny more or less.

Finally, there is still natural gas from the Norwegian section of the North Sea. A sort of second Slochteren has been tapped in the "golden" block 31-2, but then in the open. The exploration of the ocean area above latitude 62° has begun, there will be more about that in a subsequent article.

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GOVERNMENT'S PRO-WEST FOREIGN POLICY EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 4 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Sedat Ergin]

[Text] It is obvious that in the past nine months of the Demirel minority government's term of office a Western-oriented attitude has dominated Turkey's foreign policy.

In order to resolve the problem of foreign credit and ensure debt postponement the minority government has come to follow a foreign policy which on one hand in the economic field accepts an economic model demanded by the West and, parallel with its credit expectations, adopts a model of behavior expected of Turkey by the West. Thus political pronouncements can be heard from Foreign Minister Erkömen which take no consideration of whether they conform to Turkey's interests or not.

The foreign policy of the Demirel minority government fundamentally is being shaped by cold war incidents such as the hostage question, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which have seriously disturbed the international situation, and incidents which have greatly increased the dangers of a hot war such as the Iran-Iraq conflict and the U.S. military operation. In such a crisis-ridden period it is debatable whether Turkey should open to the West and what attitude she should adopt with regard to certain incidents such as Afghanistan in the face of ever-growing Western pressure. It is especially difficult to balance Turkey's national interests against the expectations of the United States.

As the pro-Western nuances came to the forefront in Turkey's foreign policy the multilateral foreign policy begun during the period of the Ecevit government and pursued by former Foreign Minister Gunduz Okçun has been seriously impaired.

In the same context again the policy of opening to Africa which developed under Prof. Okçun has been allowed to lapse. Meanwhile no policy views whatever have been heard from Erkömen on the subject of a new international economic order, and the conference of Islamic nations or the new economic

order, which was to have taken place in Istanbul during July was not permitted to materialize. The upshot of all this is that a distinctly Turkish tone which was being introduced into our foreign policy has now given way to a predominantly Western tone. In dealing with the outstanding events of the past nine months period the Demirel minority government has woven this kind of a fabric into its foreign policy.

NATO

The NATO policy begun during the Ecevit period, for example matters such as military and economic assistance by the allies to Turkey and Turkey's contribution, were continued as before. By comparison with the Ecevit government the Demirel government seems to be more willing. The NATO Council of Ministers has been invited to Ankara and efforts have been made to generate a feeling of confidence among the NATO powers. The NATO demarche toward the region has been accorded an opportunity.

The Mutual Defense Agreement

The Demirel minority government faced its first test on the subject of Turkish-American relations with regard to the Mutual Defense Agreement and followed an affirmative policy of concluding the agreement as quickly as possible. It fell to the lot of Hayrettin Erkmen's ministry to preserve the principles introduced by the Ecevit government with regard to the agreement and to sign an agreement which fundamentally followed the form given it in the Ecevit period. In particular the economic aspects of the agreement and the Turkish viewpoint that the activities of the installations should be confined to NATO purposes were expressed in a manner which leaves no room for debate. However, statements of U.S. officials following the signing to the effect that "the purposes for which the bases will be used will be determined in discussions with the Turkish Government" arouse suspicions and the Government has let them pass without comment.

Cancellation of 714

At the beginning relations with neighboring Greece were teetering precariously. The atmosphere between Athens and Ankara had been clouded particularly by unnecessary sallies on the part of the Athens Government made for domestic purposes. This situation continued up to the point of the Mitsotakis-Erkmen meeting during the course of the NATO conference. Despite the relaxation of tensions and the goodwill which began with the agreement reached at this meeting there was no concrete progress toward a resolution of the Turkish-Greek misunderstanding.

Meanwhile Athens was making efforts through United States intermediation to get Turkey to back down on her opposition to her readmission to NATO's military wing. This was introduced as a precondition for progress toward the signing of the mutual defense agreement with the United States. Athens began a campaign against economic and military aid to Turkey and put forward the concept of a 10 to 17 balance of assistance.

The most unfortunate decision made by the Demirel minority government has been the cancellation of Notam 714, neglecting the political seriousness of this move and considering only its technical aspects. The continuation of this decree, which amounted to a unilateral concession to the West and to Greece, was prevented by the stern reaction of the opposition. Another noteworthy point here is that the Foreign Ministry was by-passed when this decision was being made and the entire initiative rested with the General Staff. In a speech to the National Assembly last week Foreign Minister Erkmen admitted to this state of affairs.

Semiofficial news reports recently to the effect that Turkey will not veto Greece's reentry into the military wing of NATO and has agreed to subsequent meetings to determine who is to assume the responsibility show that the minority government has made preparations for yet another concession which might give rise to serious drawbacks in terms of Turkey's national interests.

However, there has been no retreat from the traditional Turkish position in regard to the Cyprus question.

The Middle East

The Middle Eastern policy begun during the Ecevit period has been shaken to a serious extent. In particular the atmosphere of reliance which had been generated among our Arab neighbors has been dissipated by the current Western satellite policy. The mistakes made by certain Arab countries have been compounded by the corresponding errors which Erkmen has committed in dealing with them so that relations with quite a few Arab countries, including Iraq, have cooled. Relations with the PLO have been carried on at a distance. This too has created the impression that policy has moved closer to Israel.

Turkish-Iranian relations have entered a bad period following the sudden recall to Ankara of the families of our diplomats in Tehran and the release of statements in the UN and other forums criticizing Iran, just as efforts were being made to engineer a rapprochement with the revolutionary government. However, Erkmen later reversed himself and made efforts to improve relations with Iran, but then when the United States began its economic blockade against Iran because of the hostage issue Turkey became one of the countries calling for a boycott. However, Ankara did not participate and during the embargo gave the impression of making concrete efforts to open to Iran in the economic sphere. Meanwhile, although it was stated that reexporting would not be done, permission was given to reexport goods on hand.

Another subject on which the Demirel minority government has been criticized is its silence with regard to the military operation carried out by the United States against Iran, and its refusal to express any viewpoint. Furthermore, when a newsmen asked Erkmen what his position would be if a request were made to use Incirlik Air Base for such an operation he replied, "We will think about that when the time comes," a remark which has caused uneasiness among the countries of the region and aroused their suspicions against Turkey.

In the common view of a number of observers the Demirel Government has extended itself beyond the character of a regional power in its relations with other Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, in the visits of both American senators and the British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, Turkey has taken a place in a triangle with the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia.

Free Circulation Postponed

In relations with the Common Market the Demirel Government, after gaining certain concessions from the community, abandon the Ecevit policy of requiring decisions on the Turkish case in favor of leaving everything to the dynamics of negotiation. At the same time it concurred in the German desire to put off free circulation until 1986. The sallies made by Foreign Minister Erkmén with regard to full membership in the European Community look more like being at peace with the policy of scattering flowers before the West.

Foreign Economic Relations

Laxity has been witnessed in economic and commercial relations with Middle Eastern and Eastern Bloc countries. Carelessness and lack of follow-up have occurred in the foreign sales of certain services, socialist countries have been dropped from favored status and quite a few mixed economic commissions have been unable to meet.

Personnel Policy Criticized

With Hayrettin Erkmén's assumption of office the ministry was surrendered to certain cliques. A number of diplomats who entered the service in the previous period were assigned to less important jobs as a consequence. The policy of "rejuvenation" begun under Okçun was abandoned. At the beginning Erkmén opposed the leader of the aforementioned grouping, Coskun Kirca, but in the end he could not stand in his way and the decrees which ensued were all the work of Kirca and certain ambassadors who were with him. Although Erkmén wanted to head off a number of moves which brought about uneasiness within the ministry, in a complete sense he was not successful.

When Erkmén came to office he was at first suspicious of a number of diplomats who had come into the service in the Okçun period because of certain suggestions he had received, but later on he gained confidence in them and treated them with candor and respect. Apart from this Erkmén has not left the impression of being a resolute foreign minister capable of dealing with problems that arise. The chief criticism directed at the minister is that of his aloofness from the dynamics of the world of 1980 and his tendency to deal with events according to preconceptions stemming from the cold war period of the 1950's.

NSP ACCUSES 'WESTERN CLIQUE', GOVERNMENT OF SLANDER

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 2 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] The "Westerners" who have held sway all by themselves for years, maintaining themselves in office by lying and deceiving the nation, are becoming uneasy. Because the National Salvation Party [NSP] has revealed and continues to point out the mistakes in this course, has shown that it is not possible to save the country under the guidance of the "Westerners" mentality, that their mentality is responsible for the present wretched state of the country.

These people are truly enemies of Islam. By their policies they have declared war against God's commandments. However, they could not say so right out or else they could not have won a single vote--and again it is the NSP which has pointed this out.

The only recourse for the "Westerners" is to save themselves from the NSP. Therefore, they have resorted for years to various lies and slanders. However, these lies and slanders have not held up, and the NSP has begun to take root.

Thus, for example, they have one unbeliever in a beer add say, "Look, there is Erbakan stretched out on this beach," and they print a million copies to distribute even into the villages.

And again they spread the lie that Erbakan goes to prayers without performing ritual cleansing.

As if this were not enough, they say that Erbakan prays in four places at one time.

They have obstructed the work of Parliament, but they say that it is Erbakan who is doing the obstructing.

Erbakan has worked night and day to bring about the selection of a new President as soon as possible, but this westernizing clique is saying that the NSP is hindering the selection of a President.

For years the NSP has striven night and day to present bills in the National Assembly to provide a little relief to the millions of low and fixed income persons and to have them become law as soon as possible. But the "Westerners" have attempted to pour blame on the NSP in this regard.

Why is it that they struggle so hard against the NSP?

Because in the struggle between truth and falsehood the "Westerners" attack truth, so, therefore, it is quite natural for them to feel uneasy.

All these lies and slanders cited above have not been able to prevent the NSP from growing a little more every day; on the contrary our country has come to pin its hopes on the NSP.

This very fact has caused some to become furious. Consequently, they began to fashion new tricks behind closed doors. The latest of these tricks is the heroin smuggling incident.

First of all this incident is not a new one. A year and a half ago it was written up in the very same newspaper. The government then in office sent a man from the Ministry of Interior to Germany to look into the matter. He took a new statement from Halit Kahraman and sent the tapes to Ankara where they were studied by authorized persons and it was determined that the facts bore no serious relationship to the story that appeared in HURRIYET newspaper. Consequently, no investigation was seen to be necessary, and the file was closed.

A year and a half has now passed. A file presumably in the possession of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was passed to a reporter by officials of these ministries. We say passed, because it would have been impossible for a reporter to have stolen such documents from the ministry files. In the same way it would be impossible for the daily escapes from prisons we are seeing to take place without the assistance of persons inside or outside. Therefore, it would be impossible for this file to have been stolen without it having been passed by some official.

Why was this file given to the aforementioned reporter? There are two reasons:

The first is that early elections were under consideration. For a long time the JP had been talking about early elections but making no move to place it on the legislative agenda. The NSP put an end to this little game. When the JP realized this they also submitted a motion to have early elections and the motion was submitted to debate. In these circumstances the probability arose that the motion would be passed by the National Assembly. Therefore, since like it or not the JP would have to accept early elections--because they had been singing that song for so long and could not vote against it--their only recourse would be to do in the NSP. So even though the above mentioned charges were lies it was figured that they would accomplish that purpose during an election period.

However, let us state right away that such a slander has been the cause of strengthening and uniting the NSP rather than undermining it.

The second reason for putting out an unfounded allegation at such a time is the interpellation tabled by the NSP with regard to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This interpellation has especially angered Masonic circles. Because the NSP in its interpellation is asking that the JP minority government break off diplomatic relations with Israel. However, it is impossible for them to act in such a way. They prefer to cling to friendship with the Jews instead of developing friendship with the Arabs.

Their calculation is that if such an allegation is made public while the interpellation is being discussed in the National Assembly the NSP would be squeezed into a corner and would be unable to follow up on its interpellation.

The "Westerners" have made a mistake in thinking this.

Those who base their politics on the principle "Throw mud--if it doesn't stick at least it will leave a mark" will be hoist by their own petard. We have no doubt about it. However, while we are striving for yet another period to demonstrate that these lies are just that, we are not going to be able to tell our truths to the nation. These are truths which cause sleeplessness and which turn dreams into nightmares. Nevertheless these truths are out now and they are beginning to be talked about and considered.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTER PUBLISHED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 29 Sep 80 pp 1,12

[Text of National Security Council charter]

[Text] Ankara--AKAJANS--Regulations dealing with the legislative duties of the Republic of Turkey National Security Council were published in yesterday's issue of the RESMI GAZETE and became effective as of 25 September. The charter, which was published as Decision No 1 of the National Security Council, gives the National Security Council the authority of passing laws and supervision.

According to statutes of the charter, the National Security Council will meet on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays to carry out its legislative duties. Laws will be proposed by members of the National Security Council or by the Council of Ministers. The security council will, at all times, be able to supervise the Council of Ministers and can request from it written or verbal information. The Council of Ministers can be ousted by a simple majority vote of the members of the security council, and investigations of and legal proceedings against Council of Ministers' members can be initiated by a decision of the security council.

The National Security Council charter, which includes 12 sections and 24 articles dealing with its establishment and functions, reads as follows:

Section 1: The Establishment of the National Security Council

Article 1: The National Security Council, which was forced to seize control of the government in the 12 September 1980 takeover and which took an oath before the people of the nation, is composed of Chairman of the General Staff Gen Kenan Evren, Ground Forces Commander Gen Nurettin Ersin,

Air Forces Commander Gen Tahsin Sahinkaya, Naval Forces Commander Gen Nejat Tumer, and Gendarmes Commander Gen Sedat Celasun.

Article 2: The National Security Council will meet under the leadership of the chairman of the general staff. In the absence of the chairman, one of the members of the council will serve as chairman of the meetings and sessions with the stipulation that military rank be followed.

Section 2: The Establishment of the National Security Council Secretariat

Article 3: The National Security Council secretary general will serve as the council's advisor and secretary; will participate in the council meetings, but will not be able to vote; and, when unable to attend, will have a person who represents him participate in the council meetings in his place.

Article 4: The establishment and duties of the National Security Council secretariat general will be determined by legislation that will be enacted.

Section 3: Expert Commissions

Article 5: In cases deemed necessary by the National Security Council secretary general, temporary expert commissions composed of as many specialists employed in the public sector as are required can be formed in order to study and do research on law bills, proposals, and other subjects.

These commissions will be able to call upon other experts for their ideas and, once their studies are completed, will submit conclusions to the secretariat general in the form of reports.

The secretariat general will examine these reports and put them in their final form.

The expert commissions' reports will be printed along with law bills and proposals and will be submitted to security council members and to the Council of Ministers in sufficient time to be studied.

Section 4: Agenda, Sessions, and Meetings

Article 6: The agenda will be prepared by the secretary general in behalf of the chairman of the National Security Council. After it is printed it will be sent to members of the security council and the Council of Ministers in sufficient time to be studied.

If any of the members seeks a change in the security council agenda, this can be done with a simple majority vote of the security council members.

Article 7: A session will be defined as the meetings held by the National Security Council on a single day.

A meeting will be defined as each one of the segments of a session that are separated by a recess.

Article 8: If no other decision is made or if it is not summoned by the chairman, the National Security Council will meet on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays at a time to be determined.

Section 5: Enacting Laws

Article 9: The National Security Council and the Council of Ministers have the power to propose laws.

Law bills and their covering memoranda will be submitted to the security council.

In a covering memorandum, information about the entire bill and its articles will be presented. The statutes that are to be lifted or added and the reasons they should be annulled, changed, or added will be explained clearly.

The National Security Council chairman's office can either have the proposals that come before it examined by the expert commissions it deems necessary or it can place them directly on the security council agenda.

The chairman's office will provide National Security Council members with information regarding the bills and proposals it receives.

Article 10: Security council members and the Council of Ministers may withdraw law bills and proposals they have submitted as long as this is done before they are placed on the security council agenda.

Once a bill or proposal has been put on the agenda, withdrawal requires a security council decision.

Article 11: During discussion of a law bill or proposal in the National Security Council, the prime minister or a responsible minister and, when necessary, a public employee from the most responsible office, spokesmen from the related expert commission, and spokesmen appointed by the secretariat general will be present.

Article 12: During discussion of the law bill or proposal, the entire bill or proposal will first be debated. Once this is completed and it is agreed upon to begin discussion of the articles of the bill or proposal, each article will be considered and voted upon separately. Upon completion, the entire law bill or proposal will be subject to a vote and, upon approval, will become law.

If an article contains several subjects or paragraphs, it may be proposed that it be subdivided and each part voted upon separately.

Article 13: A written proposal made by security council members, the prime minister, the National Security Council secretary general, or the related minister to reject, amend, or add an article to the text of a law bill or proposal will be voted upon at the conclusion of discussion. Short proposals may be made verbally.

Article 14: At the written request of a security council member, the prime minister, or a minister, a decision can be made to hold a closed meeting.

Minutes of a closed meeting will be taken by the secretariat general. However, if the security council deems it appropriate, stenographers who have taken an oath may perform this function.

These minutes cannot be made public or published without the decision of the security council.

Section 6: Voting

Article 15: There will be three forms of voting.

1. Show of hands.
2. Open ballot.
3. Secret ballot.

Voting by show of hands consists of members raising their hands.

Open balloting consists of placing a voting ballot on which the member's first and last name are written in the ballot box or of stating, when his name is read, whether he agrees, abstains, or opposes the proposal.

Secret balloting consists of placing a colored marble on which there are no marks into the ballot box.

In cases where no decision has been made to carry out either open or secret balloting, voting will be conducted by a show of hands.

Article 16: The National Security Council will meet with a simple majority of the total number of members. In case of a tie vote, the vote of the chairman will count as two votes.

Section 7: Minutes

Article 17: Two types of minutes will be taken of National Security Council meetings -- complete minutes and summarized minutes.

Complete minutes will be kept by stenographers with the help of a tape recorder.

Minutes will be published in a minutes' journal.

Section 8: Vote of Confidence

Article 18: Discussion of the Council of Ministers' program will begin in the session which follows the reading of the program before the National Security Council. At the conclusion of the discussion, a vote of confidence will be taken.

In order for the Council of Ministers to receive a vote of confidence, its program must be approved by a simple majority of the total number of National Security Council members.

Section 9: Supervision

Article 19: The National Security Council can, at all times, supervise the prime minister and his ministers and can request written or verbal information.

Decisions to supervise, by means of general discussion, questioning, and investigation, will be made by a simple majority vote.

While under supervision, the Council of Ministers may request a vote of confidence.

The Council of Ministers or a minister may be ousted with a simple majority vote of the total number of National Security Council members.

Section 10: Ministers' Immunity, Initiating Investigations, and Taking Legal Action

Article 20: Initiating an investigation and taking legal action regarding personal offenses or related to the office prior to a member of the Council of Ministers' taking office or while in office requires a decision of the National Security Council.

Requests of this nature will be directed to the National Security Council by way of the Ministry of Justice and the prime minister's office. After the security council places the topic on the agenda, it will hear the defense of the related minister and will make its decision.

Section 11: Administrative Organization and Fiscal Regulations

Article 21: The administrative organizations of the legislative bodies that have been dissolved will be attached to the National Security Council secretariat general.

The security council's administrative organization secretaries general have the function and authority to carry out the National Security Council's commands and decisions related to the fiscal and administrative operations of the administrative organizations of the legislative bodies that have been dissolved. They also have the responsibility and power to implement the decisions that are to be taken by the executive body that will be established by the National Security Council as to the reorganization of the structure and characteristics of the legislative body. The National Security Council secretary general may restrict these duties and powers as necessary.

The National Security Council secretariat general has the authority to examine, before payment is made, orders for expenditures that come from the budgets of these organizations.

Section 12: Final Statutes

Article 22: Proposals to amend this charter may be made by members of the National Security Council. These proposals may be put into effect as a security council decision following discussion and approval.

Article 23: This charter becomes effective upon its approval.

Article 24: This charter shall be enforced by the National Security Council.

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CSO: 4907

SOCIAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS APPROVED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 8 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] The National Security Council has ratified the social security agreements signed between Turkey and the governments of Sweden and Norway.

In the section of the draft law concerning approval for administrative accords that deals with the social security agreements, annex protocols, and execution of these agreements, it states, "When exercising these agreements citizens of a contracting party will be subject to the same procedures as the citizenry of that country in which they are working. Duration periods for insurance, labor and residence current in both countries will be taken into consideration when determining entitlement to social security assistance."

In the illness, maternity and childbirth section of the agreement signed with Sweden and ratified by the National Security Council it states, "When an individual is entitled to periods of insurance coverage according to the laws of both contracting parties, these periods are to be combined for the purpose of affording the right to assistance but with the stipulation that they not run concurrently."

Concerning old age and infirmity the agreement states, "Turkish citizens residing in Sweden are entitled to a month's base pay and additional assistance to the same extent and with the same conditions as Swedish citizens."

Similar provisions appear in the social security agreement signed with Norway.

The Norwegian agreement states that citizens of a contracting party are entitled to unemployment compensation per conditions applied to the citizenry of the other country.

With regard to accident or death on the job the agreement states, "Benefits--including wage increases and additional assistance--paid in one country for accidents on the job and occupational illness are to be paid citizens

of the other country without regard to limitative provisions and residence stipulations for foreigners."

"Citizens of one country residing in the other are entitled to death benefits in accordance with rules identical to those for that country's citizenry. These benefits will be provided should the individual die in a country other than that in which he is insured."

CSO: 4907

FORMER NSP DEPUTIES PROPOSE TURKEY MEDIATE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 24 Sep 80 pp 1, 7

[Statements by four former NSP members of parliament call conflict a peril to Turkey, call for Turkish role in finding a peaceful solution]

[Text] Ankara, 24 September--THA--Former NSP members of parliament called for a Turkish initiative to find a solution by peaceful means for the war between Iraq and Iran.

In answering the questions of the THA's reporter, former NSP Deputy Fehmi Cumalioglu stated that they felt great sadness that the border clashes between Iraq and Iran had turned to war, saying, "It is our desire that an immediate agreement be brought about between the two Muslim countries. In this, God willing, Turkey will also have a role."

Former NSP member of Parliament Hasan Aksay stated that the war between Irak and Iran "created a great danger both for those two countries with whom we are connected by historic and cultural bonds and who are our friends must be brought to an end. Soviet Russia is awaiting grounds for intervention in Iran. He stated that agreement between the two sides would be to our advantage as well as their own.

The Views of Esat Isik

Former Minister of National Defense Hasan Esat Isik stated that "in the war between the two neighboring countries the winner gains no advantage, only other countries would be given satisfaction."

Erkmen's Views

In a statement on the subject, Erkmen outlined the following views: "The discord between Iran and Iraq has dragged on for a long time until now in the form of border incidents. It is regrettable that this has now turned into large-scale armed conflict. It is also regrettable not only from the point of view of the region, but also from the standpoint that the use of peaceful means should govern international relations."

RIGHT-LEFT POLARIZATION IN FATSA EXAMINED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 4 Sep 80 p 19

[Article by Bulent Frandac]

[Text] If you draw lines joining the three Ordu Province districts of Fatsa, Aybasti and Golkov, a triangle emerges which is becoming the subject of general discussion in Ordu--it is even becoming known as the Blacksea's devil's triangle. The government, in order to display its presence, has entered Fatsa with soldiers, police, armored cars and personnel carriers.

After Fatsa the Nokta Operation began in Aybasti District on 21 August. The government has not yet gotten to the mountain villages. The soldiers, police, gendarmes, armored cars and personnel carriers circulate in the district. The government seems to be in control of things in the district.

The third leg of the devil's triangle is the Golkoy district. The areas in the vicinity of this district have been surrounded. Since there are armed rightist and leftist militants in the district a different policy will be pursued here.

The Province of Ordu has an important place in Turkish political history. Since the latest incidents the Ordu districts have witnessed some interesting developments.

The Ordu governor, Resat Akkaya, said, "The backbone of the radical left has been broken in Fatsa. They made their first moves in Fatsa only to be frustrated. At the same time the politics which rely upon the radical left have been defeated. Of course the radical left is not going to take this lying down. They are going to create incidents all over Turkey." This goes to show the differing views regarding the Fatsa incident.

Arrest orders were issued for 128 persons in connection with the Fatsa incidents. A good number of those arrested were sent to the prison in Ordu. The investigation is continuing.

The dominance of the radical left in Fatsa has been broken. But the upshot has been the substitution of the radical right for the radical left. There

is no NAP [Nationalist Action Party] organization in Fatsa. A chapter of the Ideal Way Society has opened, and so-called idealist youths are strolling along the streets. They take strangers to one side and ask for their ID cards, ask them why they have come. Civilian police and soldiers are sitting or circulating along the main streets, in the shops and coffee houses. It is clear that youths with leftist views could not go out into the streets.

No one can go to the filbert groves only a kilometer outside of Fatsa. It is said that people used to come down out of the mountains at night and shoot up the gardens to terrorize the workers. The government could not take adequate measures to provide security for the filbert groves. The people in Aybasti say to Fatsa, "We cannot come, there are fascists there." The rightwing youths who have taken over in Fatsa say, "We cannot go outside Fatsa, the communists are in control of things there."

Aybasti

In terms of the effort the government has expended to make a showing there Aybasti is the leading sensitive area in the country.

The RPP [Republican People's Party] Mayor Ahmet Zaimoglu was very anxious before the big operation. He does not want to talk very much. He avoids mention of certain things.

The district got a new sub-perfect on 8 August 1980 and a new republic prosecutor on 30 July. There has been no doctor in the district for 3 months. A doctor was assigned there on 21 August, the day the big operation began. The JP [Justice Party] district chairman A. Ihsan Aydin was killed on 17 May 1980. The government has been unable to determine the identity of the killers. Three months after the event it is being claimed that certain members of the Revolutionary Way organization who are being sought did this killing.

The republic prosecutor in Aybasti gives this account of the incidents and subsequent developments:

"With the killing on 17 May of the JP district chairman, incidents in Aybasti began to mount. There are arrest orders for 50 persons by name.

"As of 17 May there were 30 killings which were recorded as unsolved, the identities of the perpetrators unknown. It was not possible to deal with incidents which transpired in the mountain villages and in the outskirts of the district.

"After the operation which began on 21 August information began to come in which is going to disclose the identities of the killers in these unsolved cases. It is self evident how we have approached the stage of issuing arrest orders for 50 persons by name."

District officials speak of the situation in Aybasti before the operations in the following manner:

"In the district where the JP district chairman was murdered, there was no NAP organization. The NSP [National Salvation Party] was present in name only. There was a little RPP activity, but their district chairman left the district and their situation was very weak. The mayor was RPP, and he tried to keep things under control but fruitlessly."

There are secret leftist splinter groups in the district called "The Revolutionary Way," "The Revolutionary Left," and "Liberation," and they appear to have the upper hand. They are not themselves in evidence, but it is felt that the leaders of these organizations have things under their control. Children caught selling black market cigarettes in district streets say, "The organization is taking the price difference for the cigarettes." The name of two leftist splinter groups crop up in connection with almost every strange incident. The names of the leaders of these organizations are not unfamiliar, they are the names of well-known families in the district. There are not many strange names. Frequently the names of teachers crop up. The leader of "Revolutionary Left" is a teacher from Resadiye, Vedat Ozdemir, for whom an arrest order has been issued. Other teachers named Selcuk Haznedar and Aydin Yalcinkaya are also being sought, and they are thought to be in the mountain villages. Sait Ozdemir seems to be the leader of the "Revolutionary Way" splinter group. He is the cousin of the other splinter group leader.

Golkoy district is the third leg of the Black Sea Devil's Triangle. Things are a little different here from the other two districts: The JP and NAP district chairmen say, "We cannot cross the bridge into the leftist area where the PTT, the court house and the hospital are." The RPP district chairman says, "The roads from Ordu and Mesudiye to Golkoy are under rightist control so it is not easy to use them." The district's young sub-prefect holds peace-making meetings to no effect. Gunfire can be heard every night until daylight coming from the hills controlled by leftists and rightists. The residents of Golkoy cower and waiting patiently for daybreak.

The district's only doctor left the town 2 months ago because of threats he received, so there is no doctor. Not a car enters or leaves the district after 1700 hours, so the ill are left to their fate at night.

The RPP district chairman, lawyer Mevlut Bayrak claims, "When the governor took office in Ordu, Golkoy was bathed in blood. The governor is a biased man. He tolerates the right-wing attacks and has leftists tortured. Rightists shot down five persons on the Sivas road and he did not do a thing about it." Mehmet Top, the NAP district chairman says, "The communist militants escaped from Fatsa and Aybasti and came here. They murdered our second chairman. The leftists are using the PTT, the court house and the hospital, which are in their area, but we cannot cross over the bridge to

go there. The government has to come here," JP District Chairman Osman Kilic says, "Rightist sympathizers are endangered; leftists were shooting the place up every night; with the help of the governor we have been able to breathe a bit more easily." There are arrest orders in Golkoy for eight armed terrorists. This district of 10,000 population is divided into two parts by a bridge. Shame upon those who are thus dividing brother from brother, relative from relative and turning them into enemies.

In Unye

Unye, a major center of habitation in Ordu Province situated on the road to Samsun after Fatsa, is entirely in rightist hands. The slogans and posters and the youth strolling along the streets and avenues attest to this. Ordu Governor Resat Akkaya, in response to a question as to whether there was right wing terrorism in Unye said, "No there is not, but this question will arise because there are so many nationalist youths here. There is an effort to compare Unye with Corum and Yozgat, but there isn't any of that kind of thing. No one stops anyone on the street to demand his ID card." But some residents of Unye whom we asked what the controlling elements did in the case of persons they suspected answered, "They stop suspicious persons and ask them why they have come to Unye, whom they have come to see and according to the answers they get they either send them away or let them go about their business." Anyway Ordu Province and its districts began to be of interest to the RPP. The mayor, Sait Savas, used to be an RPP member. He resigned on 25 August. His deputy, also RPP, resigned too. Now there is an acting administration. In Fatsa also, an acting RPP mayor who was also the district party chairman, Feridun Karamolla, resigned a month ago.

Nothing of significance has occurred in Persembe and Mesudiye districts. In Ulubey district the leftists, judging by the graffiti and the young people we talked with, are preeminent. The same situation applies in Korgan as well. The forces that have pulled out of Fatsa and Aybasti are in control of the situation; the leftist influence continues, and in these districts and towns there is no NAP organization, no idealist establishment.

Fikri Sonmez: I shall stand for election and win again.

In Ordu's newly built prison we spoke with Fikri Sonmez, Fatsa's mayor, who came to Turkey's attention by reason of his statements, administration and behavior, and who was imprisoned as a result of the big operation.

The mayor, whom no one saw after his arrest and interrogation by security forces--everyone wondered what he had done and where he had gone--had been arrested in Fatsa on the order of the Ordu Governor and brought to the new prison in Ordu.

Fikri Sonmez was exhausted when he came to his interview in prison--by resolution of the Council of Ministers a member of the sub-prefecture was appointed mayor.

His hair was disheveled, he was rather unshaven and tired, and he began talking with a great sigh. "They tortured me and kept me isolated. Two of my bones are broken now. For a long time they could not figure out how they were going to arrest me. Police from Yozgat and Istanbul were about to kill me, I swear it on my honor, they were about to kill me when Captain Ersin from the Yozgat Commando Unit rescued me. He dispersed the police and took me out of their hands (He told them 'This man is a mayor, what are you doing?'). This captain later died in a traffic accident, it made me very sad," he said, and went on to relate the following:

I Have Respect for the State

"I did not create my own order to supercede the state. I did not set up the baricades. I did not say that no one would enter here without first crushing me. They cannot accuse me of doing anything more than paying heed to the problems of the people and trying to ease their difficulties as the mayor they chose themselves. The things the newspapers reported me as saying are all lies. I am a person who respects the state. They said that I was an enemy of the state. These are the words of those who found they were unable to engage in black market activity, who could not commit robberies or run smuggling operations, I was accused of things I never did. I showed them how successful a mayor could be, and they were jealous."

Incidents Will Increase

"Incidents will increase in Fatsa. I was saddened by the ones that occurred in Fatsa. They should not have taken place," said Sonmez, and then saying, "When I get out I shall be mayor again," he continued as follows:

"I did not do anything new in Fatsa. I have respect for the republic. The state bodies were operating. Certain citizens might have erected baricades, because it was being said that armed attacks were being prepared from outside. My aim was to defend democratic rights. I am opposed to the destruction of the Turkish State. The Turkish State will live forever. I introduced concrete solutions to the people's difficulties.

To the question, "It is said that you established a communal system?"

Sonmez replied, "No, it was the Turkish State structure. There are many difficulties, something has to be done about them." Asked whether what he just said was not in contradiction with what he had said earlier, he said, "The things I said had been attributed to me were not things that I really said. What I am saying now are my own words."

Fikri Sonmez said that the robes found in the municipal building were being used against him, and asserted, "These were for a theatrical performance, costumes and decorations. I did not set up a court, why should I? There are the state courts. They handle all the necessary trial proceedings. Anyway, how could I have done such a thing? I cannot even think of it."

"Did it shock you," he was asked, "to be arrested and imprisoned?" "It was a shock," he said. "I wanted to serve as mayor. I was distressed." And silently he was led away to his prison ward.

ULUSU GIVES TERROR AS FIRST PRIORITY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 23 Sep 80 p 7

[Statement by Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu prior to the first meeting of the new cabinet in Ankara on 22 September]

[Text] Ankara, 23 September--Special to MILLIYET--The cabinet held its first meeting yesterday, chaired by Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu. Prime Minister Ulusu, in a statement delivered to the press prior to the meeting said, "Our first priority will be to prevent incidents to terrorism by eradicating the foci of terrorism." He stated further that the Republic of Turkey would continue its present relationships, continuing its adherence to the NATO alliance and to other international agreements to which it is a party.

The cabinet met yesterday at 1000. At the meeting, which lasted approximately 1 hour, the government's program and working procedures for the cabinet were discussed. Prime Minister Ulusu made a statement to the press before the meeting began and stated the following:

"The 43rd government of the Republic of Turkey having been formed on 21 September 1980, begins operation starting today, Monday 22 September. I greet the most distinguished members of the cabinet with affection and respect, and while expressing the great pleasure I feel from working with you, I wish you success in this very important task of yours, asking for the help of God in our endeavors.

"Our government will be an Atatürkist government of national unity, in accordance with the principles and goals stated by our distinguished head of state.

"Our country has many problems awaiting solution. No matter how great the difficulties, there is no obstacle that the Turkish nation cannot surmount in national unity and togetherness. The principal goal of our efforts will be the solution of all existing problems in the manner most consistent with the interests of our country and the wishes and aspirations of our nation, by means of an Atatürkist, modern, and rational administration. With this belief we embark upon our task."

Foci of Terrorism

"While respecting human rights, our principal goal is to bring about the effective and harmonious operation of a democratic government of social laws and all of its organs.

"I must state from the outset that our main task is to eradicate the foci of terrorism and thereby prevent acts of terror.

"We will definitely make sure that all those engaged in government service deliver service to our countrymen with a superior sense of duty and full impartiality.

"Public employees will not use the powers of their office and service for personal profit or in order to obtain opportunities or privileges for those close to them.

"We will take the necessary legal and administrative steps to eliminate all of the distortions in our political and social system about which our people have been complaining, and to insure that government services are delivered in a better way.

"To assure that the country's economy is put in order and developed, the application of economic stabilization measures will be carefully continued."

Foreign Policy

"Taking into consideration the high interests of our nation, the foundation of our foreign relations will be built on the great Ataturk's principle: 'Peace at home, peace abroad.'

"The Republic of Turkey will continue its adherence to the NATO alliance and to other international agreements to which we are party and will continue its existing relationships.

"Our social, cultural, and economic relations with our neighbors first of all, and with other countries, will be developed under conditions of equality, on a basis of mutual independence and respect, and with the stipulation of noninterference in each other's affairs."

At Ataturk's Mausoleum

Following the meeting of the cabinet, Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu and the cabinet members went as a body to Ataturk's mausoleum, where they placed a wreath and observed a moment of respectful silence.

When the members of the cabinet, who had assembled in the Aslanli Yol [colonnade flanked by statues of lions at the entrance of the memorial], arrived in front of the mausoleum, Prime Minister Ulusu placed a wreath

bearing the inscription "The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic and the Cabinet" on the tomb. Following a bugle call and a moment of respectful silence, Prime Minister Uluks wrote the following in the visitor's book of Ataturk's mausoleum:

"Our great leader, we declare that we will carry on the struggle with great faith and unflinching determination, as an Ataturkist government of national unity, with the aim of assuring the rescue of our country from the condition it has been dragged into, of strengthening our state, and of making our democracy operative once again. This we do, as indicated by our most esteemed head of state, following the direction of the principles you have laid down for us, and with the confidence and aid of the whole of our great nation. With feelings of gratitude and thankfulness we bow with respect before your spiritual presence."

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CSO: 4907

GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS SERIES OF NEW LAWS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 30 Sep 80 p 8

[Text] Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu, noting that the public has doubts that the new administration will be long-lived, stated, "These fears are unfounded. We will complete total legal reorganization within the shortest time possible."

Ulusu said that the reorganization of the laws that will be accomplished and work on social issues will be undertaken in two major sections as stated in the government program. Prime Minister Ulusu, who pointed out that changes related to the constitution, the election law, and the political parties law will be made first, reported that legislative amendments for the purpose of improving the working environment and tax laws will be handled immediately. At the same time, work will be underway to put the public economic enterprises back on their feet. Ulusu said, "We will complete reorganization of the constitution, the election law, and the political parties law in the shortest time possible. While work is being conducted to revise these, we will also deal closely with other issues as well and will achieve various accomplishments."

Prime Minister Ulusu went on:

"The public has doubts that the administration will be long-lived. These fears are unfounded. We will complete the necessary legal reorganization within the shortest time possible. The government is in a position to find a solution to the deterioration of and partisanship within the state staffs. There is no question that there will be no general purge within the state staffs or the KET [Public Economic Enterprises]. Work is underway to bring fanatic and hard-line personnel to reason through warnings. However, if a solution cannot be reached despite all this work, these persons will be removed from state service."

Issue of Terrorism

The prime minister pointed out that there has been a noticeable reduction in anarchic incidents. Whereas 20 persons had been killed in violent

incidents each day prior to the 12-September takeover, there is only one incident daily resulting in death now. He said, "Planned operations directed at specific targets continue to be launched. But once these operations are completed, terrorism will subside."

Social Laws

Ulusu spoke of the special expert courts and the state security courts that are included in the government program. He said:

"In addition to the state security courts, special expert courts will be established. The number will also be increased. What will take place is the formation of special expert courts to hear cases that require expertise such as, for example, trade courts and press courts."

The prime minister stated that tax laws will be enacted as quickly as possible in conjunction with social reorganization. Prime Minister Uluu noted that a tax law bill has been sitting in parliament for a long period of time and that this has been the reason why inflation has reached the dimensions it has. He reported that work has been accelerated and said, "We will benefit from the other tax bills and proposals that are on hand in the assemblies, and we will, within a short time, pass a new tax law that will ensure budget revenues."

Police Situation

The prime minister stated that every necessary form of effort will be expended in order to bring the police organization to the state in which it can work as a unit. He said, "Divisiveness within the security organization will cease to exist. Professional training of those employed in the security organization will be carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces. For this reason, the security organization will be attached to the Gendarme Commandant General."

Ulusu reported that the drafting of the constitution and work related to the manner of formation of the founding assembly proposed by this constitution have not yet been completed. He added that, once completed, the necessary announcements will be made to the public.

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CSO: 4907

FATE OF TURK-IS AFTER COUP EXAMINED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 20 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Refik Sonmezsoy: "TURK-IS' Chance"]

[Excerpt] The new administration's promise of a healthy democracy is welcomed by the nation with gratitude and appreciation. The esteemed Chief of Staff and National Security Council Chairman General Kenan Evren has said, meanwhile, that "every right of the worker will be protected," and this guarantee is a comfort to the labor sector and union administrators, who are committed to Ataturk and their nation and are opposed to all extremist trends.

As known, the activities have been suspended of the confederations on the extreme left and right such as the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions and the Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions. In a way, a nightmare which had engulfed the working class has been removed.

Now, the major task falls to TURK-IS [Turkish Confederation of Labor]. The policy that TURK-IS has pursued for many years has been vindicated. It has, essentially, closed its ears to the ideologies which would drag the nation into internecine conflict under the orders of perverted and foreign powers. TURK-IS has always stuck to the Ataturkist line. It has adopted the principle of integrity of state and nation and a unionism in which the national interest comes first.

The new administration trusts and values TURK-IS because of this attitude, as exemplified in its allowing TURK-IS activities to continue. So, while TURK-IS tries, on the one hand, to show that it deserves this trust and respect, it will be meticulous, on the other, in the protection of worker rights, in the knowledge that it is the sole representative of the Turkish worker. Application of this policy, actually, is difficult, but not impossible. Unfortunately, abuse of the strike has made it controversial in many quarters. Doubtless, those who look at labor life from one aspect will try to bring a one-sided approach to this controversy and try to give strength to one set of suggestions. We believe that the new administration will listen to TURK-IS' views and will never allow an unfair attitude. Mobilization of the Turkish economy for production is imperative today. No one can doubt the destructiveness of strikes not based on worker rights and interests. It is necessary to eliminate these strikes in order to revitalize the Turkish economy. However, it is absolutely necessary that the principle of rights earned and won apply in the resolution of strikes. That is, the rights won

by collective agreements between other unions in these branches of labor, by TURK-IS unions, for example, must be granted to these workers also, thus preventing harm to the workers as the result of these strikes. TURK-IS absolutely must take over in this regard to ensure a result that will neither destroy the Turkish economy nor ruin the workers. Moreover, the new administration, in saying, "Every right of the hardworking and patriotic Turkish worker will be protected within the framework of existing economic conditions," reveals a good grasp of this matter.

We believe that the strike is the workers' most natural right, but a strike for the purpose of serving party A or party B does neither the nation nor the Turkish worker any good. Eighteen years of nationalist experience has taught us this. Indeed, strikes in the service of ideological purposes have done nothing but turn the nation off on strikes, and the Turkish economy and the Turkish state have been badly damaged by this. The Turkish economy has been mired down in continuous strikes. Because of strikes in the glass industry, for instance, Pasabahce, which used to be the largest international seller of glass, has today relinquished this leadership to a communist nation, Czechoslovakia. Those who promote ideological strikes have done nothing but serve anarchy and have done a great deal to help the exports of communist nations. There is no need to explain, moreover, the damage done to the country by their demands in collective agreement bargaining which lead to union competition or the prosperity of union leaders, rather than having to do with economic conditions. We all know this. There is no worker who would say that unionism is doomed to be opposed to the interests of the state and the nation. On the contrary, the patriotic Turkish worker hopes to free himself from the union lords or from leaders who want to drag the worker into a regime which reduces him to slavery. The new administration is giving adequate guarantees and confidence in this regard. Yet there are known to be some in management circles and among a group of bureaucrats who make suggestions along the lines of the old saying, "Once burned, twice careful." However, the esteemed General Kenan Evren said, in his message to the Turkish nation, "Every measure will be taken to increase production and assist in the development of export-oriented efforts, without departure from the principles by which employers will provide the conditions for labor peace," and those words show that the new administration intends to leave those with an appetite for exploiting the worker with their greed unfulfilled.

This message, which calls "quitting time for union lordism" and says "'no' to management exploitation of the worker," points to a new period in our country and a future which is the right of our nation. Ibrahim Denizci /TURK-IS president/ and his colleagues have kept the ability to carry on their duties in the new period by reason of their principles and understanding of patriotic unionism to date. If they do not swerve from this direction, they will have the honor of playing an important role in the happy tomorrows of the Turkish worker.

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CSO: 4907

'TERCUMAN' COMMENTS ON LEGAL IMPACT OF COUP

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 21 Sep 80 pp 1,12

[Article by Nazli Ilıcak: "Ironie Smile"]

[Text] We are watching events with an ironic smile on our lips...

Why was it so impossible to elect a president, something that should have been done in a day?

Why was there such a debate over the constitutionality of early elections, so that elections were indefinitely postponed?

Why were those who wanted to amend the constitution and expose the defects in the elections law so heavily criticized, so that now the order has been imposed from the top?

Every decision by the administration to suspend association activities was stopped immediately by the Council of State. So now all associations have been banned.

The Constitutional Court had the authority to examine constitutional amendments, not just for "form," but for "substance" as well. So the constitution is being changed in "substance."

Where is the Council of State? Where is the Constitutional Court?

Why ask, "Where?"

In line to offer congratulations, of course.

The only honorable thing, especially for the Constitutional Court, to do when the constitution which gave it its reason for being was abolished was to dissolve itself as "having no basis in law."

We watched those who considered the 1961 Constitution "a monument to the law" standing in line to shake hands with the members of the Council at the oath-taking ceremonies.

The event may be worthy of congratulations, but it is galling to see those who were the reason -- whether by negligence or intent -- for the takeover, those who were the object of General Evren's criticism in both his address on the first day and his press conference, going through the receiving line, competing for service.

An ironic smile took us back 20 years. We read from the book on the white revolution the legitimacy opinion given on the 27 May Revolution by the modifying committee:

"The political administration has lost every moral tie with the army, which is the basic power of the state, with the judiciary and the bar, with the civil servants who wish to be dedicated to their jobs, with the universities and with the press, and has become the enemy of the Ataturkist revolutions... By the use of arms, it has caused the death, serious injury and crippling of innocent university students. University teachers, deans and rectors who tried to protect the students have been beaten, abused and injured... The legitimacy of a government derives not just from the fact of its being, that is, its coming to power, but from its respect for the constitution, cooperation with institutions such as the army and civil and educational institutions and living within the rule of the law."

The 1961 Constitution introduced new partners in the national will, in keeping with the opinion of the "modifying committee." It is clear how these "partners" exceeded their authority and brought the country to an ingovernable state.

In his address on the first day, General Evren denounced them as follows:

"Some of the constitutional institutions, instead of taking an impartial, just and common path against anarchy, terrorism and separatism have chosen, under various influences, to remain silent even in the face of violation of the constitution itself. Despite all these conditions, our constitutional institutions charged with defending the basic principles of the legal state, either because they could not grasp the dimensions of the danger which anarchism creates at the highest level of the state or because they feared the threat from the pockets of terrorism, tried to ignore the fact that the state was face to face with the danger of being blown to bits at any minute by the dynamite laid at its foundations. It was forgotten that all the legal institutions which take refuge under the wing of the constitution would disappear under the debris when the state collapses... The defenders of pure law which failed to take circumstances into account seemed not to comprehend that those left in the debris of the destroyed state would be annihilated."

Now "the defenders of pure law" are in a race to be defenders of an event which goes beyond the law. They have their proclamations at the ready.

Attention!

The success of the Turkish Armed Forces means our success. Their honor is our honor. For this reason, we see it as our duty to warn the members of the Council. Some may come out with suggestions of a broad arrest campaign; there may be some who suggest that legitimacy will be ensured only through condemnation of the political cadre. However, any successful military operation brings its own legitimacy with it. Moreover, the climate in Turkey prior to 12 September made it clear that the operation was necessary. Let us not go too far with the procedure of demanding an accounting and create new disturbances. Let us not create an "ancien regime" on a broad scale. Let us not create a mass of victims today by messing around with the political cadre which has now been rendered harmless anyway. The principal target must be the bloody hand of the terrorist.

As the interrupted democracy again sends forth its roots into Turkish soil, they must not be watered with the tears of pain and hardship, but seeds of unity, togetherness, respect and tolerance must sprout.

STIFFER PENALTIES GIVEN FOR POST-COUP CRIMES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 22 Sep 80 p 7

/Text/ Ankara, Special -- The law revising the Martial Law Act, law no 1402, and granting broad powers to the martial law commanders has been published in the RESMI GAZETE and has gone into effect. Two important changes in the law double the penalties for crimes committed after the declaration of martial law and introduce new principles for the appointment of judges and prosecutors to the martial law courts.

The National Security Council passed the law in its first meeting in parliament, deleting all the changes which had been made in the draft during discussion in the Assembly's specialized committees and passing it verbatim in the form in which it had been sent to the Assembly.

In accordance with the law passed and put into effect by the Council, the appointment or discharge according to the public personnel statutes of those whose work is considered objectionable from the standpoint of general security and public peace and order in the jurisdictions of the martial law commands or whose service is inadequate, and demands concerning the suspension or discharge of those working in the local administrations, will be carried out immediately by the relevant institutions and organs.

Commanders' Powers

Another change made in the law adds the following to the powers of the martial law commanders:

--To control all publications, communications, letters, telegrams and such promulgated orally, in writing, by pictures, on film and by broadcast; to ban or censor the printing, publication and distribution of newspapers, magazines, books and other published matter and the possession or transportation of more than one copy; to confiscate all documents, publications and means of communication such as books, magazines, newspapers, brochures, posters, bulletins, placards, records and tapes whose printing, publication and distribution is banned and to close the presses which print them and the centers which make records and tapes.

Union Activities

--To halt permanently or require a permit for union activities such as use of the strike and lockout authorities, statements of intent and referendums; to ban, prevent or take preventive measures against such actions as destruction, looting, occupation, faits accomplis, boycotts, work slow-downs, restriction of freedom to work and closing down workplaces.

--For all meetings, demonstrations or demonstration-marches held indoors or outdoors, to ban, require a permit and designate the indoor or outdoor locations where they may be held; to control or monitor all meetings permitted; to halt or require a permit for the activities of all associations and organizations; to require a permit for the organization of new associations.

--To control if necessary commercial and industrial institutions which manufacture, produce, store, transport or sell basic goods; to take action against those who hoard, sell at extortionary prices, halt or slow down the manufacture of or fail to transport these goods and to take or cause to be taken measures to fulfill requirements and to close down sites which do not take measures.

--To control, close or designate and restrict the opening and closing hours of restaurants, clubs, cafes, coffee houses, beer houses, taverns, theaters, movie houses, discotheques, bars, inns, dancing and similar places of entertainment and night clubs.

--To cause all public and private organizations in the martial law region to take necessary measures; to make use of the buildings, equipment and personnel belonging to the Treasury, public economic enterprises, organizations and institutions if necessary.

--To suspend temporarily education and training in the institutions of basic, middle and higher education or to reverse or modify decisions to suspend classes temporarily or permanently by the person or body of authority of these institutions.

--To suspend temporarily or permanently students whose presence in the martial law region is deemed objectionable and who have been removed from the region and to cause those concerned to apply the bylaws of the institutions in question for this purpose.

Authority to Use Arms

The law reiterates the authority of the members of the Armed Forces subordinate to the martial law command, police forces involved in security and public order and those assigned other security duties to use arms in the event of the occurrence of any one of the states and conditions which require the use of arms in the special laws and directives to which they are subject during the performance of their duties, and introduces the following new provisions:

"On-duty security forces members may fire at the target directly and without hesitation in the event of his failure to comply with the surrender order of security forces having the authority to use arms, or response to such order by use of arms, or in self-defense.

Appointment of Judges and Prosecutors

Legal counsels, military judges and military prosecutors and their assistants to be appointed to the martial law courts, according to the new law, will be appointed by the chief of the general staff from among candidates to be selected by a board composed of the personnel chief and legal counsel of the Office of the Chief of

the General Staff, the personnel chief and legal counsel of the force command of which the candidate is a member and the chief of the Office of Military Justice of the Ministry of National Defense.

Until the military courts under the martial law command begin operating, military prosecutors and military courts, or if there are none, republic prosecutors and courts of justice in the area where a crime is committed will perform the duties of the martial law command military prosecutors and courts.

The cases of those who committed crimes related to events which were the cause of the declaration of martial law in regions under martial law, crimes covered by the Law Concerning Firearms and Knives and Other Implements and crimes found to be related within a general and common purpose to crimes committed not more than 3 months prior to the proclamation of martial law or to any crime already under martial law military court jurisdiction will be handled by the martial law military courts. However, the martial law command will have the authority to turn over to the competent justice authorities those of these crimes it does not deem necessary to be handled in the military courts.

No Jurisdiction Decision Not Allowed

Republic prosecutors, military prosecutors and courts to which the martial law command sends criminal files may not plead no jurisdiction.

Another change made in the law extends to 30 days the period of legal detention and introduces a provision saying, "This period may not be used more than once for the same person without just cause, such as being charged with the same crime or the appearance of new evidence."

Punishable Offenses

In areas under martial law, imprisonment of from 3 months to 1 year will result for those who act in violation of measures taken by the command, who disobey orders, who fail to carry out demands, who give false identities or refuse to identify themselves. From 6 months to 2 years imprisonment and heavy fine of no less than 5,000 liras will result for those who disseminate or convey false or exaggerated reports and rumors in such a way as to cause deliberately alarm and panic among the people in the martial law region; and if this crime is committed in collusion with a foreigner, imprisonment will be no less than 1 year and the fine no less than 10,000 liras. If these crimes are committed by communications media, sentences will be doubled. Those who have been expelled from the martial law region and enter the region without permission will be imprisoned for 2 to 4 months, and in the event of repetition, from 4 months to 1 year.

Fines Increases

The law raises fines and penalties restricting liberty to be given by martial law courts for crimes committed after the declaration of martial law. This increase will raise the normal penalty for that crime by from no less than one-third to double. Penalties for crimes committed against those assigned to martial law duty will be doubled. Penalties given by the courts may not be converted to fines or one of the measures and may not be postponed.

Through another change in the law, identities of those who inform on criminals will not be revealed except by their own consent and unless they are implicated in the information given. Penalties restricting liberties for up to 3 years given by the martial law military courts may not be appealed.

After martial law is lifted, the duties and powers of these courts will continue until cases being handled by the military courts are concluded.

Martial Law Duty Pay

The law provides for a pay differential, called Martial Law Duty Pay, for those assigned duties under the martial law command. This payment will be made on a per diem basis computed by multiplying the points shown in the accompanying table by the salary coefficient specified in the Budget Law. The Council of Ministers will decide whether payment of duty differentials is required during periods of martial law. Payment will be made for the number of days of actual duty and will be tax-free except for the stamp duty.

The Martial Law Duty Pay table follows:

Duties	Points
General - admiral	10
Colonel, lieutenant colonel, major	9
Captain, first lieutenant, second lieutenant	8
Lieutenant, junior officer, expert gendarmerie sergeant	7
Security supervisor and above	9
Chief superintendent and superintendent of police	8
Deputy superintendent of police	7
Other security members, business and residential guards	5
Civilian employees and workers	5
Privates and NCO's (including gendarmerie)	3

Half this amount will be given to generals, admirals, officers and junior officers who serve on active duty; members of the police force who serve jointly with the military; legal counsels, military judges, prosecutors and officer members who perform court duties under martial law commands; junior officers and civilian employees assigned to court duty; prison wardens and those assigned duties outside of NCO's and privates.

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CSO: 4907

MONTH AND A HALF OIL STOCK REPORTED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Sep 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) -- Energy and Natural Resources Minister Serbulent Bingol has said that the war between Iran and Iraq has created a serious situation as to Turkey's meeting its oil needs. "We are watching developments closely and we hope the war will come to an end as soon as possible. Turkey's diplomatic relations with Iran and Iraq aside, the seriousness of the situation appears automatically when we consider our dependency on these two nations for oil," he said.

Our Two Tankers En Route

Bingol reported in a statement to CUMHURIYET that Turkey has 40 days' oil stocks at the moment and said the following, in summary:

"Meeting our oil needs is not a desperate problem at the moment. Turkey has 40 days' oil stocks. We also have two tankers bringing 500,000 tons of crude oil to our country and we have received news that they have transited the Straits of Hormuz safely. It is good news to hear that our two tankers have passed without accident through this region where the war is most violent.

"We are awaiting developments and watching the developing situation closely. It is our most sincere hope that the war will end. The neighborly ties of diplomatic relations between us and Iran and Iraq aside, the seriousness of the situation appears automatically when we consider our dependency on these two nations for oil."

Increased Importance

Noting that Iraq, with its oil production of 3.6 million barrels daily, was now the second largest oil producer in the world after Saudi Arabia, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Serbulent Bingol stressed that "the importance of this oil pipeline has doubled" and said that the Turkish-Iraqi crude oil pipeline was operating at full capacity at the moment. "This pipeline transported 25 million tons of crude oil from September 1970 to the first of September this year. This figure is quite close to its 30 million ton annual capacity," he said.

New Ties

Minister Bingol said that the Iraq-Iran war was changing the balances on the world oil market. He was asked whether "Turkey might seek new oil ties, considering the developments in our region" and said, "We are in a position to review the matter of oil commitments according to the changing situations. You know that oil purchases become a fast-moving business in such situations. I expect discussions to be held with Libya on this matter, but I hope it does not come to that point."

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CSO: 4907

OIL, SUGAR FERTILIZER PRICE HIKES NOTED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 22 Sep 80 pp 1, 7

[Article lists price increases announced by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Industry and Technology on 21 September]

[Text] Ankara, 22 September--CUMHURİYET Bureau--New price increases in petroleum products, sugar, and fertilizer have been announced. Regular gasoline has been raised from 43 to 48 liras, super from 48 to 53 liras; diesel fuel and kerosene prices have been raised five liras a liter to 31 liras. Bottled gas in 12-kilogram cylinders has been raised from 350 to 425 liras, picnic-type bottled gas increased from 60 liras to 75 liras a container. No 6 motor oil used in industry has increased from 18.50 liras to 21 liras per liter. Granulated sugar has been increased on the whole-sale level to 48 liras, while cube sugar has been raised to 57 liras. Price increases ranging from 9 percent to 45 percent have been made for various types of fertilizer. These, the first price increases announced following the 12 September maneuvers, will be effective for petroleum products and fertilizer as of today, for sugar as of tomorrow.

According to announcements issued by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, the prices for petroleum products, fertilizer, and sugar, have been increased at different rates. The rise in prices for petroleum products was at a rate between 11 percent and 22 percent that for sugar at a rate between 20 percent and 27 percent, and for fertilizer between 9 percent and 45 percent.

Including the price increases realized yesterday, there have been three price increases on petroleum products and sugar and two on fertilizers in the last 18 months.

Petroleum Products

Among petroleum products, regular and super gasoline, diesel fuel and kerosene, each received an increase of five liras per liter. Bottled gas (12-kilogram size) was raised 75 liras, No 6 motor oil 2.5 liras, picnic

bottled gas 15 liras. Thus, regular gasoline has risen to 48 liras and super gasoline to 53 liras. The old and new prices are as follows:

Name of Product:	Former Price:	New Price:
Super gasoline	48.00 TL/liter	53.00 TL/liter
Regular gasoline	43.00 TL/liter	48.00 TL/liter
Diesel Fuel	26.00 TL/liter	31.00 TL/liter
Kerosene	26.00 TL/liter	31.00 TL/liter
No 6 motor oil (industrial)	18.50 TL/liter	21.00 TL/liter
Bottled gas (12 kg size)	350.00 TL	425.00 TL
Bottled gas (Picnic type)	60.00 TL	75.00 TL

Price Increases for Fertilizer

Various types of fertilizer received price increases at different rates. The lowest increases were for ammonium sulfate and ammonium nitrate (9 percent), while the highest increases were at 45 percent for urea and diamonium sulfate. Prices for ammonium sulfate were increased from 5500 liras a metric ton to 6000 liras, while urea was increased from a price of 10000 liras for a metric ton to 14500 liras a metric ton; a diamonium sulfate increased from 12000 liras a metric ton to 20000 liras a metric ton. The old and new prices for fertilizer are as follows:

Name of Product	Former price (TL/ton)	New Price (TL/ton)
Ammonium sulfate (1.21)	5500	6000
Ammonium nitrate (1.20.5)	5500	6000
Ammonium nitrate (1.26)	6800	7500
Urea	10000	14500
Normal superphosphate	4500	5000
Triple superphosphate	10000	12500
Diammonium sulfate	12000	20000
Composition (1.20 20)	10000	14000
Composition (1.15.15)	10000	14000
Potassium sulfate	10000	12500
Potassium chloride	9000	11500

Price Increases for Sugar

Aside from petroleum products and fertilizer, the third price increase was in sugar. The rate of increase for sugar lies between 20 percent and 27 percent. The wholesale price for granulated sugar, formerly set at 40 liras, has now been raised to 48 liras. Cubed sugar has been increased from 45 liras to 57 liras on the wholesale level. Boxed sugar rose from 47 liras to 59 liras wholesale. Refined sugar was raised from a wholesale price of 44 liras to 56 liras.

It was announced that the price increases announced on the wholesale level would be reflected exactly in retail sales, and that the new prices would come into effect as of tomorrow.

The new prices for petroleum products will go into effect as soon as the state of inventories is clarified, with a great degree of probability tomorrow, while price increases for fertilizer are effective starting today.

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